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The privilege in favor of the contractor is one which exemplifies the
intelligent sense of justice which distinguishes the civil law. It is founded
on the equitable theory that he who has by his labor or expenditure
increased the value of a thing pledged for the payment of a debt, should
not be omitted in the distribution of the proceeds of that thing.1

INTRODUCTION
Arriving to lay the foundation stone of a great house, Goethe’s
fictional mason, with trowel and hammer in hand, and in verse flowing
merrily from his lips, proclaimed to the party assembled: “Three things are
to be looked to in a building—that it stand on the right spot; that it be
securely founded; that it be successfully executed.”2 In a sense,
Louisiana’s Digest of 1808, promulgated the year before the publication
of Goethe’s novel although almost certainly not his source of inspiration,
was in accord on all three points,3 yet insisted upon a fourth: that
1. City of Baltimore v. Parlange, 23 La. Ann. 365, 366 (1871).
2. JOHANN WOLFGANG VON GOETHE, ELECTIVE AFFINITIES 96.
3. See A DIGEST OF THE CIVIL LAWS NOW IN FORCE IN THE TERRITORY OF
ORLEANS, WITH ALTERATIONS AND AMENDMENTS ADAPTED TO ITS PRESENT
SYSTEM OF GOVERNMENT, Book II, Title II, Ch. III, Sec. I, art. 12 (1808),
available at https://digestof1808.law.lsu.edu/ [https://perma.cc/KB6X-Y837]
[hereinafter “DIGEST OF 1808”] (“When plantations, constructions, and works
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architects, contractors, bricklayers, and other workers who contributed to
its construction be paid.4 Indeed, for over two centuries, Louisiana law has
protected those who perform work for the improvement of immovable
property by granting them claims against the owner and privileges on the
immovable to secure the amounts owed to them. These protections—
originally borrowed from the law of France but retained and enhanced over
the course of the adoption of all three of Louisiana’s Civil Codes and
numerous supplementary statutes—can now be found in the Private Works
Act, Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 9:4801 et seq. As the Louisiana
Supreme Court expressed long ago in the quotation appearing above, these
protections are founded upon the equitable principle that those who
contribute to the improvement of an immovable are entitled to be paid and
accordingly must not be overlooked in distributing the proceeds of the
immovable. From their perspective, this is as important a consideration as
the three things pointed out by Goethe’s mason.
Since its enactment in the early part of the 20th century, the basic
policy goals and mechanisms of the Private Works Act have remained
largely intact, though legislators created its present structure and
organization when they comprehensively revised the Act in 1981. That
revision was prompted by the disorganization that had resulted from
decades of piecemeal amendments.5 The process of legislative change did
not, however, cease with the adoption of the 1981 Act, which over the
ensuing years was the subject of dozens of amendments, all of which were
narrow in scope and many of which inevitably introduced ambiguities or
inconsistencies into the Act. The cumulative effect of those ambiguities
and inconsistencies led to the most recent revision of the Act in 2019, the
have been made by a third person and out of said person’s own materials, the
owner of the soil has a right to keep them, or to compel this third person to take
away or demolish the same.”); DIGEST OF 1808, Book III, Title VIII, Ch. III, Sec.
I, art. 71 (“If a building which an architect or other workman has undertaken to
make by the job, should fall to ruin either in whole or in part, on account of the
badness of the workmanship, the said architect or undertaker shall bear the loss.”);
DIGEST OF 1808, Book III, Title VIII, Ch. III, Sec. I, art. 77 (“If an undertaker fails
to do the work he has contracted for, or if he does not execute it in the manner and
at the time he has agreed to do it, he shall be liable to pay all the losses that may
ensue.”). Analogous provisions can be found in Louisiana’s current Civil Code.
See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 493, 2762, and 2769 (2020).
4. DIGEST OF 1808, Book III, Title VIII, Ch. III, Sec. I, art. 78 and Book III,
Title XIX, Ch. IV, Sec. I, art. 75 (granting special privileges on the immovable in
favor of these workers and, in the case of masons, carpenters, and other workers,
a direct action against the owner).
5. Michael H. Rubin, Private Law: Security Devices, 42 LA. L. REV. 413,
428 (1982).
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goal of which, as before, was to restore the Act’s integrity and
cohesiveness by harmonizing its provisions, eliminating inconsistencies
and unintended consequences, and removing potential traps for the
unwary.6
This Article presents a comprehensive treatment of the Private Works
Act, including its historical development; the basic protections it confers
upon those who contribute to the improvement of an immovable; the filing
and notice requirements it imposes; the effectiveness and ranking of the
privileges it grants; and the manner of enforcement of the rights it creates.
Although particular emphasis will be placed on the changes made by the
2019 revision and the policy reasons behind those changes, this Article
will not presuppose a familiarity with the Act as it existed before the 2019
revision. It is the hope of the authors that this Article will be as helpful to
those reading and applying the Act for the first time as to those members
of the bench and bar already versed in the workings of the Act.
I. HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT
The Private Works Act, enacted in its present form in 1981, is the
culmination of a long history of legislative efforts to protect contractors,
laborers, suppliers, and others who contribute to the improvement of an
immovable. As will be seen below, the 1981 Act was a comprehensive
revision of a series of statutes enacted in response to an 1879 constitutional
directive to the legislature to improve upon the regime of construction
privileges found in the 1870 Civil Code. That regime was itself the product
of several decades of attempts to expand the rather modest protections that
had been codified in the Code Napoleon.
A. The Code Napoleon
The Code Napoleon granted a privilege7 to architects, contractors,
bricklayers, and other workers employed in constructing, rebuilding, or
6. See Report of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the Louisiana
Legislature in Response to S.R. No. 158 of 2012, Louisiana Lien Laws (Private
Works Act) (Feb. 15, 2013), available at www.lsli.org/files/reports/2013/
7.%202012%20SR%20158%20Louisiana%20Lien%20Laws%20Private%20Wo
rks%20Act%20Report.pdf [https://perma.cc /SHR5-UFWS].
7. According to the Code Napoleon, and also article 3186 of the current
Louisiana Civil Code, a “[p]rivilege is a right, which the nature of a debt gives to
a creditor, and which entitles him to be preferred before other creditors, even those
who have mortgages.” See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2095 (Fr.) (1804); LA. CIV.
CODE art. 3186. A privilege is thus a preference established by legislation and is
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repairing buildings, canals, or other works.8 The privilege had existed
under both Roman law and ancient French law9 and had been confirmed
by legislation adopted during the French Revolution, the law of 11
brumaire An VII.10 Justified by augmentation of the debtor’s patrimony,
the privilege was accordingly limited to the increase in value of the
immovable resulting from the work.11
Despite the rather expansive wording of the text of the Code
Napoleon, the privilege was understood to be established in favor of only
those who contracted directly with the owner; thus, subcontractors and
workers employed by either the contractor or a subcontractor had no
privilege of their own on the immovable.12 Moreover, suppliers of
materials, even when sold directly to the owner, had no privilege.13
Workers employed by a contractor were, however, given a right of action
against the owner for payment up to the amount for which the owner was
still indebted to the contractor at the time that their actions against the
owner were instituted.14 Although noted French scholar Marcel Planiol felt
an exception to the general rule that the proceeds of the sale of an obligor’s
property are distributed ratably among his creditors. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3134.
Privileges cannot be granted contractually; they can arise only by operation of law
based upon the nature of the debt. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3185; see, e.g.,
Southport Petroleum Co. of Del. v. Fithian, 13 So. 2d 382, 383 (La. 1943); In re
Liquidation of Hibernia Bank & Trust Co., 162 So. 644, 645 (La. 1935); State v.
Miller, 126 So. 422, 428 (La. 1930); Succession of Rousseau, 23 La. Ann. 1, 3
(1871). A privilege in Louisiana is similar in many respects to the form of security
known in other states as a lien.
8. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2103 (Fr.) (1804). After recent revisions to the
French Civil Code, the privilege is now provided in article 2374. CODE CIVIL [C.
CIV.] art. 2374 (Fr.) (1804).
9. See 2 Marcel Planiol & Georges Ripert, Treatise on the Civil Law pt. 2,
No. 2913.
10. Loi du 11 brumaire An VII (1er novembre 1798), art. 12.
11. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2103 (Fr.) (1804). See also PLANIOL & RIPERT,
supra note 9, Nos. 2914 and 2921.
12. See PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 9, Nos. 2916–17.
13. See Harriet Spiller Daggett, LOUISIANA PRIVILEGES AND CHATTEL
MORTGAGE § 63, at 218 (1942).
14. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1798 (Fr.) (1804). This right was limited to
masons, carpenters, and other workers providing manual labor. 3 M. TROPLONG,
L’ÉCHANGE ET DU LOUAGE, LE DROIT CIVIL EXPLIQUÉ § 1052 (1840); 22 G.
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & A. WAHL, TRAITÉ THÉORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT
CIVIL, Du contrat de louage, Tome Deuxième, No. 4045 (3d ed. 1907). The
workers’ right to bring suit against the owner could not be defeated by a
stipulation to that effect in the contract between the owner and contractor. Id. at
No. 4043.
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that this right of action was properly viewed only as a species of the
oblique action, he recognized that the jurisprudence had effectively
transformed the right of action into a privilege upon the sum remaining
due by the owner.15 The direct action against the owner was not available
to either suppliers or subcontractors.16
The Code Napoleon made the existence of the privileges of architects,
contractors, and workers dependent upon a double appraisal of the
immovable. Specifically, an appraisal was required to be made by a courtappointed expert before the commencement of the work, and a second
appraisal was required after its completion.17 The purpose of the double
appraisal was, of course, to fix the extent of the privilege. In practice, this
condition was almost never fulfilled, thus making the privilege, in the eyes
of Planiol, a “dead letter.”18
15. See PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 9, Nos. 1921–22. Troplong cast doubt
upon the view that article 1798 was simply a redundant application of the oblique
action, asserting instead that the article created a direct right of action in favor of
workers in their own right, founded on notions of negotiorum gestio. See
TROPLONG, supra note 14 at § 1048–49. Troplong also disagreed with the
proposition that the article created a privilege, explaining that there can be no
privilege except where there are creditors of a common debtor and that in this
instance the contractor is no longer a creditor and is not in competition with the
workers. Id. at § 1050. Though recognizing the prevailing view that article 1798
creates a direct action against the owner and a privilege upon the unpaid balance
owed by the owner to the contractor, Baudry-LaCantinerie insisted that the proper
view was that the article is nothing more than an illustration of the application of
the oblique action and that the theory of the existence of a direct action leads to
an insoluble dilemma if the owner is presented with claims not only from workers
asserting this direct action but also from other creditors who undeniably are
exercising the oblique action. Baudry-LaCantinerie also disputed the assertion
that article 1798 is based on negotiorum gestio because workers are not managing
the affairs of the owner, and, in any event, this theory would grant them a distinct
right against the owner independent of the right they have against the contractor.
BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE supra note 14 at No. 4028.
16. See PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 9, No. 1923; TROPLONG, supra note
14 at § 1052; BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, supra note 14 at Nos. 4045 and 4047.
Being in derogation of common right, article 1798 could also not be expanded to
give workers employed by a subcontractor a right of direct action against the
contractor. Id. at No. 4090.
17. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2103 (Fr.) (1804).
18. See PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 9, Nos. 2923–24. Some present-day
commentators agree that these requirements have made the privilege
anachronistic and have urged its abrogation. See Philippe Simler & Philippe
Delebecque, DROIT CIVIL: LES SURETÉS LA PUBLICITÉ FONCIERE, § 425 (6th ed.
2012). Modern French law has found other means of protecting contractors and
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B. The Digest of 1808 and the Civil Code of 1825
An almost identical framework appeared in Louisiana’s Digest of
1808, except that the drafters eliminated the double-appraisal
requirement.19 Thus, the Digest afforded architects, contractors, and
workers a privilege upon the immovable, provided that they were in privity
of contract with the owner. Other workers had an action against the owner
to the extent of any contract funds remaining in the owner’s hands at the
time of initiation of the action. Suppliers of materials were accorded
neither a privilege nor a right of action against the owner.20
This would change with the adoption of the Civil Code of 1825, which
supplemented the existing privileges of contractors and workers21 with a
new privilege for those who supplied materials to the owner.22 No
privilege upon the immovable, however, was afforded directly in favor of
either workers or suppliers who contracted with a contractor or
subcontractor rather than directly with the owner.23 Instead, those workers
and suppliers were given the right to seize any unpaid funds owed by the
owner to the contractor, and they were subrogated of right to the
contractor’s privilege upon the immovable.24 If the owner had made
payments to the contractor that were not yet due, these payments were
disregarded and considered as having not been made.25 The 1825 Civil
Code also preserved the direct action that the Code Napoleon and Digest

subcontractors, such as the addition to the French Civil Code of article 1799-1,
which requires the owner to furnish a guaranty of payment to the contractor or,
where the owner is obtaining financing for the work, to arrange for his lender to
make direct payment to the contractor, as well as special legislation affording
subcontractors a non-waivable right of direct action against the owner. See CODE
CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 1799-1 (Fr.) (1804); Loi No. 75-1334 de 31 décembre 1975.
19. DIGEST OF 1808, Book III, Title XIX, Ch. IV, Sec. I, art. 75 and Book III,
Title VIII, Ch. III, Sect. III, art. 78.
20. See DAGGETT, supra note 13, § 63; Schwartz v. Cronan, 30 La. Ann. 993,
996 (1878).
21. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2743, 3216(2) (1825).
22. Id. art. 3216(3). According to the Projet of the 1825 Code, the rationale
given for the creation of the supplier’s privilege, as well as another new privilege
in favor of those who make or repair levees, bridges, and roads through exercise
of the state’s police power, was that “the last two species of privilege are not
contained in the code: but the justice and expediency of adopting them will be
readily admitted.” Projet of the Civil Code of Louisiana of 1825, p. 375.
23. Schwartz, 30 La. Ann. at 996.
24. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2744.
25. Id. art. 2745.
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of 1808 had given to masons, carpenters, and other workers against the
owner for sums remaining owed to the contractor.26
The 1825 Civil Code imposed a recordation requirement when the
contract for the work exceeded $500.27 If the parties did not record such a
contract, the contractor enjoyed no privilege, and those who might
otherwise claim subrogation to his privilege obviously could not be
subrogated to a privilege that did not exist.28 The text of the law was not
clear as to whether the recordation requirement applied to the privileges
arising directly in favor of workers or suppliers, but the weight of judicial
authority was that the recordation requirement also applied to them.29
The 1825 Code also addressed the issue of when recordation was
required, providing that privileges flowing from contracts having an
amount in excess of $500 were effective against third persons from the
date of the contract, but only if the contract was recorded within six days
of its execution.30 If not recorded within that time, the privilege
degenerated into an ordinary mortgage, taking its rank from the time of
recordation.31
26. Id. art. 2741.
27. Id. art. 2746.
28. Id. Allen v. Willis, 4 La. Ann. 97 (1849). Where the contractor did record
his contract, others claiming subrogation to his privilege on the immovable were
not required to separately record their own claims. Nolte v. Their Creditors, 6
Mart. (n.s.) 168 (La. 1827). Even if the contractor failed to record the contract,
workers and suppliers still enjoyed their own privilege upon the unpaid balance
of the price due to the contractor, with priority over other creditors of the
contractor. See First Municipality v. Bell, 4 La. Ann. 121 (1849).
29. See Taylor et al. v. Crain’s Administrator, 16 La. 290 (1840) and Spence
v. Brooks, 6 La. Ann. 63 (1851). But see Succession of Erard, 6 Rob. 333 (La.
1844) (suggesting that the recordation requirement applies only to those who are
employed by virtue of a contract, or those who do work by the job or for a fixed
price, rather than to those who are employed by the owner to work by the day or
by the week and are to be paid as the work progresses).
30. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3239 (1825). If the act was not passed in the same
place in which registry was required, the period was lengthened by one day for
every two leagues of distance. Id. art. 3240 (1825). These articles are the
predecessors of present Civil Code article 3274, which provides for a period of
seven days if the property is located in the same parish where the act was passed;
otherwise, the period is 15 days. Id. art. 3274 (2020).
31. The “degeneration” concept, which applied to privileges generally and
not just those arising from construction, was borrowed from the French Civil
Code. See CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2379 (formerly art. 2113) (Fr.) (1804);
PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 9, Nos. 3149–50. The concept was expressly
incorporated into the Civil Code of 1825. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3240–3241 (1825).
The 1870 Code, however, suppressed the degeneration concept altogether,
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Another innovation of the Civil Code of 1825 was its introduction of
a series of articles that ranked privileges among themselves. These articles
did not find their genesis in the Code Napoleon32 but were instead created,
apparently out of whole cloth, by the redactors of the Projet of the Civil
Code of 1825. Most of these rather complicated, and even enigmatic,
articles ranked privileges on movables, but there were a few articles
ranking special privileges on immovables. According to these articles,
privileges on immovables, including the construction privileges, enjoyed
a preference over all mortgages if they were filed in a timely manner.33
Construction privileges and the only other special privilege on
immovables created by the Civil Code, the vendor’s privilege, were ranked
ahead of most general privileges.34 Construction privileges were not
directly ranked against vendor’s privileges, but instead the Civil Code
provided for a separate appraisement procedure with the vendor being paid
the amount of the “appraisement on the land” and those entitled to a
construction privilege receiving “the appraisement of the building.”35 The
existence of this separate appraisement procedure, protecting a contractor
who subsequently performs work upon an immovable against the preproviding instead that an untimely inscribed privilege affords no preference over
creditors who have previously acquired mortgages. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3274
(2020). In other words, the creditor in question still holds a privilege, but the
tardily inscribed privilege is robbed of its priority over mortgages that were
recorded before the date the privilege was recorded. For an explanation of the
differing treatment of this issue by the 1825 and 1870 Codes, see Wheelright v.
St. Louis, N.O. & Ocean Canal Transp. Co., 17 So. 133 (La. 1895). See also L.
David Cromwell, Vendor’s Privilege: Adheret Visceribus Rei, 75 LA. L. REV.
1165, 1235–37.
32. Planiol observed that the failure of the legislator to rank privileges had
the fortunate result of allowing time for the doctrinal writers to study the matter
and to arrive at “scientific solutions.” PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 9, No. 2622,
at 460. Not all French commentators shared his enthusiasm for this omission. See
3 AUBRY ET RAU, COURS DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS 797 et seq., § 289 (5th ed.
1900); 2 COLIN ET CAPITANT, COURS ÉLÉMENTAIRE DE DROIT CIVIL FRANÇAIS
919, no. 1126 (8th ed. 1935).
33. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3153, 3240 (1825).
34. Id. art. 3234. This article, and its analogue in the current Civil Code,
article 3267, erroneously use the word “movables” in the first clause of the article
where “immovables” certainly was intended, as more fully discussed infra in Part
VIII. See Joseph Dainow, Art. 3267 and the Ranking of Privileges, 9 LA. L. REV.
370 (1949). After nearly two centuries, this error was at last corrected in the 2019
revision of the Private Works Act, as discussed infra in Part VIII. See Act No.
325, §2, 2019 La. Acts.
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3235 (1825).
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existing privilege of the vendor, prompted the Louisiana Supreme Court
to make the observation appearing at the beginning of this Article, praising
“the intelligent sense of justice” exemplified by the civil law.36
C. Subsequent Amendments and the Civil Code of 1870
Legislation enacted in 1844 enhanced the remedies available to
workers and suppliers.37 This legislation added a mechanism by which
workers and suppliers not in privity of contract with the owner could
provide a statement of account to the owner, who was then obligated to
initiate a procedure with the contractor to adjust and fix the amount owing
to the claimant. If the contractor did not pay the claimant this amount
within 10 days after it was determined, the owner was required to pay the
amount owed out of any remaining funds due to the contractor. The
effectiveness of this additional remedy was somewhat diminished,
however, when the Supreme Court held that a claimant had no right to
force an owner to initiate the procedure to adjust the amount due and,
where the owner refused to do so, the claimant’s only recourse was to
exercise one of the other remedies available under the Civil Code.38
When Louisiana adopted the Civil Code of 1870, the 1844 statute was
copied nearly verbatim into the article that provided privileges to
contractors and workers employed by the owner.39 Most of the other
relevant articles of the 1825 Code were carried forward without change.40
New article 3249 continued to provide, as had article 3216 of the 1825
Code, for privileges in favor of those contractors, workers, and suppliers
who were in privity of contract with the owner, but the new article also
36. City of Baltimore v. Parlange, 23 La. Ann. 365, 366 (1871).
37. Act No. 66, 1844 La. Acts 34. The Act was originally introduced as an
amendment to article 2744, but, as passed, enacted a new section of the Revised
Statutes, leaving article 2744 untouched. See Schwartz v. Cronan, 30 La. Ann.
993, 996–97 (La. 1878) (expressing the view that the “whole matter would have
been greatly simplified if . . . this act had been accepted and treated as an
amendment to article 2744; and if articles 2741, now 2770, and 2745, now 2774,
had been stricken out”).
38. Schwartz, 30 La. Ann. 993. The Supreme Court ultimately retreated from
this holding in Vordenbaumen v. Bartlett, 30 So. 219 (La. 1901).
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2772 (2019), the first two paragraphs of which were
taken from article 2743 of the 1825 Code. As discussed infra in Part VIII, Civil
Code article 2772 was repealed in the 2019 revision.
40. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2770 (identical to article 2741 of the 1825 Code),
2773–75 (identical to articles 2744–46 of the 1825 Code), 3267 (closely parallels
article 3234 of the 1825 Code, except for the deletion of a reference to slaves),
and 3268 (identical to article 3235 of the 1825 Code) (2020).
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recognized the effect of a recent amendment to the 1825 Code, which had
granted a privilege to persons supplying materials to a contractor or
subcontractor.41
The Civil Code of 1870 substantially altered recordation requirements
for all privileges. Although the $500 threshold applicable to construction
privileges was preserved, and contracts less than that amount were still not
required to be recorded or even to be in writing, the 1870 Code provided
that privileges arising under such contracts were preserved only if a
statement of the claim was recorded.42 This change was consistent with the
broader goal of the 1870 Code, which was to protect third persons from
unrecorded interests. Where the 1825 Code had provided that privileges
were effective against third persons from the date of the act creating them
if the act was ultimately recorded within the delay prescribed by law, the
1870 Civil Code provided that privileges were effective against third
persons only from the time of recordation of the act or evidence of
indebtedness.43 Where the 1825 Code had allowed a period of at least six
days to record the act creating a privilege, the 1870 Code, as originally
enacted, required recordation on the very day that the contract was entered
into, thus eliminating the need for retroactive effectiveness that the 1825
Code had allowed.44
D. Genesis of the Private Works Act
As outlined above, the regime of construction privileges found in the
1870 Civil Code was the result of several decades of legislative evolution,
beginning with the Code Napoleon and Digest of 1808, both of which
41. Act No. 126, 1868 La. Acts 167. This Act also limited the extent of the
privileges arising under the article to a maximum of one acre and provided that
privileges arising from a work undertaken by a lessee extended only to the lease
and did not affect the owner.
42. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2776 (2020).
43. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 3273 (2020), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3240
(1825). This change had been introduced two years earlier in Act No. 126, 1868
La. Acts 167.
44. Compare LA. CIV. CODE art. 3274 (1870), with LA. CIV. CODE art. 3241
(1825). Thus, where a contractor had no written contract and therefore failed to
record one on the date that he was engaged, any construction privilege in his favor
did not enjoy the priority that a seasonably filed privilege ordinarily has over a
previously recorded mortgage. See Marmillon v. Archinard, 24 La. Ann. 610
(1872). By an amendment in 1877, the present delays of seven and fifteen days
were inserted. See Act No. 45, 1877 La. Acts 59. For a discussion of the effect of
the changes that the 1870 Civil Code made to the rules applicable to recordation
of privileges, see supra note 31.
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granted privileges only to architects, contractors, and laborers. The
evolution continued with innovations made in the Civil Code of 1825,
which extended privileges to suppliers for the first time, and with
numerous statutory enactments that preceded the adoption of the 1870
Code. However intelligent and just this system may have appeared to
Supreme Court,45 others apparently found it lacking. The Louisiana
Constitution of 1879, in article 175, mandated that the General Assembly
“pass laws to protect laborers on buildings, streets, roads, railroads, canals
and other similar works, against the failure of contractors and subcontractors to pay their current wages when due, and to make the
corporation, company or individual for whose benefit the work is done
responsible for their ultimate payment.”46
The first attempt at fulfillment of this constitutional directive appeared
in Act 134 of 1880, which, as the Constitution dictated, sought to protect
laborers. Among other protections, it gave laborers a first priority privilege
upon the immovable that was improved by their labor, subject to the
requirement of recordation of evidence of their claims. No protection was
provided for suppliers or subcontractors.
Act 180 of 1894 marked the first real step toward enactment of the
protections that exist in the current Private Works Act. It required each
owner under a contract for $1,000 or more in cities containing a population
of at least 50,000 inhabitants to require the contractor to post a bond in the
full amount of the contract for the protection of laborers and suppliers. The
owner was required to record the contract and bond within one week after
the contract was signed and before work commenced. If the owner failed
to do so, he was made personally liable for their claims. The 1894 Act also
afforded these claimants a privilege upon the immovable to secure their
claims, provided that they recorded their sworn bills, regardless of whether
the contract was recorded. The protections of the statute were not limited
to those who dealt with the contractor or his immediate subcontractor but
included even those who dealt with remote subcontractors.47
In 1896, the legislature expanded the protections of Act 180 of 1894
to apply to all cities having a population of at least 10,000 inhabitants.48
Ten years later, the state adopted Act 134 of 1906 for cities of 50,000 or
more inhabitants. Where the 1906 Act applied, the bond was required to
be for only one-half of the contract sum, and, if the surety was ultimately
found to be insolvent, the owner was personally liable for the claims of
45. City of Baltimore v. Parlange, 23 La. Ann. 365, 366 (1871).
46. LA. CONST. art. 175 (1879). Similar mandates were found in later
constitutions. See LA. CONST. art. 185 (1898); LA. CONST. art. 185 (1913).
47. Willey v. St. Charles Hotel, 28 So. 182 (La. 1899).
48. Act No. 123, 1896 La. Acts 179.
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persons who were supposed to be protected by the bond. This Act was also
the first to provide for the institution of concursus proceedings to resolve
claims in a single proceeding.49 To fill the gap left by the population
thresholds of the 1894 and 1906 acts, the legislature enacted Act 65 of
1908, which applied to cities having a population under 10,000 inhabitants
and to rural areas of the state. Unlike the acts that applied to larger
municipalities, the 1908 Act required the bond to exceed the amount of the
contract by one-half.
Over the ensuing years, the legislature enacted a number of other
statutes on this subject matter, often with overlapping and inconsistent
provisions.50 These statutes culminated in Act 139 of 1922, which was
comprehensive in its scope but lacked a repealing clause. Thus, it was held
that the 1922 Act did not repeal the statutes that had preceded it, except to
the extent of a conflict.51 The lack of a repealing clause was cured four
years later, with the enactment of Act 298 of 1926, which was not only
exhaustive of the subject matter but also provided that “[t]he manner and
method of creating and preserving liens and privileges created and
specified in this act shall be exclusive” and repealed all conflicting laws,
including inconsistent provisions of the Civil Code.52

49. See DAGGETT, supra note 13, § 63. A later Act would allow claimants to
institute a concursus. Act No. 262, §3, 1916 La. Acts 563.
50. A listing of all of these statutes, commencing with Act 180 of 1894, can
be found in Thibodaux Boiler Works v. People’s Sugar Co., 122 So. 290 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 1929). For a detailed discussion of these statutes and their
provisions, see DAGGETT, supra note 13, § 63.
51. Thibodaux Boiler Works, 122 So. 290. The cases also held that these new
statutes were supplementary to the provisions of the Civil Code, and, to the extent
that the articles of the Civil Code were not in conflict with the new statutes, they
remained in force. Vordenbaumen v. Bartlett, 30 So. 219 (La. 1901) (construing
Act No. 180, 1894 La. Acts 223); Daniel v. Vasquez, 9 Teiss. 300 (Orl. App.
1912) (construing Act No. 134, 1906 La. Acts 223); Conroy v. Pine Belt Oil Co.,
79 So. 523 (La. 1918) (construing Act No. 229, 1916 La. Acts 494).
52. Act No. 298, §16, 1926 La. Acts 552. The 1926 Act did not, however,
expressly repeal any articles of the Civil Code. Nevertheless, on the basis of the
repealing clause contained in the Act, it has been held that the Act was intended
to exhaust the subject matter and thus repealed article 2772 and other provisions
of the 1870 Code by implication, even those provisions of the Civil Code that
were not inherently inconsistent with the Act. See Robertshaw Controls Co. v.
Pre-Engineered Products, Co., Inc., 669 F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1982). As discussed
more fully infra in Part VIII, the 2019 revision of the Private Works Act expressly
repealed article 2772 and a number of other related articles. See Act No. 325, §3,
2019 La. Acts.
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Writing in 1942, Professor Harriet S. Daggett praised the 1926 Act for
eliminating the “general state of confusion” that had plagued the statutory
law and jurisprudence on the subject prior to its enactment. Yet, lamenting
both its “undue technicality and repetition” as well as its “varying and
arbitrary classifications,” she called for a further revision of the 1926 Act
with the goal of clarification and simplification.53
E. The 1981 Revision
With a number of subsequent amendments, the 1926 Act, after
incorporation into the Revised Statutes of 1950,54 was the law in force at
the time the legislature adopted House Concurrent Resolution No. 150 of
1977, directing the Louisiana State Law Institute to “study and propose a
revision of the lien laws under Title 9 of the Louisiana Revised Statutes of
1950 so as to clarify and simplify the lien laws and the enforcement
thereof.” The process of revision consumed nearly four years and resulted
in the enactment of Act 724 of 1981, which totally rewrote the Private
Works Act, creating its present structure and organization.55 One of the
goals of the revision was to improve a statute that was “disorganized,
contradictory, and confusing” on account of amendments that had been
made to the Private Works Act following its incorporation into the Revised
Statutes.56 Apart from these general criticisms, the Law Institute identified
three deficiencies of particular concern: (1) the Act’s failure to define what
comprised a “work”; (2) the existence of parallel, but not entirely
consistent, provisions imposing personal liability on an owner for his
failure to file a bond and his failure to file the contract; and (3) the Act’s
failure to distinguish between cases in which the owner’s liability arose
from contracts entered into by his contractor—rather than from the
owner’s own actions—and the Act’s related failure in the former instance
to indicate whether the privilege arising under the Act directly secured the
principal debt owed to the claimant or rather secured the statutory liability
that the Act imposed upon the owner.57
Although Act 724 of 1981 completely reworked Louisiana Revised
Statutes §§ 9:4801 et seq., it left the statute’s basic policy goals and

53. See DAGGETT, supra note 13, § 73, at 323.
54. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4801 et seq. (1950).
55. Rubin, supra note 5, at 428.
56. Exposé des Motifs, LA. REV. STAT. ANN., CIV. CODE ANCILLARIES, Vol.
3D, page 96.
57. Id.
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mechanisms intact.58 The identity of persons entitled to privileges under
the Private Works Act was largely unchanged, and the ranking of those
privileges also remained the same, although the provisions governing
priority were harmonized.59 The revision defined terms such as “work,”60
“contractor,”61 and “general contractor.”62 Structurally, the 1981 Act
separated privileges securing an owner’s contractual obligation to a person
with whom he is in privity of contract63 from those privileges securing
claims that the Act established in favor of other claimants.64 The revision
contemplated the possibility of multiple contracts and multiple contractors
on the same work.65 Recordation of the full contract was no longer to be
required; rather, a notice of contract containing only basic statutorily
prescribed information would be filed. The previous requirement that the
filing occur within 30 days from the date of the contract was suppressed.
For contracts under $25,000, a general contractor was no longer required
to file his contract in order to be entitled to a privilege.66 Statements of
claim or privilege filed by claimants were no longer required to be in
affidavit form.67 The revision changed the period within which a claimant
was required to file suit on his claim to one year from the expiration of the
period allowed for filing statements of claim or privilege, rather than one
year from the actual date of filing of the claimant’s statement of claim or
privilege.68 The revision also clarified that the privileges arising under the
Private Works Act always secure the liability of the owner, rather than the
underlying obligation owed by others to claimants not in privity of contract
with him. For that reason, if the owner had no personal liability, there was
no privilege created upon his immovable.69
58. For a scholarly and comprehensive treatment of the 1981 Act, see
Michael H. Rubin, Ruminations on the Louisiana Private Works Act, 58 LA. L.
REV. 569 (1998). Much of the discussion in that article of the workings of the
Private Works Act remains relevant even after the 2019 revision.
59. Exposé des Motifs, supra note 56.
60. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4808 (1982).
61. Id. § 9:4807(A).
62. Id. § 9:4807(B).
63. Id. § 9:4801.
64. Exposé des Motifs, supra note 56.
65. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4801(1), 9:4807(A), 9:4808(B).
66. Id. § 9:4811(D).
67. Id. § 9:4822.
68. Id. § 9:4823(A). A subsequent amendment to the Private Works Act
restored the requirement that the claimant file suit within one year after filing his
statement of claim or privilege. See Act No. 394, 2012 La. Acts 2111, amending
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4823(A)(2).
69. Exposé des Motifs, supra note 56.

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 20

10/12/20 7:07 AM

2020]

REWORKING LOUISIANA’S PRIVATE WORKS ACT

1009

Although the Law Institute’s 1981 proposal for revision of the Private
Works Act was adopted with only a few changes,70 little time would pass
before the legislature would decide that further changes to the Act were
warranted. After the 1981 revision, the Private Works Act underwent over
two dozen amendments, almost all of which were very narrow in their
scope and operation.71 Even though those amendments did not alter the
Act’s basic structure and policies, they modified its details and procedures
to deal with specific problems caused by the jurisprudence, changing
business and financing practices, or the desires of certain classes of
persons affected by the Act to correct what they perceived to be its
deficiencies as applied to them in particular cases. However wellintentioned, these disjointed changes to certain specific provisions of the
Private Works Act were sometimes made in a fashion that did not comport
with the overall thrust of the Act. A number of changes introduced
statutory language that was imprecise, ambiguous, or different from the
words used to describe the identical concepts elsewhere in the Act. Some
amendments used the words “claim” and “privilege” almost
interchangeably, even though these two concepts have entirely different
meanings and consequences under the Act. Over the course of time, the
legislature added notice requirements to the Act in a variety of places,
rather than in a central location, with the unintended effect of creating traps
for unwary claimants. A number of changes to the Act did not appear to
state what was likely intended, leaving courts to struggle with the proper
interpretation of the amendments.72
70. Rubin, supra note 5. That article also contains a detailed comparison of
the 1981 revision against former law.
71. See Act No. 589, 1983 La. Acts 1179; Act No. 388, 1984 La. Acts 994;
Act No. 556, 1985 La. Acts 1024; Act No. 711, 1985 La. Acts 1287; Act No. 903,
1985 La. Acts 1945; Act No. 424, 1986 La. Acts 790; Act No. 685, 1987 La. Acts
1657; Act No. 685, 1988 La. Acts 1774; Act No. 713, 1988 La. Acts 1826; Act
No. 904, 1988 La. Acts 2363; Act No. 999, 1988 La. Acts 2698; Act No. 41, 1989
La. Acts 287; Act No. 952, 1990 La. Acts 2334; Act No. 353, 1991 La. Acts 1270;
Act No. 370, 1991 La. Acts 1314; Act No. 1024, 1991 La. Acts 3298; Act No. 31,
1995 La. Acts 238; Act No. 666, 1995 La. Acts 1759; Act No. 1155, 1995 La.
Acts 3323; Act No. 861, 1997 La. Acts 1443; Act No. 1134, 1999 La. Acts 3017;
Act No. 1105, 2001 La. Acts 2348; Act No. 729, 2003 La. Acts 2470; Act No.
209, 2004 La. Acts 1227; Act No. 169, 2005 La. Acts 1383; Act No. 13, 1st Ex.
Sess., 2005 La. Acts 2506; Act No. 601, 2010 La. Acts 2195; Act No. 638, 2010
La. Acts 2296; Act No. 394, 2012 La. Acts 2111; Act No. 425, 2012 La. Acts
2182; Act No. 277, 2013 La. Acts 1822; Act No. 357, 2013 La. Acts 2130; Act
No. 182, 2014 La. Acts 1550; and Act No. 791, 2014 La. Acts 3326.
72. See, e.g., Hawk Field Servs., L.L.C. v. Mid Am. Underground, L.L.C., 94
So. 3d 136 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012), writ denied, 99 So. 3d 652 (La. 2012);
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Of course, no argument could be reasonably made that the 1981 Act
as originally adopted was insusceptible of improvement, or that the
legislative changes made over the years following the 1981 revision were
necessarily inappropriate either in their substantive effect or in their
drafting. In the 15 years preceding the enactment of the 2019 revision, the
legislature twice adopted resolutions directing the Law Institute to
consider revisions to the Private Works Act.73 In its report in response to
the latter resolution,74 the Law Institute expressed its belief that, in order
to restore the integrity and cohesiveness of the Private Works Act, a
comprehensive review of the whole Act was warranted. The report
indicated that the Law Institute would undertake this task and make
recommendations to the legislature for specific changes to the wording in
the Act. It was not envisioned that this process would result in a wholesale
revision of the Act as occurred in 1981, nor that the recommended changes
would have far-reaching substantive effects. Rather, the report noted that
the recommended changes would be designed to remove ambiguities or
inconsistencies in the wording of the Act that either had already caused,
or had the potential to cause, the Act to be interpreted in a manner that
likely was not intended.
F. The 2019 Revision
The work leading to the 1981 revision of the Act consumed four years;
the process leading to the 2019 revision required even longer. The task
was assigned to the Law Institute’s Security Devices Committee,75 which
supplemented its ranks with special advisors representing segments of
industries with interests in the proper working of the Act, such as
representatives of general contractors, subcontractors, suppliers, lessors,
Byron Montz, Inc. v. Conco Constr., Inc., 824 So. 2d 498 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir.
2002).
73. H.C.R. 259, 2004 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2004) and S.R. 158, 2012 Leg.,
Reg. Sess. (La. 2012).
74. Report of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the Louisiana Legislature
in Response to S.R. No. 158 of 2012, supra note 6.
75. Members of the Security Devices Committee during the revision process
included L. David Cromwell (Reporter), James R. Austin, David J. Boneno,
Elizabeth R. Carter, Christopher K. Odinet, Scott P. Gallinghouse, David W.
Gruning, Peter L. Koerber, Marilyn C. Maloney, Max Nathan, Jr., Kelly Juneau
Rookard, Michael H. Rubin, Ronald J. Scalise, Jr., Emmett C. Sole, James A.
Stuckey, Adam J. Swensek, Susan G. Talley, George J. Tate, Robert P. Thibeaux,
Dian Tooley-Knoblett, and Keith Vetter. Claire Popovich and Mallory C. Waller
served as the Committee’s staff attorneys during the revision process.
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sureties, title insurers, construction lenders, developers, and construction
law practitioners.76 To the task of revision, the committee devoted a total
of 20 committee meetings beginning in 2014, and the committee’s work
was presented in stages to the Council of the Law Institute at seven
different meetings. Once complete, the Law Institute introduced its
proposal for revision in the legislative session as House Bill No. 203 of
2019,77 and, with only scant legislative changes, the revision was enacted
into law as Act 325 of 2019, with a general effective date of January 1,
2020.78
The essential mechanisms of the Act were untouched by the 2019
revision. As was the case under prior law, contractors, laborers, materials
suppliers, equipment lessors, engineers, architects, and surveyors who are
in privity of contract with the owner are granted a privilege on the
immovable upon which work is performed as security for their contractual
claims against the owner.79 Those who are not in privity of contract with
the owner but instead have a contractual relationship with either a
contractor or a subcontractor of any tier are given personal claims against
both the owner and the contractor,80 as well as a privilege upon the
immovable to secure their statutory claims against the owner.81 Claims and
privileges arising under the Act must be preserved by the filing of a
statement of claim or privilege before the expiration of a rather short filing
period following substantial completion or abandonment of the work.82
Provided that they are properly preserved by a timely filing, privileges
under the Act have effect against third persons from the earlier to occur of
76. These special advisors included John T. Andrishok, Billy J. Domingue,
George Trippe Hawthorne, John O. Hayter, III, Craig Kaster, H. Bruce Shreves,
Tim Stine, David C. Voss, and Russ Wray.
77. The bill was authored by Representative Gregory A. Miller.
78. The effective date of the Act and its limited retroactivity are discussed in
a later Part of this Article. See infra Part IX.
79. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4801 (2020).
80. As the official revision comments to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802
reflect, these personal claims against the owner and contractor are a form of
personal security. See id. § 9:4802 cmt. c. See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3136–
37 (2020). Although official revision comments to Louisiana legislation are
generally anonymous, the authors of this Article are, in fact, the drafters of the
comments to the 2019 revision of the Private Works Act. Therefore, it is their
hope that any similarity between the words used in this Article and those found in
the comments is attributed not to the vice of plagiarism but rather to the virtue of
consistency in thought.
81. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802.
82. Id. § 9:4822(A)–(D). The 2019 revision did clarify, and to some extent
alter, the filing periods.
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the commencement of the work or the filing of a notice of contract.83 A
claimant who has properly preserved his privilege by filing a statement of
claim or privilege must bring suit within one year after the date of filing
and, to preserve the effectiveness of the privilege against third persons,
must file a notice of pendency of the action in the mortgage records before
expiration of that one-year period.84
Although the 2019 revision completely rewrote the ranking provision,
the substance of ranking rules was for the most part unchanged. As under
prior law, laborer’s privileges have priority over all mortgages and other
non-governmental privileges. As they were under prior law, most other
Private Works Act privileges are superior to all mortgages and other nongovernmental privileges, except for mortgages and vendor’s privileges
that became effective as to third persons before work began or notice of
contract was filed.
Apart from its myriad stylistic changes,85 the 2019 revision did,
however, make a number of substantive changes, all of which will be
discussed later in this Article. The threshold contract amount triggering
the requirement that a general contractor record notice of his contract in
order to be entitled to a privilege was raised from $25,000 to $100,000,
and the revision expressly provides that a general contractor who fails to
file notice of his contract when it exceeds that threshold is deprived of any
privilege under the Act.86 A payment bond must now be in the full amount
of the contract, rather than in the tiered amounts that had existed under
prior law.87 The rules governing the periods within which statements of
claim or privilege must be filed were revised and clarified, and, most
importantly, an outer time limit was imposed even when notice of
termination is never filed.88 The requirement that a materials supplier on a
83. Id. § 9:4820(A).
84. Id. §§ 9:4823(A), 9:4833(E).
85. Included among the non-substantive changes found in the 2019 revision
was the relocation of three provisions whose original placement interrupted the
flow and progression of the Act. Those provisions pertained to the misapplication
of proceeds by contractors or subcontractors, the escrow of funds earned by
contractors and held as retainage, and the furnishing of retainage bonds by
contractors. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4814, 9:4815, 9:4822(M) (2019).
Moved to a newly created Subpart H of the Act, these provisions were
redesignated as Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 9:4856, 9:4857, and 9:4858. As
indicated in the legislation that enacted the 2019 revision, this redesignation
should not be interpreted as either an amendment to or a reenactment of these
provisions. See Act No. 325, §4, 2019 La. Acts.
86. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4811(D) (2020).
87. Id. § 9:4812(B).
88. Id. § 9:4822(A)–(D).
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residential project give notice of nonpayment to the homeowner before
filing a statement of claim or privilege was suppressed. The 2019 revision
provided a meaningful consequence for an owner’s failure to comply with
a claimant’s request to be notified of the filing of notice of termination.89
The time within which affidavits of no work must be filed, and the effect
of a timely filed affidavit, were altered.90 Notice requirements of the Act
were revised,91 and the mechanisms of giving notice modernized.92 The
revision expanded the reach of the Act to cover work on “other
constructions” belonging to owners who are not landowners and to provide
that privileges arising from such work extend to those other constructions,
even though property law classifies them as movables.93 Finally, the Civil
Code articles providing for or contemplating the existence of construction
privileges were at long last either repealed outright or substantially
modified.94
A few changes to the bill drafted by the Law Institute were made
during the legislative process. The period within which a lessor is required
to notify a contractor of the fact that the lessor is leasing movables in
connection with a work was expanded from 20 to 30 days after the date
movables first leased by the lessor are placed at the site.95 The legislature
also added a stipulation that a lessor is not required to respond to a request
made by an owner or contractor for information unless the lessor has
previously given such a notice to the person making the request.96 A
proposed provision that a seller of movables to a subcontractor need give
notice of nonpayment on only one occasion to an owner or contractor was
deleted,97 as was an entirely new § 4805, which, if adopted, would have
89. Id. § 9:4822(J).
90. Id. § 9:4820(C).
91. Id. § 9:4804.
92. Id. §§ 9:4842–45.
93. Id. § 9:4810(4).
94. See Act No. 325, §§ 2–3, 2019 La. Acts.
95. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4804(B)(1).
96. See id. § 9:4804(B)(2).
97. See id. § 9:4804(C). The proposed provision that was deleted by
legislative amendment had read as follows: “A seller who sells movables to a
subcontractor shall not be required to deliver a notice under Paragraph (1) of this
Subsection on more than one occasion with respect to amounts owed or to be
owed by that subcontractor in connection with a work. After one such notice has
been given to an owner and contractor, no further notices under this Subsection
shall be required with respect to any movables sold at any time by the seller to
that subcontractor in connection with the work, regardless of whether or when the
amounts claimed in the notice are paid.” H.B. 203 at 10, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess.
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provided a formal mechanism by which an owner or contractor could
request a statement of amounts owed to claimants who have no direct
contractual relationship with the person making the request.98 Another
legislative amendment added a stipulation that a sub-subcontractor having
no direct contractual relationship with the contractor has no right of action
to enforce a claim against the contractor or surety, unless at least 30 days
before filing suit the sub-subcontractor has given the contractor a notice
stating the amount owed and identifying the other subcontractor for whom
the work was performed.99 The form of notice that residential contractors
must give to homeowners, already substantially simplified in the Law
Institute’s projet, was further revised to address concerns of residential
contractor groups.100
The amendment that spawned the most discussion during the
legislative session was the addition of a new Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4822(D), which, on a residential work for which a timely notice of
(La. 2019), available at http://www.legis.la.gov/Legis/ViewDocument.
aspx?d=1118818 [https://perma.cc/669D-QBXA].
98. The premise behind proposed § 4805 was that, once enabled to obtain
information from those supplying materials or services to subcontractors, the
contractor and owner would be able to see that the unpaid claimants were paid
before making payment to the subcontractor who was responsible for the unpaid
balances owed to these claimants. The thrust of proposed § 4805 was as follows:
Within fifteen days after receipt of a written request from an owner or
contractor, a person who is granted a claim and privilege under
R.S. 9:4802(A)(3) or (4) but who has no direct contractual relationship
with that owner or contractor shall provide to that owner or contractor a
statement of all amounts owed to the person as of a date no earlier than
forty-five days before the date of the response. The request shall contain
a reasonable identification of the work and shall state that a failure to
provide a timely or accurate response may result in a loss of all or part
of the person’s claim and privilege. The person’s failure to provide a
timely and accurate response to a request made under this Subsection
shall extinguish the person’s claim and privilege under
R.S. 9:4802(A)(3) or (4) to the extent of any damages suffered by the
owner or contractor as a result of the failure or inaccuracy.
H.B. 203 at 12, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
99. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4804(D). This is similar to the former
requirement of Revised Statutes § 9:4822(J) (2019), which had not only required
notice before suit but also required an actual filing of the claimant’s statement of
claim or privilege in the mortgage records. That provision was removed in the
2019 revision on account of its incompatibility with other provisions of the Private
Works Act. See id. (2020), which provides a claimant rights against a contractor
and his surety even where a statement of claim or privilege is never filed.
100. Id. § 9:4852(A) (2020).
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contract has not been filed, allows sellers, lessors, and all claimants under
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802 to extend their filing period to a total
of 70 days by giving notice of nonpayment to the owner at least 10 days
before filing a statement of claim or privilege.101 This notice of
nonpayment is, however, wholly optional, and its effect, if properly and
timely given, is simply to extend the filing period applicable to those
claimants.102
II. BASIC PROTECTIONS AFFORDED BY THE ACT
The Private Works Act serves as the framework for implementing two
fundamental policy objectives: (1) to protect those who contribute to the
improvement of an immovable to ensure that they are compensated by
owners for the value of their work; and (2) to encourage owners who
benefit from the work to take reasonable steps to ensure not only that their
direct contractors are paid, but also that subcontractors, laborers, and
suppliers are paid for the value of their work.103 The primary mechanism
by which these policy objectives are accomplished is by granting to
contractors, subcontractors, sellers, and lessors of movables—and others
who contribute to the improvement of an immovable—claims and
privileges to secure the price of their work or the price of the movables
they provide.104
A. General Observations
The claims and privileges afforded by the Private Works Act are set
forth in the Act’s first two provisions: Louisiana Revised Statutes
§§ 9:4801 and 9:4802. The dichotomy between these two provisions was
first created in 1981, when the Act separated privileges arising in favor of
persons who had a direct contractual relationship with the owner from
privileges securing claims established in favor of persons who were in
privity of contract with a contractor or subcontractor, rather than with the
101. Id. § 9:4822(D). This change, which illustrates one of the few instances
in which the Act treats residential projects differently from others, required the
addition of a definition for the term “residential work.” Id. § 9:4810(8). See
discussion infra in Part III.
102. As discussed infra in Section IV.D.4, this provision replaced a mandate
that had existed under prior law requiring a seller on a residential project to give
notice of nonpayment to the owner at least 10 days before filing his statement of
claim or privilege. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802(G)(2) (2019).
103. Exposé des Motifs, supra note 56.
104. Id.
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owner.105 Privileges arising in favor of those who have a direct contractual
relationship with the owner are included in Louisiana Revised Statutes §
9:4801,106 and claims and privileges established in favor of those who do
not have a direct contractual relationship with the owner are included in
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802.107
As is the case with other lien statutes, the courts have held that the
Private Works Act is stricti juris. Accordingly, its provisions must be
interpreted rigidly, and the privileges it confers cannot be extended or
enlarged either by implication or the application of equitable
considerations. Nevertheless, strict construction cannot be applied as to
permit purely technical objections to defeat the real intent of the Act.108
B. Privileges Granted by Louisiana Revised Statutes Section 9:4801
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801 grants a privilege on immovable
property to secure the obligations of the owner arising out of work
performed on the immovable.109 This privilege is afforded to contractors
for the price of their work, as well as to laborers or other employees of the
owner for the price of their labor or services performed at the site of the
immovable.110
A privilege under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801 is also granted
to sellers and lessors of movables when they sell or lease directly to the
owner. Sellers of movables sold to the owner are granted a privilege for
the price of the movables, provided that these movables: (1) become
component parts of the immovable; (2) are consumed at the site of the
immovable; or (3) are consumed in equipment used at the site of the
immovable.111 Another provision of the Act creates a rebuttable
presumption that movables delivered by the seller to the site of the
immovable have become component parts of the immovable or were used
105. See id.
106. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4801 cmt. a (2007).
107. See id. § 9:4802 cmt. a. As discussed infra in Section III.I, there is an
exception to this general rule in the case of professional subconsultants who are
employed by other surveyors, engineers, or architects employed by the owner.
108. Guichard Drilling Co. v. Alpine Energy Services, Inc., 657 So. 2d 1307
(La. 1995); Subdivision Planning Engineers, Inc. v. Manor Dev. Corp., 349 So.
2d 247 (La. 1977); Morgan v. Audubon Constr. Corp., 485 So. 2d 529 (La. Ct.
App. 5th Cir. 1986); Authement’s Ornamental Iron Works, Inc. v. Reisfeld, 376
So. 2d 1061 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied, 378 So. 2d 1390 (La. 1980).
109. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4801 (2020).
110. Id. § 9:4801(1), (2).
111. Id. § 9:4801(3).
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on or at the site of the immovable in performing the work.112 Lessors of
movables leased to the owner by written contract are granted a privilege
for the rent of the movables, provided that these movables are used at the
site of the immovable.113
Finally, a privilege under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801 is
afforded to professional consultants engaged by the owner and to the
professional subconsultants of those professional consultants for the price
of professional services rendered in connection with work undertaken by
the owner.114 As will be discussed more fully in Section III.I, those
professional subconsultants are the only persons who have no direct
contractual relationship with the owner but who are nevertheless granted
a privilege under § 4801.115
C. Claims Against the Owner and Privileges Granted by Louisiana
Revised Statutes Section 9:4802
The second section of the Act, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802,
grants a personal claim against the owner to secure payment of obligations
arising out of the performance of work under a contract between the owner
and contractor.116 This claim is afforded to subcontractors for the price of
their work, as well as to laborers or other employees of the contractor or a
subcontractor for the price of their labor or services performed at the site

112. See Id. § 9:4846. This presumption can be rebutted by a showing that the
movables “were not used in the construction or incorporated into the job.” Parish
Concrete, Inc. v. Fritz Culver, Inc., 399 So. 2d 694 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1981).
113. Id. § 9:4801(4).
114. Id. § 9:4801(5). As discussed infra in Section III.I, “professional
consultants” are professional surveyors, professional engineers, or licensed
architects who are engaged by the owner, a contractor, or a subcontractor.
“Professional subconsultants” are professional surveyors, professional engineers,
or licensed architects who are engaged by professional consultants.
115. Since 1987, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801 has granted a privilege
in favor of professional subconsultants who are employed by other surveyors,
engineers, or architects who are employed by the owner. See Act No. 685, 1987
La. Acts 1657. Although the surveyors, engineers, or architects who employ these
professional subconsultants have a direct contractual relationship with the owner,
the professional subconsultants themselves do not. As discussed infra in Section
III.I, the 2019 revision continues to include these professional subconsultants
within the scope of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801, even though they lack
privity of contract with the owner, because their work does not emanate from the
contractor, as is required under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802.
116. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802(A) (2020).
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of the immovable.117 This claim is also granted to sellers and lessors of
movables when they sell or lease to a contractor or a subcontractor of any
tier.118 Sellers of movables sold to the contractor or a subcontractor are
granted a claim for the price of movables that become component parts of
the immovable, are consumed at the site of the immovable, or are
consumed in equipment used at the site of the immovable.119 Lessors of
movables leased to the contractor or a subcontractor by written contract
are granted a claim for the rent of movables that are used at the site of the
immovable.120
Finally, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802 grants a claim against
the owner to professional consultants engaged by the contractor or a
subcontractor, and to the professional subconsultants of those professional
consultants, for the price of professional services rendered in connection
with work undertaken by the contractor or a subcontractor.
Given that these personal claims against the owner exist in the absence
of privity of contract and regardless of whether the owner has paid the
contractor the full amount owed, it might be legitimately questioned why
the law imposes such liability upon the owner. The following explanation
appears in the Law Institute’s 2012 report to the legislature on the Private
Works Act:
Several arguments have been made to support the Act’s
imposition of personal liability on the owner to persons with
whom there is no privity of contract, even after the owner has paid
his contractor. First, and most importantly, the Act gives the
owner a means to avoid personal liability by recording notice of
117. Id. § 9:4802(A)(1) and (2).
118. A claim under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802 is not, however,
granted to a seller of movables who sells to another seller of movables. See Cable
& Connector Warehouse, Inc. v. Omnimark, Inc., 700 So. 2d 1273, 1275 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 1997) (“[W]hile a supplier to a subcontractor or a contractor has
certain rights under the Private Works Act, a supplier to a supplier does not have
such rights under that statute. Put another way, in order to have rights under the
Private Works Act, a supplier must sell directly to a subcontractor or a
contractor.”). See also Jesse F. Heard & Sons v. Southwest Steel Products, 124
So. 2d 211, 220 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1960), interpreting the corresponding
provision of the Public Works Act (“Under the settled law of this State, a
materialman who furnishes material to a materialman, has no right to a lien.”).
119. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802(A)(3). See also id. § 9:4846, creating a
rebuttable presumption that movables delivered by the seller to the site of the
immovable became component parts of the immovable or were used on or at the
site of the immovable in performing the work.
120. Id. § 9:4802(A)(4).
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contract and requiring a surety bond. Secondly, the presence of
the bond permits, indirectly, the owner to agree to make his
payments as the work progresses, or even after it is finished, and
still permits the contractor to obtain credit for the cost of the work
as it progresses. In the absence of some assurance of payment,
subcontractors and suppliers are less likely to extend credit to the
contractor, who would then need to have sufficient capital to
complete the job. In a sense, the credit extended to the contractor
is in effect credit extended to the owner, for in the absence of the
contractor’s ability to obtain services and supplies on credit, the
contractor would demand that the owner fund costs in advance,
rather than in periodic, after-the-fact progress payments.
Moreover, it is obviously advantageous to the owner to defer
paying until after the work or some definable part of it is finished,
particularly since financial institutions are unlikely to lend even
part of the funds without some assurances of completion and
freedom from claims. The Act’s balancing of interests among the
contractors, those from whom they obtain services and supplies,
the owner, and lenders, has proved to be essentially effective for
more than a hundred years. This balancing of interests is
ultimately founded in the policy judgment, which pervades many
areas of Louisiana law, that one who receives an unmerited
enhancement of his property should compensate those persons
who cause that enhancement.121
The personal claims granted by Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802
against the owner are a form of security because they secure the underlying
obligation of the person who is contractually indebted to the claimant for
the amount owed.122 The personal claims against the owner are themselves
in turn secured by a privilege on the immovable on which the work was
performed.123 Because the privilege acts as security for the corresponding
claim against the owner, the privilege is necessarily extinguished when the
claim is extinguished.124 The converse, however, is not necessarily true,
and courts have held that even if a privilege under Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4802 has been lost, the corresponding claim against the owner
121. Report of the Louisiana State Law Institute to the Louisiana Legislature
in Response to S.R. No. 158 of 2012, supra note 6.
122. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802 cmt. c. See generally LA. CIV. CODE
arts. 3136–37 (2020).
123. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802(B).
124. See id. § 9:4802 cmt. d. See also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3277(3), providing
that privileges become extinct “[b]y the extinction of debt which gave birth to it.”
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can still persist.125 These holdings were based on provisions of former law
that provided for the loss of the privilege under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4802 without also providing for the loss of the underlying claim,126 an
issue that the 2019 revision sought to correct by providing, in most cases,
that the claim and privilege afforded by this section are coterminous.127
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802 thus provides considerable
protection to laborers, subcontractors, materials suppliers, equipment
lessors, and others who lack privity of contract with the owner in the form
of a personal claim against the owner and a privilege upon the immovable,
both of which arise by operation of law. A central feature of the Act,
however, is that the owner is given the ability to avoid both the personal
claims and the privileges of § 4802 claimants by filing a notice of contract
before work begins along with a surety bond guaranteeing the contractor’s
payment of the amounts owed to those claimants.128 Where the owner has
done so, he will be entitled at the conclusion of the work to a judgment
directing the cancellation of all claims or privileges of § 4802 claimants
and declaring him discharged from further liability.129 Regardless of
whether the owner has complied with these requirements, he is entitled to
indemnity from the contractor against all claims and privileges asserted
under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802.130
125. See, e.g., Hawk Field Servs., L.L.C. v. Mid Am. Underground, L.L.C., 94
So. 3d 136 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012), writ denied, 99 So. 3d 652 (La. 2012)
(holding that even though a lessor of movables lost its privilege under Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4802 for failing to timely provide the owner with a copy of
its lease, the lessor nevertheless still had a claim against the owner because the
notice requirements “refer[] only to the privilege securing the owner’s personal
liability . . . granted by La. R.S. 9:4802(B) and not the claim granted by La. R.S.
9:4802(A)”). See also Standard Materials, L.L.C. v. C & C Builders, Inc., 2010
WL 5479903 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2010) (holding that a seller’s failure to comply
with the 10-day notice requirement imposed under former Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4802(G)(2) caused only a loss of the seller’s privilege and not a loss
of his personal claim against the owner).
126. See, e.g., former LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802(G) (1982), which
originally provided that a lessor must give notice to the owner and contractor in
order to preserve his claim under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802.
Inexplicably, an amendment made in 1991 substituted “privilege” for “claim,”
thus creating the possibility that a claim could persist where the privilege had been
lost by the lessor’s failure to give notice. Act No. 1024, § 1, 1991 La. Acts 3298.
127. There are, however, certain exceptions to this rule, which can be found in
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4822 and 9:4823 (2020). See also id. § 9:4802 cmt. d.
128. Id. § 9:4802(C).
129. Id. § 9:4841(D).
130. Id. § 9:4802(F).
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The claims arising against the owner in favor of § 4802 claimants are
in addition to any other contractual or legal rights that those claimants may
have for the payment of amounts owed to them.131 Thus, the claims against
the owner supplement, and in fact secure, the contractual obligations owed
to those claimants by the contractor or subcontractor who contracted with
them. The claims against the owner also supplement the personal claims
that the Act establishes in favor of § 4802 claimants against the contractor,
as discussed in Section II.D below.
D. Claims Against the Contractor Granted by Louisiana Revised Statutes
Section 9:4802
In addition to the claim against the owner, Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4802 grants a claim against the contractor to secure payment of
obligations arising out of the performance of work under a contract
between the owner and contractor.132 The claim against the contractor is
afforded to the same persons to whom a claim against the owner is granted:
(1) subcontractors; (2) laborers or other employees of the contractor or a
subcontractor; (3) sellers and lessors of movables sold or leased to the
contractor or a subcontractor; and (4) professional consultants engaged by
the contractor or a subcontractor, as well as the professional
subconsultants of those professional consultants.133 Like claims against the
owner, claims against the contractor are in addition to any other
contractual or legal rights that § 4802 claimants may have for the payment
of amounts owed to them.134 Unlike claims against the owner, however,
claims against the contractor are not secured by a privilege on the
immovable.
The Act allows a claimant to assert his claim against the owner, the
contractor, or the contractor’s surety without the joinder of the others.135
As mentioned in Section II.C above, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802
requires the contractor to indemnify the owner for claims against the
owner arising from work to be performed under the contract.136 A similar
indemnification requirement applies to a subcontractor for amounts paid
by the owner, the contractor, or another subcontractor for claims arising
from work performed by the former subcontractor.137
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
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III. DEFINITIONS
The Private Works Act contains a number of definitions. Many of the
terms that are defined, such as “owner,” “contractor,” and “work,”
appeared for the first time in the 1981 Act. The 2019 revision retained
these existing definitions and added a new provision—Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4810—that contains miscellaneous definitions previously
scattered throughout the Act. This newly enacted provision also introduces
several additional defined terms, including “complete property
description,” “immovable,” and “residential work.”
A. Owner
Before the 1981 revision, the Private Works Act contained no
definition of “owner.” Based on judicial interpretation of former law,138
the 1981 revision defined this term for the first time: owners, co-owners,
naked owners, owners of predial or personal servitudes, possessors,
lessees, and other persons having an interest in an immovable were all
deemed to be owners for purposes of the Act.139 The 1981 revision also
provided that claims against an owner under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4802 were limited to the owner who contracted with the contractor and
that, if more than one owner had contracted, each was solidarily liable for
the claims.140 Similarly, the privileges arising under the Private Works Act
were limited to the interest in the immovable enjoyed by those owners.141
The Act was subsequently amended in 1985 to provide that claims under
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802 could also arise against an owner who
agreed in writing to the price and work of the contract of a lessee and
specifically agreed to be liable for any claims granted by the Act.142
The 2019 revision retained the broad definition of “owner” for
purposes of the Act to include anyone having the right to use or enjoy an
immovable, regardless of whether the owner’s interest is actual ownership
or whether the owner even holds a real right in the immovable.143 The
138. See id. § 9:4806 cmt. a (2007).
139. Id. § 9:4806(A) (1982).
140. Id. § 9:4806(B).
141. Id. § 9:4806(C).
142. Act No. 903, 1985 La. Acts 1945, amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4806(B).
143. Prevailing doctrine in Louisiana, as well as the jurisprudence, has long
insisted that a contract of lease, even of an immovable, is a mere personal contract.
See Hoffman v. Jaurans, 18 La. 70, 73 (1841) (holding, in a suit involving a claim
to a construction privilege, that “[a lease] is a right strictly personal giving to the
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definition now includes a specific reference to usufructuaries.144 The 2019
revision also retained the provisions limiting the application of Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4802 to those owners who contracted with the
contractor or agreed in writing to the price and work of the contract made
by another owner, provided that the owner expressly agreed in writing to
be liable for claims arising under that provision.145 In other words, the
2019 revision retains the longstanding rule that the mere consent of one
owner to the performance of work contracted by another, or knowledge
that such work is ongoing, will not be sufficient to impose liability upon
the owner who consented to or knew of the work.146
Also unchanged by the 2019 revision is the statement that privileges
arising under the Act encumber only the interest in the immovable enjoyed
by the owner whose obligation is secured by the privilege.147 The 2019
revision did, however, make more general a proposition that—at least
according to the express text of the Act—formerly applied only to lessees:
if the owner whose obligation is secured by the privilege is a lessee or
holder of a servitude, or otherwise derives his interest in the immovable
from another person, the privilege is inferior and subject to the rights and

lessee only the use of the property and conferring neither the legal possession nor
any proprietary interest in it.”). See also 2400 Canal, L.L.C. v. Board of
Supervisors of Louisiana State University Agricultural and Mechanical College,
105 So. 3d 819 (La. 2012) (reaffirming that a lease is distinguishable from a real
right, such as a right of use, because a lease involves only personal rights rather
than real rights); A. N. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY § 9:26, in 2 LOUISIANA CIVIL
LAW TREATISE (5th ed. 2015); Stadnik, The Doctrinal Origins of the Juridical
Nature of Lease in the Civil Law, 54 TUL. L. REV. 1094, 1135 (1980).
Nevertheless, a lessee can clearly be an “owner” under the Act. See Cajun
Contractors, Inc. v. EcoProduct Solutions, LP, 182 So. 3d 149 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2015).
144. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4806(A) (2020).
145. Id. § 9:4806(B). Before the 2019 revision, this rule, as stated in the Act,
applied when an owner agreed to be liable for a work undertaken by a lessee. The
2019 revision expanded the rule to apply whenever an owner agrees to be
responsible for a work undertaken by any other owner.
146. See id. § 9:4806 cmt. a. The principle was established very early in
Louisiana that an owner is not responsible for claims arising from a work
undertaken by a lessee, even where the owner consents to the work and provides
funds for its execution. Hoffman v. Jaurans, 18 La. 70 (1841). See also Fruge v.
Muffoletto, 137 So. 2d 336, 341 (La. 1962); Louisiana Industries v. Bogator, Inc.,
605 So. 2d 213 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1992); Clegg Concrete, Inc. v. BonfantiFackrell, Ltd., 532 So. 2d 465, 469 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1988).
147. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4806(C).
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obligations of that other person.148 The Act continues to set forth a specific
application of that proposition in the context of leases, providing that
privileges arising under the Act upon a lessee’s rights in the lease or in
buildings and other constructions are inferior and subject to rights and
claims of the lessor, such as the right to dissolve the lease upon the lessee’s
default.149
The 2019 revision contains an express statement that inclusion in a
statement of claim and privilege of the name of an owner who has no
responsibility for the claim does not, of itself, create liability on the part
of that owner or create a privilege upon his interest in the immovable.150
B. Contractors and Subcontractors
The 1981 Act expressly defined the terms “contractor,” “general
contractor,” and “subcontractor” for the first time. The 2019 revision made
no changes to the definitions of those terms.
A contractor is defined under the Act as a person who contracts
directly with an owner to perform all or a part of a work.151 A general
contractor is a contractor who either contracts to perform all or
substantially all of the work or is deemed to be general contractor because
notice of his contract has been properly filed, even if the scope of his work
is less than the entire project.152 Whether a contractor is considered to be
a general contractor has important consequences under the Act. For
example, a general contractor who fails to properly file notice of contract
when the price of the work exceeds $100,000 is denied any privilege under
the Act and is not entitled to file a statement of claim or privilege for any
amounts owed to him.153
148. Id.
149. Id. § 9:4806(D).
150. Id. § 9:4806(E). As the official revision comments mention, an owner
without responsibility for the claim might be named as a result of the claimant’s
error or abundance of caution, or, under a rule introduced in the 2019 revision, on
account of the responsible owner’s lack of an interest of record in the immovable.
Id. § 9:4806 cmt. e. In that circumstance, the 2019 revision permits the claimant
to name the owner of record in a statement of claim or privilege rather than
naming the responsible owner who has no interest of record. See id. §
9:4822(H)(5).
151. Id. § 9:4807(A).
152. Id. §§ 9:4807(B), 9:4808(B).
153. Id. § 9:4811(D). The threshold amount that triggers the requirement of
filing a notice of contract was increased from $25,000 to $100,000 by the 2019
revision, as mentioned supra in Section I.F.
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By so providing, the 2019 revision overruled a line of cases that
allowed a general contractor to assert a privilege for that portion of the
work that he had personally performed, as opposed to what he had
subcontracted out, even when he had failed to comply with the
requirement of filing notice of his contract.154 The theory behind those
cases was that, to that extent, the contractor was acting only as an ordinary
contractor, not as a general contractor. The 2019 revision rejected this
rationale, expressly providing that a general contractor who does not
comply with the requirement of filing notice of a contract exceeding
$100,000 is not entitled to file a statement of claim or privilege for any
amounts due to him.155 The definition of a “general contractor” in
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4807(B) makes no differentiation based on
whether the contractor has subcontracted out none, some, or all of the
work.
An additional reason that the distinction between general contractors
and other contractors is important is that a general contractor potentially
benefits from a longer period of time within which to file a statement of
his privilege: a general contractor is given seven months after substantial
completion or abandonment of the work within which to file—rather than
only 60 days—in cases where no notice of termination is filed.156 Yet
another reason that the distinction has significance is that both the default
of the general contractor and the termination of his contract serve as bases
for filing a notice of termination of the work, but this is not true in the case
of a contractor who is not a general contractor.157
154. See Burdette v. Drushell, 837 So. 2d 54, 68–69 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2002) (finding that a general contractor who failed to record a notice of contract
nevertheless “occupied the status of an ordinary ‘contractor’” and was therefore
entitled to a privilege under the Act “to the extent he performed or provided labor
or services other than the supervisory work generally performed by a ‘general
contractor’”); Tharpe & Brooks, Inc. v. Arnott Corp., 406 So. 2d 1, 5–6 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 1981) (recognizing a laborer’s privilege in favor of a contractor who
entered into a contract with the owner “solely for labor that was understood to be
performed by the contractor himself” and concluding that such contract did not
need to be recorded because the contractor “was not a general contractor”). See
also Tee It Up Golf, Inc. v. Bayou State Constr., L.L.C., 30 So. 3d 1159 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 2010).
155. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4811(D).
156. Compare id. § 9:4822(A), with id. § 9:4822(C). If a notice of termination
is filed, both the general contractor and any other contractor would have 60 days
from its filing to file their statements of claim or privilege. Id.
157. Id. § 9:4822(E)(3)(c), (d). The 2019 revision made this clear by
substituting “general contractor” for “contractor” in LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4822(E)(3)(c).
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The Act defines subcontractors as those who contract either directly
with a contractor, or through a series of contracts emanating from a
contractor, to perform all or a part of the work contracted for by the
contractor.158 Thus, the term embraces subcontractors of any tier.
Accordingly, not only are remote subcontractors entitled to a claim and
privilege under the Act, but so are the laborers or employees who work for
them and those who sell or lease movables to them.159
C. Work
The determination of what constitutes a “work” affects a host of issues
that arise under the Act. As discussed in Part VII below, the
commencement of work often determines when Private Works Act
privileges become effective as to third persons.160 Similarly, the
commencement of work determines the ranking of Private Works Act
privileges arising from the work against mortgages and vendor’s
privileges.161 If no notice of termination is filed, the substantial completion
or abandonment of work marks the beginning of the periods within which
claimants must file statements of their claims or privileges.162
Additionally, the determination of whether a contractor has contracted to
perform all or substantially all of a work and is therefore a general
contractor necessarily requires a determination of the work itself.163
The 1981 Act expressly defined the concept of “work” for the first
time based on the jurisprudential development of the meaning of the
term.164 A work is a single continuous project for the improvement,
construction, erection, reconstruction, modification, repair, demolition, or
other physical change of an immovable or its component parts.165 As
158. Id. § 9:4807(C).
159. See id. §§ 9:4807(C), 9:4802(A)(1)–(4). This rule illustrates the
importance of the distinction between a subcontractor and a supplier: a supplier
to a subcontractor is given a claim and privilege under the Act; a supplier to
another supplier is not. See discussion supra note 118.
160. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4820(A).
161. Id. § 9:4821(A)(2).
162. Id. §§ 9:4822(A)(2), (B)(2), (C)(2), (D)(2).
163. Id. § 9:4807(A).
164. See id. § 9:4808 cmt. a (2007).
165. Id. § 9:4808(A) (2020). The 2019 revision added one additional
clarification to this definition, inserting the words “located in this state” after
“immovable.” The intent of this addition was to expressly include a choice of law
rule providing that Private Works Act privileges arise only in connection with
work performed on immovables in Louisiana, not real property located in other

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 38

10/12/20 7:07 AM

2020]

REWORKING LOUISIANA’S PRIVATE WORKS ACT

1027

explained by the jurisprudence, “a work constitutes the entire continuous
project, and not just one portion of the project.”166
The provision that defines “work” for purposes of the Private Works
Act, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4808, also sets forth instances in
which a work will be considered separate and distinct from other parts of
the project. For example, if notice of contract is properly filed, the work
to be performed under the contract is deemed a separate work, even if such
work does not comprise the entirety of the project.167 Moreover, as
discussed in Section III.B above, the contractor under such a contract is
deemed to be a general contractor, even if he contracts to perform less than
all or substantially all of the project.168
The Private Works Act provides that preliminary site work, such as
clearing, leveling, grading, test piling, cutting or removing trees and
debris, placing fill dirt, and demolishing existing structures, is deemed a
separate work as long as it is not performed by the contractor responsible
for later constructing a building or other structure on the immovable.169
states, as discussed more fully infra in Section III.G. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4808 cmt. b.
166. Nu-Lite Elec. Wholesalers, LLC v. Alfred Palma Inc., 878 So. 2d 660,
662 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004). Thus, the court held that an abandonment by an
electrical subcontractor of its portion of the work did not constitute an
abandonment of the entire work because the part of the work undertaken by the
subcontractor was less than the “entire single, continuous project.”
167. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4808(B). Applying these rules, the court in
Keybank National Association v. Perkins Rowe Associates, LLC, 823 F. Supp. 2d
399 (M.D. La. 2011), held that work performed for the construction of a medical
office building within a larger development pursuant to a separate contract that
was properly filed was considered to be a work separate from that concerning the
overall development. As discussed later in this Article, the 2019 revision removed
the additional requirement that a proper bond be attached in order for this effect
to be achieved. See infra Section IV.A.
168. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4807(B)(2), 9:4808(B). These rules apply to a
contractor who files a notice of contract with respect to the portion of the overall
work that he has contracted with the owner to perform; these rules do not apply
to a subcontractor who has contracted with a contractor to perform part or even
all of the work within the scope of that contractor’s contract. The portion of a
work to be performed by a subcontractor is never itself deemed to be a separate
work. For the distinction between a contractor and a subcontractor, see id. §
9:4807(A) and (C) and discussion supra.
169. Id. § 9:4808(C). This means that those who perform the preliminary site
work are required to file statements of their claims or privileges upon the
substantial completion of the site work. Also, unlike the privileges of most other
claimants, their privileges are effective as to third persons only from the time of
filing their statements of claim or privilege. See id. § 9:4808(C).
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Thus, in Keybank National Association v. Perkins Rowe Associates,170 the
court held that work creating roads, drainage, and utilities for a large
development was mere preliminary site work that was separate from the
overall project because it “differ[ed] in kind” from the work that was
ultimately performed to “raise the buildings” of the development.171
Nevertheless, it is important not to confuse “preliminary site work” with
“dirt work,” for not all dirt work is considered to be preliminary site work,
as evidenced by the court’s decision in C & J Contractors v. American
Bank & Trust Co.172 In this case—a ranking dispute between a mortgagee
and several Private Works Act claimants involving work performed on a
golf course—the mortgagee argued that the work performed at the golf
course was mere dirt work that should not be considered for purposes of
determining the ranking of privileges as to third persons under the Act.173
The court disagreed, explaining that the dirt work at issue “was not in
preparation for the construction, but was the actual work of constructing a
golf course” and therefore constituted the beginning of work for purposes
of the Act.174
The provision concerning preliminary site work has remained largely
unchanged since its enactment almost 40 years ago, with the exception of
a 2003 legislative amendment that, in addition to adding the demolition of
existing structures as an example of preliminary site work, expanded this
provision to cover preliminary site work performed by the contractor when
the preliminary site work was not part of the contractor’s work for the
erection of the building or other construction.175 The 2019 revision
retained the reference to demolition work but eliminated as unnecessary
the expansion of the provision to cover preliminary site work performed
by the building contractor.176
In certain limited instances, the Act provides that a suspension of a
work for 30 days or more will cause it to be divided, for the limited
purposes of ranking only, into two separate works. This division results
170. Keybank Nat’l Ass’n, 823 F. Supp. 2d 399.
171. Id. at 414.
172. C & J Contractors v. American Bank & Trust Co., 559 So. 2d 810 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 562 So. 2d 318, 332 (La. 1990).
173. Id. at 814.
174. Id. at 815.
175. Act No. 729, 2003 La. Acts 2470, amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4808(C).
176. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4808 cmt. d (2020). The 2019 revision
retained a separate provision of the Act stating that preliminary site work does not
mark the commencement of work, even if performed by the contractor who will
erect the building. See id. § 9:4820(A)(2).
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only when the work is for the renovation or modification of an existing
building or other construction, and then only when notice of contract was
not filed.177 This provision, which was substantially rewritten by the 2019
revision in an effort to more clearly convey its intended meaning, is
discussed in Section VII.B below in the treatment of ranking issues.
By its terms, the Private Works Act does not apply to certain types of
work covered by other statutes, such the drilling of oil, gas, and water
wells, construction on railroads, and public works performed by the state
or its political subdivisions.178
D. Commencement of Work
Since 1966, the Private Works Act has specified the kinds of activities
that constitute the commencement of work.179 Generally, work was
considered to have commenced when excavation started and could be
observed upon inspection or when materials having a value of more than
$100 were delivered to the job site and were visible upon inspection. This
definition was amended several times prior to the 1981 revision to exclude
from consideration activities such as test piling,180 the cutting or removal
of trees and debris, the placing of fill dirt, and the leveling of the land
surface.181 The 1966 amendment also provided that work performed by an
architect, engineer, or other professional was not considered for purposes
of determining the commencement of work.182
The 1981 revision codified the basic elements of this definition, and
subsequent amendments introduced the additional exclusion of demolition
of existing structures183 and a provision that, for purposes of determining
when work has begun, the site of the immovable is the area within the
boundaries of the property.184 The 2019 revision retained this definition of
commencement of work, making technical changes to improve readability
and adding only the clearing and grading, in addition to leveling, of land
177. Id. § 9:4820(B). A work is suspended if the cost of the work performed
is less than $100 during a period of 30 days or more.
178. Id. § 9:4808(D). Public works are governed by the Public Works Act, LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 38:2241 et seq. (2005).
179. Act No. 507, 1966 La. Acts 1062.
180. Act No. 152, 1972 La. Acts 509.
181. Act No. 163, 1979 La. Acts 407.
182. Act No. 507, 1966 La. Acts 1062. Registered land surveyors were
expressly added to this list of professionals in 1968. See Act No. 252, 1968 La.
Acts 593.
183. Act No. 729, 2003 La. Acts 2470.
184. Act No. 666, 1995 La. Acts 1759.
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surfaces to the list of exclusions provided by former law. This addition
was made for the sake of consistency with the provision of the Act treating
preliminary site work as a separate work.185
For purposes of the Act, work is commenced by placing materials to
be used in the work at the site of the immovable or conducting other work
at the site of the immovable, the effect of which is visible from a simple
inspection and reasonably indicates that work has begun.186 Preliminary
site work, services rendered by surveyors, architects, and engineers, and
the placing of materials having an aggregate price of less than $100 are
not considered for purposes of determining when work has begun, even if
performed by the contractor who will erect a building.187
The determination of whether and when work has commenced is of
critical importance for a number of reasons. For example, as will be
discussed more fully in Section VII.A below, Private Works Act privileges
are effective against third persons from the earlier of the commencement
of the work or the filing of a notice of contract. The date that these
privileges become effective against third persons largely determines their
ranking.188 Owners are relieved of the claims and privileges of claimants
not in privity of contract with them if a timely notice of contract and
payment bond are filed before the commencement of work.189 If work has
not yet commenced, the Act provides a mechanism whereby a prematurely
filed notice of contract may be canceled, provided that certain
requirements concerning the filing of a no-work affidavit are satisfied.190
185. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4808(C) (2020).
186. Id. § 9:4820(A)(2).
187. Id. As discussed supra in Section III.C, if such work is performed by
some other contractor, it is deemed to be a separate work. Id. § 9:4808(C). This
distinction is important in the determination of when those who perform
preliminary site work must file statements of claim and privilege. If the
preliminary site work is a separate work, then the completion of the preliminary
site work will mark the commencement of the filing period. On the other hand, if
the preliminary site work is performed by the contractor who will erect the
building, then those who perform preliminary site work for the contractor will
have the same period of time to file a statement of claim or privilege following
completion of the entire work, as is afforded to other claimants. See Id. § 9:4808
cmt. d.
188. Id. § 9:4820(A). Persons intending to acquire rights in an immovable are
entitled to conclusively rely upon facts recited by a qualified inspector in a
properly filed affidavit to the effect that work on the immovable has not yet
commenced. See id. § 9:4820(C). The term “qualified inspector” is defined in id.
§ 9:4810(7).
189. Id. § 9:4802(C).
190. Id. § 9:4832(C)(2).
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Finally, when work begins determines whether the 2019 revision will
apply to the work because the transitional rules of the revision provide that
most of its provisions apply only to works commenced after January 1,
2020.191
E. Substantial Completion and Abandonment of Work
Another important determination to be made under the Act is whether
and when a work has been substantially completed or abandoned. Where
no notice of termination has been filed, these events mark the beginning
of the periods within which claimants must file statements of their claims
or privileges, as will be discussed later in this Article.192
The Private Works Act has contained rules concerning the meaning of
“substantial completion” of a work since 1964.193 These rules, which were
expanded in the 1981 Act,194 were substantively unchanged by the 2019
revision, though they were relocated within the Act.195 A work is
substantially completed when one of two events occur. The first is when
the last work is performed on, or the last materials are delivered to, the
immovable or to the specified area of the immovable with respect to which
a partial notice of termination has been filed. The second of the events
constituting substantial completion is when the owner accepts the
improvement or possesses or occupies the immovable or the area of the
immovable specified in a partial notice of termination, even though minor
matters or errors remain to be finished or resolved. According to the case
law, “if the only work remaining on the date the owner occupies the
premises is minor ‘punch list’ items, substantial completion occurs on that
date.”196 Conversely, “[o]ccupancy of the property does not trigger the
beginning of the period for filing liens if major or consequential

191. Act No. 325, §6, 2019 La. Acts. See infra Part IX.
192. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(A)(2), (B)(2), (C)(2), (D)(2). For this
reason, claimants may request that the owner notify them of the substantial
completion or abandonment of the work, and the owner must do so within 10 days.
See id. §§ 9:4822(I), (J).
193. Act No. 317, 1964 La. Acts 676.
194. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(H), (I) (2019). See also id. § 9:4822
cmt. h (2007).
195. Id. § 9:4809(A) (2020).
196. C & S Safety Systems, Inc. v. SSEM Corp., 843 So. 2d 447, 452 (La. Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 2003).
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construction items are unfinished or major remedial work remains to be
done.”197
In Urban’s Ceramic Tile, Inc. v. McLain, the court considered whether
a house for which a “long punch list” of items remained but possession of
which had been taken by the owners had been substantially completed for
purposes of the Act.198 The punch list of items included, among other
things, insulation, indoor and outdoor paint, installation and repair of
lighting, and installation of trim and molding.199 According to the court,
“substantial completion may be found even though deficiencies exist,” and
“the extent of the defect or nonperformance, the degree to which the
purpose of the contract is defeated, the ease of correction, and the use or
benefit of the work to be performed” should be considered in determining
whether a work has been substantially completed.200 Ultimately, the court
held that although some of the items on the punch list at issue, including
“laying the attic insulation, attaching the washer and dryer, and installing
the garage doors” constituted “larger projects,” these punch list items did
“not defeat the intended use of the house,” and the project had therefore
been substantially completed.201
A similar conclusion was reached by the court in E. Smith Plumbing,
Inc. v. Manuel, which held that the home at issue had been substantially
completed when the new owners “moved into and began living in” it,
despite the fact that “merely ‘minor or inconsequential’ items of work such
as installation of a light fixture” remained to be performed.202 In
Southmark Corp. v. Ellis Millwork, Inc., however, the court held that the
installation of ceiling lighting in an office building “is a major and
consequential part of the construction” and “not minor or remedial in
nature.”203 Because the owner’s tenant had moved into the office building
when major work, as opposed to “minor or inconsequential” matters,
remained to be performed, the court held that substantial completion did
not occur until the unfinished work was completed.204
197. Southmark Corp. v. Ellis Millwork, Inc., 535 So. 2d 507, 509 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1988).
198. Urban’s Ceramic Tile, Inc. v. McLain, 113 So. 3d 477, 482 (La. Ct. App.
2d Cir. 2013).
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Id.
202. E. Smith Plumbing, Inc. v. Manuel, 88 So. 3d 1209, 1216–17 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 2012).
203. Southmark Corp. v. Ellis Millwork, Inc., 535 So. 2d 507, 510 (La. Ct.
App. 2d Cir. 1988).
204. Id.
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In addition to its expansion of the concept of “substantial completion”
of the work, the 1981 Act added a definition of “abandonment” of the
work, the substance of which was also unchanged by the 2019 revision. A
work is abandoned by the owner when he terminates the work and notifies
those who are working on the project that he no longer desires to continue
it or when he otherwise objectively and in good faith manifests the
abandonment or discontinuance of the project.205 In Jonesboro State Bank
v. Tucker, the case cited in the comments to the 1981 Act, all work on the
project ceased for lack of funds, and the court explained that “any
unexplained and complete cessation of all work” on a project should be
treated as “a manifestation of intent on the owner’s part to abandon the
project.”206 In Evangeline Brokerage Co., Inc. v. Lewis, the court applied
the Jonesboro court’s reasoning in determining that, where “all work
activity ceased on the project” at the time the last worker left the project,
the work was abandoned within the meaning of the Private Works Act.207
In Nu-Lite Electrical Wholesalers, LLC v. Alfred Palma, Inc., the court
considered the issue of whether abandonment of work by a subcontractor
to whom materials were supplied is sufficient to trigger the period within
which the materials supplier must file its statement of claim or privilege,
or whether the Act instead requires “abandonment of the entire project by

205. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4809(B) (2020).
206. Jonesboro State Bank v. Tucker, 381 So. 2d 578, 581 (La. Ct. App. 2d
Cir. 1980). The court’s holding was to some extent premised upon the rule of strict
construction applicable to the Private Works Act and other lien statutes.
207. Evangeline Brokerage Co. v. Lewis, 539 So. 2d 1311, 1314 (La. Ct. App.
3d Cir. 1989). In reaching the conclusion that the Jonesboro approach provided
for the most equitable results, the court provided a brief history of several
jurisprudential tests that had developed for purposes of determining the actions
that constitute abandonment under the Act. Id. The first of these tests was the
“hope of completion” test, which posited that the filing period did not begin to
run until “the owner manifested an intent to abandon the project.” Id. See also
Stanley v. Falgoust, 398 So. 2d 1240 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1981). According to
the Jonesboro court, concern arose about the difficulty in determining the date of
abandonment under this test, as well as the existence of “indefinitely lingering”
filing periods in cases where the owner “stopped work on a project but manifested
no intent to abandon,” which ultimately led to the development of the “same
contract test” by the court in Clegg Concrete, Inc. v. Kel-Bar, Inc, 393 So. 2d 178
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1980). As explained by the court in Evangeline, this rule
provided that the 60-day filing period begins to run for works under a given
contract or contractor when that contractor “discontinues work on the project,”
regardless of whether work is later resumed with a new contractor. Evangeline,
539 So. 2d at 1314.
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the owner or general contractor.”208 In reaching its conclusion that the
default of a subcontractor on its portion of the work does not equate to
abandonment of the work, the court determined that, for purposes of
commencing the filing period, the “entire single, continuous project” must
be abandoned.209
F. Residential Work
As originally enacted, the 1981 revision did not distinguish between
residential works and other types of works. This changed to some degree
in 1991, when the legislature amended the Act to impose notice
requirements on sellers of movables used in connection with a residential
work. The amendment provided that for their Private Works Act privileges
to arise, sellers of movables sold for use in work for residential purposes
were required to deliver to the owner a notice of nonpayment at least 10
days before filing their statements of claim or privilege.210 The amendment
also provided that, where notice of contract was not filed, the period within
which a seller of movables on a work for residential purposes was allowed
to file his statement of claim or privilege was extended from 60 to 70
days.211 The 1991 amendment did not, however, provide any guidance as
to what constituted “work on an immovable for residential purposes,” as
opposed to other types of work performed under the Act.212

208. Nu-Lite Electrical Wholesalers, LLC v. Alfred Palma Inc., 878 So. 2d
660, 662 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2004).
209. Id. at 662–63.
210. Act No. 1024, 1991 La. Acts 3298, adding former LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:4802(G)(2). Notices of nonpayment provided by sellers of movables used in
connection with work for residential purposes were required to contain
information such as the seller’s name and address, a general description of the
movables provided, a description sufficient to identify the immovable upon which
work was performed, and a written statement of the seller’s lien rights.
211. Act No. 1024, 1991 La. Acts 3298, adding LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4822(D)(2).
212. Thus, it was unclear whether the amendment might apply to the
construction of large residential apartment complexes or other multi-unit
dwellings. The wording of the reference to work for residential purposes also
created an ambiguity as to whether that reference was intended to limit the
applicability of the amendment to residential works or was included merely for
emphasis. See Hawk Field Servs., L.L.C. v. Mid Am. Underground, L.L.C., 94
So. 3d 136 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012), writ denied, 99 So. 3d 652 (La. 2012) and
Standard Materials, L.L.C. v. C & C Builders, Inc., 2010 WL 5479903 (La. Ct.
App. 1st Cir. 2010) (interpreting the provision to apply only to residential works).
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While drafting the 2019 revision, the Law Institute’s Security Devices
Committee determined that both the notice requirement and the extended
filing period added in 1991 should be suppressed because of their limited
applicability to only sellers of movables, as opposed to other claimants.
The Committee could discern no policy justification for requiring that a
homeowner receive notice of nonpayment from sellers but not from other
claimants entitled to a privilege under the Act, nor for allowing sellers, but
not other claimants, a potential 70-day filing period.213 The Committee
also felt that the requirement of notice of nonpayment before filing was a
trap for the unwary seller, who might easily lose his claim and privilege
out of a lack of awareness of the rather obscure notice requirement. Thus,
as submitted to the legislature, House Bill No. 203 of 2019 eliminated both
former Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 9:4802(G)(2) and 4822(D)(2).214
Nevertheless, during the legislative session, a provision was added
that restored certain elements of the former law applicable to residential
works, but without a limitation to sellers and without any mandate that
notice of nonpayment be given before filing.215 As enacted, Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4822(D) provides that, on a residential work for
which a timely notice of contract was not filed, the period within which a
claimant must file his statement of claim or privilege is extended from 60
to 70 days if the claimant gives notice of nonpayment to the owner within
the 60-day period that would otherwise apply and at least 10 days before
filing his statement of claim or privilege.216 Significantly, the Act does not
require that notice of nonpayment be given. If the claimant elects not to
give notice of nonpayment, or if a claimant attempts to do so but fails to
satisfy the requirements of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4822(D), the
claimant will simply lose the benefit of the 10-day extension and will be
required to file his statement of claim or privilege within 60, rather than
70, days.217
In conjunction with the addition of Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4822(D), the legislature also added a definition of “residential work.”
For purposes of the Private Works Act, residential works are those for the
construction, improvement, modification, or repair of immovables

213. Minutes of the June 17, 2016 Meeting of the Security Devices
Committee, Louisiana State Law Institute (June 22, 2016) (on file with the Law
Institute).
214. H.B. 203, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
215. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(D) (2020).
216. The operation of this provision is discussed more fully infra in Section
IV.D.4.
217. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(A); see also id. § 9:4822 cmt. g.
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occupied or designed to be occupied as single- or double-family
residences.218
Within the Private Works Act is a series of five statutory provisions
that appear under the rather lofty heading of the Residential Truth in
Construction Act.219 These provisions require contractors on projects
consisting of “residential home improvements”220 to inform homeowners,
before they sign a contract for the work, of the possible “lien rights”
arising under the Private Works Act, but a contractor’s failure to give the
required notice does not affect the lien rights of any claimant, apparently
even those of the contractor himself.221 Although the Law Institute
considered several possible means of giving additional protection to
innocent homeowners, who often lack the practical ability to protect
themselves by requiring residential contractors to furnish payment
bonds,222 the 2019 revision ultimately made only one change to these
provisions: the prescribed form of the required notice was wholly rewritten
and simplified, without use of legal jargon, in an effort to make the
substance of the notice more understandable to those without training in
the law.223
G. Immovables
Historically, the privileges created by the Private Works Act operated
only upon immovables and arose only from work upon immovables.
Before the 2019 revision, the Private Works Act did not attempt to define
what constitutes an immovable but instead left that determination to other
law, primarily the Civil Code.224 Tracts of land are, of course, immovable,
as are their component parts.225 Buildings are immovable, regardless of
218. Id. § 9:4810(8).
219. Id. §§ 9:4851–55 (2007).
220. This term is defined in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4851(B).
221. Id. §§ 9:4852–54.
222. See Minutes of the June 15, 2018 Meeting of the Security Devices
Committee, Louisiana State Law Institute (June 19, 2018); Minutes of the August
17, 2018 Meeting of the Security Devices Committee, Louisiana State Law
Institute (Aug. 29, 2018) (on file with the Law Institute).
223. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4852(A) (2020).
224. Special legislation has provided, or clarified, that certain types of property
are not to be considered immovable, regardless of the degree of attachment to the
ground. See, e.g., id. §§ 9:1149.1, et seq. (2018) (manufactured homes considered
to be movable until filing of a declaration of immobilization); § 9:1106 (storage
tanks placed on land by someone other than the landowner considered to be
movable).
225. LA. CIV. CODE art. 462 (2020).
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whether they belong to the owner of the ground or to another person.226
Constructions other than buildings, however, are immovable only when
they belong to the owner of the ground.227 When these other constructions
belong to someone who is not the owner of the ground, they are
characterized as movables under the Civil Code.228
As applied to the Private Works Act as it existed before the 2019
revision, this characterization could sometimes lead to anomalous
consequences. If someone performed work on a structure, such as a tower,
that was owned by the owner of the ground, he was afforded a privilege
upon not only the tower itself, but also the tract of land of which it was a
component part. This privilege existed regardless of whether the work
caused a physical alteration of the land or was limited to the tower itself.
If, on the other hand, the identical tower was owned by someone other than
the landowner, such as a lessee or holder of a servitude, then the tower was
characterized as a movable under the Civil Code. Accordingly, if someone
performed work for the owner of the tower causing a physical alteration
of the ground, such as the installation of its foundations in the ground, he
would have a privilege under the Private Works Act, but that privilege
would encumber only the incorporeal right, usually a lease or servitude,
held by the person who owned the tower. The privilege would not extend
to the tower itself because it was movable.229 Moreover, if the claimant
worked only on the actual tower, as in the case of a painter who paints the
tower, the claimant would have no privilege at all under the Private Works
Act because the thing that he worked on was movable and his work was
therefore totally outside the scope of the Act.
The legislature likely never intended these anomalous results. As
enacted in 1926, the Act granted a privilege to persons providing labor or
materials for “the erection, construction, repair or improvement of any
building, structure or other immovable property” and provided that the
privilege extended to “the land and improvements.”230 The Act did not
differentiate whether the “structure” was owned by someone other than
the landowner. This is not surprising because, until the revision of the law
of property in 1978, buildings as well as other constructions, regardless of
whether owned by the owner of the ground or someone else, were

226. Id. arts. 463–64.
227. Id. art. 463.
228. Id. art. 475; see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 464, cmt. d (2010).
229. A privilege might arise under other law upon the tower as a movable. See,
e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4501–02 (2020).
230. Act No. 298, 1926 La. Acts 552 (emphasis added).
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immovable by their nature.231 The 1978 revision changed this
classification in the case of such other constructions owned by someone
other than the landowner, thereby creating the anomaly. The 1981 revision
of the Private Works Act seems not to have taken this change in property
law into account. Evidence of this exists in a provision of the 1981 revision
subordinating a “privilege granted by this Part upon a lessee’s rights in the
lease or buildings and structures” to the rights of the lessor.232 Those
“structures” must clearly be something other than a building and, as
property of the lessee rather than the landowner, would necessarily be
movable. The Act seemed to presuppose that the privileges it created
would attach to the structure without actually providing for that result. 233
The 2019 revision addressed the problem by defining the term
“immovable” for purposes of the Act to include, in addition to property
defined by the Civil Code as immovable, any construction that is
permanently attached to the ground and that would be classified by law as
immovable if it belonged to the landowner.234 This definitional approach
231. LA. CIV. CODE art. 464 (1870) (“Lands and buildings or other
constructions, whether they have their foundations in the soil or not, are
immovable by their nature.”). See Industrial Outdoor Displays v. Reuter, 162 So.
2d 160 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1964) (classifying a commercial billboard sign
structure as an “other construction” and holding it to be “an immovable by nature”
under former Civil Code article 464); Continental Cas. Co. v. Associated Pipe &
Supply Co., 279 F. Supp. 490 (E.D. La. 1967) (holding that a pipeline is an “other
construction” that is governed by the Private Works Act because it “can only be
considered an immovable” under former Civil Code article 464); P. H. A. C.
Servs., Inc. v. Seaways Intern., Inc., 403 So. 2d 1199 (La. 1981) (discussing the
provisions of former Civil Code article 464 and the changes made by the 1978
property revision before ultimately concluding that a “three story high permanent
steel structure” designed to serve as living quarters for offshore workers is a
building that “is therefore classified as an immovable” and subject to the Private
Works Act).
232. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4806(D) (2019) (emphasis added).
233. Interestingly, the 1991 revision of the law of mortgage, undertaken a
decade later, did take the 1978 change in property law into account by providing
that a mortgage can encumber the rights of a lessee or servitude owner in
“buildings or other constructions on the land.” See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3286(3)–
(4) (2020). Thus, these other constructions, although movable, are susceptible of
encumbrance by mortgage.
234. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4810(4) (2020). The law of accession affords
similar treatment of constructions of this nature as immovables when they belong
to someone other than the landowner. Where a principal thing consists of a
movable construction permanently attached to the ground, its accessories include
things that would be its component parts if the construction were immovable. LA.
CIV. CODE art. 508.
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to the problem has two effects: not only will the privilege attach to these
other constructions, but work solely upon them will trigger the protections
of the Act. Thus, in the example given above, persons involved in the
installation or repair of the tower, regardless of whether their work
involves only the tower itself rather than an alteration of the ground, will
be afforded a privilege under the Act upon the servitude or lease held by
the person who owns the tower, as well as upon the tower itself.235
As mentioned in Section III.C above, a “work” under the Act always
involves a physical change in an immovable or its component parts, but
this does not mean that land is always involved. For instance, a
condominium unit is a corporeal immovable,236 and repair work
undertaken by a unit owner on his unit will trigger the protections of the
Act. Because a building is always an immovable, construction or repair of
a building constitutes a “work” under the Act even if the building has no
connection at all with land.237 The 2019 revision made clear, however, that
the immovable must be located in Louisiana at the time of the work in
order for the Act to apply.238 Thus, general conflict of law principles
cannot be asserted to export the Act to projects on real property in other
states based on the argument that Louisiana’s policies, such as those of
protecting unpaid claimants who contribute to the improvement of an
immovable, would be most seriously impaired if its law were not applied
to a project in another state.239
H. Complete Property Description
As originally enacted, the 1981 Private Works Act required all filings
under the Act to “reasonably identify” the immovable upon which work
was performed.240 The Act gave no indication of what form such a
235. Because the structure, as a movable, may be subject to encumbrances,
such as security interests arising under the Uniform Commercial Code, the 2019
revision includes a new rule to rank these competing interests, as discussed infra
in Section VII.C. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821(D).
236. See YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 143, § 7:42.
237. P. H. A. C. Servs., Inc. v. Seaways Intern., Inc., 403 So. 2d 1199 (La.
1981).
238. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4808(A).
239. See id. § 9:4808 cmt. b. Nevertheless, as that official revision comment
observes, work on a building that is located in Louisiana at the time of the work
but is later moved outside the state is subject to the Act. See P. H. A. C. Servs.,
Inc., 403 So. 2d 1199.
240. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4811(A)(2), 9:4822(E)(1),
9:4822(G)(3) (1982).
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reasonable identification might take or what degree of specificity was
required.
The Act was amended in 1983241 to require filings that refer to an
immovable to contain a description of the immovable “sufficient to clearly
and permanently identify the property.”242 The amendment also provided
examples of descriptions that satisfy this requirement, including
references to the lot, square, subdivision, or the township and range.243
Since 1983, the Act has also specifically provided that a mere municipal
address is insufficient.244 A 1988 amendment to the Act went even further,
requiring that a notice of contract contain a “legal property description” of
the immovable.245 The amendment supplied no definition of that term.
The 2019 revision introduced the term “complete property
description,” which it defines as a description that, if contained in a
properly filed mortgage, would be sufficient for the mortgage to be
effective as to third persons.246 Thus, in a scant three dozen words, the Act
incorporates all of the jurisprudence that has interpreted the Civil Code’s
requirement that a mortgage “must state precisely the nature and situation”
of the mortgaged immovable.247 The 2019 revision requires the use of a
241. Act No. 589, §1, 1983 La. Acts 1179.
242. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4831(C) (1983).
243. Id.
244. Id. See also Tee It Up Golf, Inc. v. Bayou State Constr., LLC, 30 So. 3d
1159 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010); Boes Iron Works, Inc. v. Spartan Bldg. Corp.,
648 So. 2d 24 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1994); Norman H. Voelkel Constr., Inc. v.
Recorder of Mortgages for East Baton Rouge Parish, 859 So. 2d 9 (La. Ct. App.
1st Cir. 2003).
245. Act No. 685, §1, 1988 La. Acts 1774. The same Act amended LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. §9:4811(B) to provide that the improper identification of the
immovable was prima facie proof of actual prejudice by a claimant or other person
acquiring rights in an immovable.
246. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4810(3) (2020). A non-uniform provision of the
Louisiana Uniform Commercial Code uses a similar formulation for prescribing
the type of immovable property description that must be contained in fixture
filings and financing statements affecting as-extracted collateral or standing
timber. See id. § 10:9-502(b)(3).
247. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3288 (2020). See, e.g., H.J. Smith & Sons v. Baham,
102 So. 657 (La. 1925); Consolidated Ass’n of Planters of Louisiana v. Mason,
24 La. Ann. 518 (1872); Mid-State Homes, Inc. v. Knapp, 156 So. 2d 122 (La. Ct.
App. 3d Cir. 1963). The words “nature and situation” originated in the Loi du 11
brumaire An VII (1er novembre 1798), which required a conventional mortgage
to describe “la nature et la situation” of each of the mortgaged immovables. The
intent was to break with past custom, which had conferred upon any notarial act
evidencing an obligation the effect of a general mortgage upon all present and
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complete property description in all filings that are made by the owner or
contractor, such as notices of contract and notices of termination.248 An
affidavit of no work must also contain a complete property description.249
Filings by other persons may contain a complete property description but,
as under the 1981 Act, are required to contain only a reasonable
identification of the immovable.250 The Act provides that a mere municipal
address qualifies as neither a complete property description nor a
reasonable identification of the immovable.251
Before its revision in 2019, the Act specifically provided that a notice
of termination could, in lieu of stating a full description of the immovable,
refer to the recordation data of the filed notice of contract to which it
related and that such a reference would suffice as an adequate
identification of the immovable.252 Perhaps from oversight, the Act did not
expressly apply this same rule to other filings made subsequent to the
notice of contract. The 2019 revision expands the rule to apply to those
subsequent filings. If a notice of contract containing a complete property
description of the immovable has been filed, reference in any subsequent
filing to the recordation data of the notice of contract suffices as a complete
property description in the subsequent filing and would certainly also
constitute a reasonable identification of the immovable. If the filed notice
of contract contains at least a reasonable identification of the immovable,
reference in a subsequent filing to the notice of contract is sufficient as a
reasonable identification of the immovable in the subsequent filing.253
It is, of course, possible that a notice of contract may contain neither
a complete property description, as the law requires, or even a reasonable
identification of the immovable. In that event, a claimant who has chosen
to describe the immovable in his statement of claim or privilege by a mere
future immovables of the obligor, even without a stipulation of a mortgage. See
21 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE & P. DELOYNE, TRAITÉ THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE
DE DROIT CIVIL, Du nantissement, des privilèges et hypothèques et de
l’expropriation forcée, Tome Premier, Introduction, p. I, XXXI–XXXII (2d
ed.1899). These words were later incorporated into the Code Napoleon upon its
adoption and appear in the 1825 and 1870 Louisiana Civil Codes, as well as its
present Civil Code. CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] art. 2191 (Fr.) (1804); Louisiana Civil
Code of 1825, art. 3273; Louisiana Civil Code of 1870, art. 3306; LA. CIV. CODE
art. 3288 (2020).
248. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4811(A)(2); 9:4822(E), (G); 9:4831(B).
249. Id. § 9:4831(B).
250. Id. §§ 9:4822(H)(3), 9:4831(B).
251. Id. § 9:4831(B).
252. Id. § 9:4822(E)(1) (2019).
253. Id. § 9:4822(E)(1) (2020).
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reference to the recorded notice of contract has not satisfied the
requirement for a reasonable identification of the immovable in his
statement of claim or privilege. It would be unfair to third persons for this
deficient statement of claim or privilege to suffice to preserve the
claimant’s privilege against them, and the 2019 revision expressly
provides that the privilege is not preserved under those circumstances as
to any third person having or acquiring an interest in the immovable. An
innovation in the revision, however, partially rescues the claimant from
the consequences of his error by providing that the statement of claim or
privilege, even though containing a deficient description of the
immovable, will nevertheless be sufficient to preserve all rights of the
claimant against the owner, the contractor, and the surety.254 As the official
revision comments explain, this rule prevents an owner from profiting
from his own error in giving an insufficient description of the immovable
in the notice of contract.255
I. Professional Consultants and Professional Subconsultants
As enacted, the 1981 Act granted a privilege to registered or certified
surveyors or engineers and licensed architects employed by the owner for
the price of their professional services, but it did not employ any sort of
special terminology to refer to these professionals.256 In 1987, an
amendment to the Act extended this privilege to professional
subconsultants, who were defined in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801
as registered or certified surveyors or engineers or licensed architects
employed by the “prime professional.”257 In 1989, the legislature amended
the Act to grant a claim and privilege in favor of “[p]rime consultant
registered or certified surveyors or engineers, or licensed architects, . . .
employed by the contractor or a subcontractor” for the price of their
professional services.258 A claim and privilege was also granted to the
professional subconsultants of these prime consultants. The amendment
defined “professional subconsultants” in Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4802 as registered or certified surveyors or engineers or licensed
254. Id. § 9:4831(D). Another instance in which a claimant’s privilege is lost
as to third persons but where his claims against the owner, contractor, and surety
are preserved occurs when a claimant files a timely suit on his claim but fails to
file a timely notice of the pendency of the suit in the mortgage records. See id. §
9:4833(E).
255. Id. § 9:4831 cmt. d.
256. See id. §§ 9:4801, 9:4820 (1982).
257. Act No. 685, 1987 La. Acts 1657.
258. Act No. 41, 1989 La. Acts 287.
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architects employed by the “prime consultant.”259 Thus, until the 2019
revision, the term “professional subconsultant” was defined twice in the
Act, and the terms “prime professional” and “prime consultant” were used
without definition.
The 2019 revision retained a definition of “professional
subconsultant” and added a definition of “professional consultant.” For
purposes of the Private Works Act, a professional consultant is a
professional surveyor, professional engineer, or licensed architect engaged
by the owner or by a contractor or subcontractor.260 A professional
subconsultant is a professional surveyor, professional engineer, or licensed
architect engaged by a professional consultant.261
These definitions of professional consultant and professional
subconsultant are important because the Act grants rights to only those
professionals who qualify as a professional consultant or professional
subconsultant. Where a professional consultant or professional
subconsultant is a juridical person, claims and privileges arise under the
Act in favor of the juridical person, rather than its individual employees.262
Thus, if an engineering firm is engaged by the owner and subcontracts a
portion of the engineering services to another engineering firm, both firms
will be entitled to a privilege under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801.
None of the individual engineers employed by either firm will be entitled
to any rights under the Act; their rights will be strictly against their
respective employers.
The inclusion of professional subconsultants within the ambit of
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801 creates the only instance in which a
person not in privity with the owner is granted a privilege under that
section. Despite the absence of a direct contractual relationship between
these professional subconsultants and the owner, their privilege is included
in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801, rather than Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4802, because their work does not arise out of a contract
between the owner and a contractor. This is also the only instance in which
a claimant is given a privilege under the Act when he has no personal
claim, whether contractual or statutory, against the owner. And
accordingly, this creates the only instance in which a privilege arising
259. Act No. 41, 1989 La. Acts 287, enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4802(A)(5)(a).
260. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4810(5) (2020). The revision substituted
“professional” in place of “registered or certified” when referring to surveyors or
engineers in order to conform to the designations currently used by those
professions. Id.
261. Id. § 9:4810(6).
262. Id. § 9:4803(D).
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under the Act does not secure an obligation of the owner.263 Because the
owner is not personally obligated to professional subconsultants of a
professional consultant that the owner directly engaged, the privilege
arising in favor of those professional subconsultants must necessarily
secure an obligation owed by someone other than the owner; specifically,
it secures the obligations owed to them by the professional consultant who
engaged them.
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802 grants both a claim and privilege
against the owner, as well as a claim against the contractor, in favor of
professional consultants engaged by the contractor or a subcontractor,
and also in favor of the professional subconsultants of those professional
consultants, for the price of their professional services rendered in
connection with the work.264
Several provisions of the Act treat the claims and privileges
established in favor of professional consultants and their professional
subconsultants differently from those afforded to other claimants.265 As
will be discussed in Section VII.D below, their privileges rank behind the
privileges of most other Private Works Act claimants and are not effective
as to third persons until a statement of claim or privilege is filed.
Professional consultants and their professional subconsultants are also
required to give notice to the owner within 30 days of their engagement in
order to be entitled to rights under the Act, unless they were directly
engaged by the owner.266
IV. FILING REQUIREMENTS
The Private Works Act requires or permits the filing of several
different documents in connection with a work: a notice of contract, a
payment bond, a “no-work” affidavit, a notice of termination, a statement
of claim or privilege, a notice of pendency of action, and a release bond,
all of which are filed in the mortgage records of the parish of the
immovable upon which the work is to be performed.267 Each document
will be discussed in turn below.

263. Other privileges granted by Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801 secure
the contractual obligations of the owner, and privileges granted by Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4802 secure the personal claims that that section grants them
against the owner. See id. § 9:4802(B).
264. Id. § 9:4802(A)(5).
265. Id. §§ 9:4820(D), 9:4821(B)(3).
266. Id. § 9:4804(A).
267. Id. § 9:4831(A).
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A. Notice of Contract
The Act contemplates, and even appears to require, that an owner will
file a notice of contract prior to the commencement of work.268 The notice
must contain certain basic statutorily prescribed information, such as the
names and addresses of the owner and contractor, a complete property
description of the immovable,269 the name of the project,270 the price of the
work or the method by which the price is to be calculated and an estimate
of it, when payment of the price is to be made, and a general description
of the work to be done. The contract itself can be recorded, rather than a
notice of contract, provided that it contains the prescribed information.271
The purposes of a notice of contract are two-fold. First, the notice
gives a potential claimant important information that is needed to file his
statement of claim or privilege, such as the names and addresses of the
responsible owner and the contractor, as well as a description of the
immovable upon which the work is to be performed. Indeed, rather than
describing the immovable property in his statement of claim or privilege,
the claimant can simply make reference to the recordation of the filed
notice of contract.272

268. Id. § 9:4831(C).
269. Prior to the 2019 revision, the Act required that the notice contain “the
legal property description of the immovable.” Under the 2019 revision, the notice
must state a “complete property description,” a term that is now defined in LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4810(3). See supra Section III.H.
270. Under the 2019 revision, the name of the project must be given only if
the project actually has a name. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4811(A)(2).
271. Often, the contract itself fails to contain a proper description of the
immovable and for that reason will not satisfy the requirements of the law. See,
e.g., Thompson Tree & Spraying Serv., Inc. v. White-Spunner Constr., Inc., 68
So. 3d 1142 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2011). Nevertheless, it remains a common,
though ill-advised, practice for owners and contractors to file the contract itself,
rather than a notice of contract, without taking care to include a sufficient
description of the immovable.
272. But if the notice of contract to which the statement of claim or privilege
refers does not itself contain at least a reasonable identification of the immovable,
that reference will be insufficient to preserve the claimant’s privilege against third
persons. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4831(C). Nevertheless, as discussed supra in
Section III.H, a statement of claim or privilege that refers to a filed notice of
contract for an identification of the immovable will be sufficient to preserve the
claimant’s personal claims against the owner, the contractor, and the surety, even
if the identification of the immovable in the notice of contract does not constitute
a reasonable identification. Id. § 9:4831(D).
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The other purpose of a notice of contract is to serve as notice to third
persons of the potential existence of privileges arising under the Act.273
Although this purpose is worthwhile, it must not be inferred that the
absence of the filing of a notice of contract means that third persons
acquiring rights in the immovable will take free of privileges arising under
the Act. To the contrary, provided that a statement of claim or privilege is
ultimately filed before expiration of the applicable filing period, a
privilege arising under the Act is effective against third persons, without
recordation, from the moment work commences, even if notice of contract
is never filed and even if the third person acquires rights in the immovable
long before the statement of claim or privilege is filed.274 If notice of
contract is filed, however, the date of its filing is an important factor in the
determination of when Private Works Act privileges arising from the work
become effective as to third persons275 and, accordingly, their ranking
against third persons.276
Although filing a notice of contract is not absolutely mandated by the
Act, whether a notice of contract is properly filed has important
consequences. First, the owner is relieved of claims and privileges of those
who are not in privity of contract with him if a timely notice of contract,
with a payment bond attached, is filed before commencement of the
work.277 Second, filing a notice of contract automatically causes the work
comprehended within the contract to be considered as a separate work for
purposes of the Act and causes the contractor to be considered as a general
contractor under the Act, even if the contractor is not responsible for the
273. Exposé des Motifs, supra note 56; LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4811 cmt. d
(2020).
274. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4820(A). It has long been the rule under the
Private Works Act and its predecessors that privileges arising under those statutes
are effective against third persons from the moment the privilege arises, even
without recordation, provided that a statement of the privilege is ultimately filed
within the time required by law. See Gleissner v. Hughes, 95 So. 529 (La. 1922).
The Act itself, however, contains two exceptions to this rule: privileges arising
under Louisiana Revised Statutes §§ 9:4801(5) and 9:4802(A)(5) in favor of
professional consultants and their subconsultants are not effective as to third
persons until a statement of claim or privilege is filed. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4820(D). The same rule applies to privileges arising from preliminary site work.
See id. § 9:4808(C).
275. Id. § 9:4820(A)(1).
276. Id. § 9:4821(A)(2).
277. Id. § 9:4802(C). For the owner to be relieved of liability, the surety must
remain solvent through the time the owner moves for a judgment of discharge of
further responsibility after completion or abandonment of the work. Id. §
9:4841(C).

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 58

10/12/20 7:07 AM

2020]

REWORKING LOUISIANA’S PRIVATE WORKS ACT

1047

entire construction project.278 Third, the periods for filing statements of
claim or privilege for claimants under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802
are shortened to 30 days, but the 30-day period does not commence to run
until a notice of termination is filed.279 The final consequence arises when
notice of contract is not filed and the contract is a general contract that
exceeds $100,000: in that event, the general contractor is deprived of a
privilege under the Act.280
To have the effect of relieving an owner of claims and privileges in
favor of those claiming under a general contractor, and of preserving the
general contractor’s right to a privilege, the notice of contract must be filed
in a timely manner, that is, before the commencement of work.281 As
mentioned above, another effect of filing notice of contract is the
shortening to only 30 days of the period within which claimants under
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802 are required to file their statements
of claim or privilege.282 As the 1981 Act was originally enacted, this effect
resulted from the filing of a notice of contract, even if it was untimely.
This rule was an intentional change in the law that existed at that time, and
the official revision comments to the 1981 revision explicitly indicated
that, under that revision, an owner could file notice of contract
simultaneously with a notice of termination in order to achieve the effect
of requiring claimants to file within the shorter filing period.283 This could
create a trap for unwary claimants who might have reasonably believed
from the fact that notice of contract was not filed at the inception that the
filing period would be a full 60 days. A legislative amendment in 1988
restored the requirement that the notice of contract must be filed in a timely

278. Id. § 9:4808(B).
279. Id. § 9:4822(B). Under the 2019 revision, an outer filing date of six
months from substantial completion or abandonment—or seven months in the
case of a general contractor’s privilege—is imposed. See discussion infra in
Section IV.D.4.
280. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4811(D). As discussed supra in Section I.F and
note 153, the 2019 revision raised the threshold from $25,000 to $100,000 and, at
the same time, legislatively overruled the rationale of cases that had allowed a
general contractor to assert a privilege for that portion of the work that he did
himself rather than subcontracting to others. See supra note 154 (discussing
Burdette v. Drushell and Tharpe and Brooks, Inc. v. Arnott Corp.).
281. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4802(C), 9:4811(A), (D). A surety bond
conforming to the requirements of the Act must also be attached to the filed notice
of contract, as discussed below. Id. § 9:4802(C).
282. Id. § 9:4822(A) (1982).
283. Id. § 9:4822 cmt. a (2007).
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manner to have the effect of reducing the filing period to 30 days.284 The
2019 revision continued this rule.285
For the notice of contract to have the effect of relieving an owner of
claims and privileges arising under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802,
it must, in addition to being timely filed, have attached to it at the time of
filing a payment bond conforming to the requirements of the Act.
Nevertheless, it was clear under the 1981 Act—and it remains equally
clear under the 2019 revision—that the failure of the owner to attach a
payment bond does not cause a notice of contract to be improperly filed.
This is explicitly provided in the text of the Act.286 Of course, if no
payment bond is attached to the notice of contract, its filing will not relieve
the owner of claims and privileges arising through the general contractor,
but the other effects mentioned above will still be achieved.287
The 2019 revision made one change in the consequences of the failure
to attach a bond. Under the law in effect prior to the 2019 revision, if notice
of contract with a contractor who would not otherwise qualify as a general
contractor was filed in a timely manner, that contractor would be deemed
to be a general contractor, and his work would be deemed to be a separate
work, but only if a proper bond was attached to the notice of contract. The
Security Devices Committee of the Law Institute could discern no policy
reason why this effect should flow only when a bond is attached to the
contractor’s notice of contract,288 nor any logical connection between the
provision of a bond and the consequences of separateness of the
contractor’s work or his treatment as a general contractor. Accordingly,
the 2019 revision eliminated the condition that a bond must be attached to
the notice of contract in order for these consequences to result.289
Although the Act makes clear that notice of contract must be filed
before work commences to be considered timely,290 it sets no limit on how
far in advance of the commencement of work that the notice of contract
can be filed. When notice of contract is filed before work commences, its
filing establishes the date that privileges arising from the work will
become effective as to third persons and will prevent a later-filed mortgage
284. Act No. 685, 1988 La. Acts 1774, amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4822(A).
285. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(B) (2020).
286. Id. § 9:4811(C).
287. Id. § 9:4802(C).
288. Minutes of the March 4, 2016 Meeting of the Security Devices
Committee, Louisiana State Law Institute (Mar. 18, 2016) (on file with the Law
Institute).
289. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4808(B).
290. Id. § 9:4811(A).
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from being accorded priority over those privileges.291 If his construction
lender’s mortgage was not previously filed, the owner may find his ability
to obtain construction financing for the project seriously impaired.
Provided that work has not already begun, the Act supplies a
mechanism by which the improvidently filed notice of contract can be
canceled so that the construction lender’s mortgage can then be filed
followed by a second notice of contract, thereby permitting the lender to
achieve the first priority that construction lenders typically require as a
condition of financing. Prior to the 2019 revision, this was achieved by
filing a “mutual release” along with an affidavit from an engineer,
architect, or surveyor that work had not commenced “at a specified time
subsequent to the filing of the contract.”292 The 2019 revision retains this
concept but corrects an apparent error in the former provision.293 The
critical point in time for a determination of whether work had commenced
should not be any randomly selected point in time after filing of the notice
of contract but rather should be the time when the request for cancellation
of the notice of contract is filed.294 Thus, the revision contemplates a twostep process to achieve cancellation.295 First, a request for cancellation
signed by the owner and contractor must be filed, and, within four business
days afterward, a no-work affidavit from a “qualified inspector” must be
filed, stating that, as of any specified time following the filing of the
request for cancellation, work had not begun.296 When this process is
followed, the notice of contract that is canceled has no effect,297 and the
date of filing of a subsequent notice of contract is considered to be the date
of filing of notice of contract for purposes of the Act.298
291. Id. §§ 9:4820(A), 9:4821(A)(2).
292. Id. § 9:4811(E) (2019), added by Act No. 729, 2003 La. Acts 2470.
293. Id. § 9:4832(C).
294. Id. § 9:4832 cmt. b.
295. Id. § 9:4832(C).
296. The terms “business day” and “qualified inspector” are defined in
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4810.
297. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4832(D).
298. Id. § 9:4820(E). The Act does not expressly provide what occurs when
the affidavit is false, and, contrary to its assertions, work had in fact begun before
filing of the request for cancellation. That result can, however, be easily inferred
from the provisions of the Act. Under those circumstances, the canceled notice of
contract is still without effect, but privileges arising from the work will
nevertheless continue to have effect against third persons from whatever date
work actually began. If the affidavit is false, that date is necessarily some point in
time prior to the filing of the request for cancellation. In other words, Private
Works Act privileges will have effect from the moment work began, as though
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A notice of contract ceases to have effect five years after it is filed,
unless it is reinscribed within that time.299 Unlike reinscriptions of
mortgages,300 an untimely reinscription of a notice of contract is not
permitted.301
B. No-Work Affidavits
Since 1966, the Private Works Act has permitted the filing of an
affidavit from an architect, engineer, or surveyor to the effect that work on
an immovable has not begun.302 Given that the commencement of work is
a critical element of the determination of when privileges arising under the
Act take effect against third persons, and accordingly their ranking, the
facts established by such an affidavit are of great importance to a third
person who might desire to obtain a mortgage or other interest in the
immovable. Originally, only lenders were permitted to rely upon such an
affidavit, but the 1981 revision expanded this protection to apply to any
person “acquiring or intending to acquire a mortgage, privilege, or other
right, in or on an immovable.”303 So long as the affidavit was filed before
or within two business days after the filing of the mortgage, privilege, or
other document creating the rights in question, the 1981 revision provided
that the correctness of the facts recited in the affidavit could not be
controverted to affect the priority of the rights of the person for whom the
affidavit was given. Thus, the effect of the affidavit, if timely filed, was to
preclude a Private Works Act claimant from claiming priority on the
ground that work had in fact begun as of the time of the inspection, despite
the recitations of the affidavit. The two business-day period was expanded
to four business days in 1988.304
Even though the no-work affidavit could be filed before the mortgage,
careful practitioners were wary of relying on an affidavit filed before the
the notice of contract had never been filed. A second notice of contract filed later
will not change this. See id § 9:4832 cmt. c.
299. Id. § 9:4834. The 2019 revision made no substantive change to this
provision, but it did clarify that successive reinscriptions are permitted. See id. §
9:4834 cmt.
300. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3365 (2020).
301. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4834.
302. Act No. 507, 1966 La. Acts 1062. Immediately prior to the 1981 revision,
this provision was codified at Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4819(A)(3). The
provision is quoted at length in Louisiana National Bank of Baton Rouge v. Triple
R Contractors, Inc., 345 So. 2d 7 (La. 1977).
303. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4820(C) (1982).
304. Act No. 999, 1988 La. Acts 2698.
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mortgage. The reason was that, while filing the affidavit before the
mortgage would preclude a potential Private Works Act claimant from
contending that at the moment of the inspection work had not begun, he
would not be precluded from asserting that, as of the very next moment in
time, work was in fact in progress. This assertion would be correct, given
that work actually had begun at some time prior to the inspection,
notwithstanding the recitations in the affidavit. Thus, if the affidavit was
recorded before the mortgage, or if it recited a time of inspection before
the time of recordation of the mortgage, the mortgagee was still exposed
to the risk of priming Private Works Act privileges. The perception of this
risk led to the practice of “bookending,” in which affidavits would be
obtained and filed both before and after the filing of the mortgage, so that
the facts recited in the later affidavit would be the essential facts needed
to establish the mortgage’s priority.
Act 425 of 2012 attempted to address this problem through the
addition of former subsection D of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4820.
That subsection provided that the person obtaining the no-work affidavit
was given “priority in accordance with R.S. 9:4821,” regardless of whether
work was actually begun after the effective date and time of the affidavit.
The provision presupposed that Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4821
grants priority to the person obtaining the affidavit, but that was not
necessarily so; indeed, that was not so when work had actually begun
before the time the mortgage is filed. Thus, it could be legitimately
questioned whether subsection D achieved its intended goal. 305

305. Other criticisms could also be leveled against former Subsections C and
D of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4820. Subsection C required that the no-work
affidavit be filed within four business days after its execution and that the
mortgage be filed before or within four business days of the filing of the affidavit.
This gave rise to the possibility that a total of eight business days might elapse
between the execution of the affidavit and the filing of the mortgage that is to be
given priority on the basis of the affidavit. For instance, the affidavit might be
executed on Friday, May 17, 2019, filed four business days later on Thursday,
May 23, 2019, followed by the filing of the mortgage itself an additional four
business days later on Thursday, May 30, 2019 (Monday, May 27, being a legal
holiday). Thus, a total of 13 calendar days could elapse between the time the
affidavit was executed and the time the mortgage was filed—a substantial period
of time during which there might be a significant possibility that work had actually
begun. But the problem was actually much worse, for there was nothing in these
provisions that imposed a temporal requirement upon the actual inspection itself.
Thus, in the example just given, the inspection might actually have occurred on
January 1, 2019. So long as the inspector did not actually execute an affidavit until
May 17, the mortgage filed on May 30 would arguably still have priority.
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To remedy the deficiencies in these provisions, the 2019 revision
added the presumption that was missing from them: if a no-work affidavit
from a qualified inspector is timely filed, the underlying facts recited in
the affidavit are deemed not only to be “true at the time of the inspection”
but also “to remain true at the time of the filing of the mortgage, privilege,
or other document” creating rights in favor of the person obtaining the
affidavit. The correctness of these facts cannot be controverted to affect
the priority of that person’s rights.306 Bookending should thus no longer
be necessary, so long as the no-work affidavit obtained before the filing of
the mortgage is itself filed in a timely manner.
Although the 1981 Act as originally enacted provided that a no-work
affidavit must be filed within a very short window of time before or after
the filing of the mortgage, a subsequent legislative change effectively
removed the limit on how long the affidavit might be filed after the
mortgage is filed.307 Thus, the no-work affidavit might not be obtained and
filed until months, or even years, after the mortgage had been filed. The
2019 revision requires a no-work affidavit to be filed within four business
days before or within four business days after the filing of a mortgage if
the affidavit is to be conclusively relied upon by the mortgagee.308 The
Security Devices Committee consciously made the policy decision to
restore an outer time limit on the filing of the affidavit. A no-work affidavit
has the potential effect of depriving Private Works Act claimants of
priority to which they are legitimately entitled. If a mortgagee wishes to
have the conclusive benefit of a no-work affidavit, to the prejudice of
innocent claimants, the committee felt that the mortgagee should have the
burden of arranging the inspection and recording the affidavit near the time
of its mortgage, rather than as an afterthought.309 Of course, if the
mortgage truly was recorded before work began and before notice of
contract was filed, the mortgagee will still be able to establish the priority

306. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4820(C) (2020) (emphasis added). The
mortgage would, however, be subordinate to privileges of laborers, given that
those privileges always have priority over mortgages.
307. Act No. 999, 1988 La. Acts 2698 (changing the time period within which
the affidavit must be filed from two to four business days and changing the event
that triggered this time period from “the filing of the mortgage, privilege, or other
document creating the rights” to “the execution of the affidavit”).
308. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4820(C).
309. Minutes of the March 24, 2017 Meeting of the Security Devices
Committee, Louisiana State Law Institute (Mar. 28, 2017) (on file with the Law
Institute).
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of his mortgage based upon the actual facts,310 but he will not be able to
use a no-work affidavit as conclusive proof.
Question has arisen in the jurisprudence as to whether a mortgagee
can avail himself of the benefits of a no-work affidavit when the
mortgagee has actual knowledge of the falsity of the recitations in the
affidavit. In C & J Contractors v. American Bank & Trust Co.,311 the court
held that a no-work affidavit is designed to protect only an innocent
mortgagee or other third person who either did not inspect the property or
had no actual knowledge that work had begun. Where that person had
actual knowledge to the contrary, he did not actually rely on the no-work
affidavit and could not claim its benefits. The court felt that to hold
otherwise would encourage the abuse of a provision of law that “was not
meant to provide technical immunity to mortgage holders that have actual
knowledge that a project is well under way, who wish to use the affidavit
only to protect their interest and usurp the rights of lienholders when a
project fails.”312
Apparently because of fear of the exact reach of the court’s holding in
C & J Contractors, the legislature responded by amending the text of the
Act to allow the third person obtaining the no-work affidavit to have the
benefit of its conclusive effects “unless actual fraud by such person is
proven.”313 Although the term “actual fraud” appears undefined in
Louisiana law,314 the 2019 revision retained this provision as it was written
in order to avoid implying that a change in the law on this point was
intended. The term “actual fraud” presumably requires something more
than mere constructive knowledge that the affidavit may be incorrect; a
person’s actual knowledge of its falsity is required in order to defeat the
person’s ability to rely on the affidavit.315
As discussed in Section IV.A above, a no-work affidavit is required
when an owner and contractor seek to cancel a prematurely or
improvidently filed notice of contract.316 The affidavit must recite that
310. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821(A)(2).
311. C & J Contractors v. American Bank & Trust Co., 559 So. 2d 810 (La.
Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990), writ denied, 562 So. 2d 318, 332 (La. 1990).
312. Id. at 814.
313. Act No. 370, 1991 La. Acts 1314, amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4820(C). See KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Perkins Rowe Associates, L.L.C., 823 F.
Supp. 2d 399, n.11 (M.D. La. 2011).
314. For the definition of fraud in the Louisiana Civil Code, see LA. CIV. CODE
art. 1953 (2020).
315. For an explanation of the meaning of “actual fraud” in this context, see
Rubin, supra note 58.
316. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4832(C) (2020).
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work had not begun as of a specified time subsequent to their request for
cancellation of the notice of contract.
Whether obtained for purposes of establishing the priority of a
mortgage or canceling a prematurely filed notice of contract, a no-work
affidavit must contain a complete property description of the
immovable.317 Curiously, and likely as the result of oversight, the 1981
Act did not specify in which records no-work affidavits were to be filed.318
Although the nearly universal practice has been to record no-work
affidavits in the mortgage records, this omission in the Act might have led
to an inference that filing in the conveyance records was necessary and
appropriate under the articles on registry found in the Civil Code.319 The
2019 revision, however, makes clear that no-work affidavits, like all other
filings under the Act, are filed in the mortgage records.320
C. Notice of Termination
After the notice of contract, a notice of termination is one of the most
important filings that an owner makes under the Act, for its filing marks
the commencement of the delays allowed to claimants to file their
statements of claim or privilege.321 The required content of a notice of
termination changed only slightly with the 2019 revision. It must identify
the work and contain a complete property description of the immovable,
rather than a mere reasonable identification as under former law, but the
notice of termination may refer to a filed notice of contract to satisfy either
or both of these requirements.322 The notice of termination must be signed
by the owner who contracted the work or his successor in title, or their
representative; the Act does not require that it be signed by the contractor
or an architect.323
The notice of termination must certify that at least one of several
events has occurred. As under prior law, two of these events are the
substantial completion or abandonment of the work.324 Another is the
general contractor’s default under his contract.325 The 2019 revision adds
317.
318.
319.
320.
321.
322.
323.
324.
325.
that “a
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Id. § 9:4831(B).
Id. § 9:4831(A) (1982).
LA. CIV. CODE art. 3346(A) (2020).
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4831(A) (2020).
Id. § 9:4822(A)–(D).
Id. §§ 9:4822(E)(1), 9:4831(B), (C).
Id. § 9:4822(E)(2).
Id. § 9:4822(E)(3)(a)–(b).
Id. § 9:4822(E)(3)(c). Before the 2019 revision, the notice could certify
contractor” was in default under his contract. According to the revision
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yet another triggering event: a termination of the general contractor’s
contract even if no default has occurred, such as a termination for
convenience.326
The text of the Act does not itself address the consequence of an
owner’s filing a notice of termination in bad faith or, specifically, whether
the bad faith filing will start the running of the delays within which
statements of claim or privilege must be filed. As they did before the 2019
revision, the official revision comments assert that the delays will begin to
run in the event that rights of third persons are involved, but the owner
should not be allowed to profit from his own bad faith actions. Thus, the
delays will not commence to run as to him. Nothing in the 2019 revision
alters this outcome; as before, the commencement of the filing periods is
not conditioned upon a good faith filing or the actual occurrence of the
triggering events that the notice of termination certifies have occurred. The
2019 revision does, however, make clear that the facts recited in the notice,
if made in good faith, are conclusively established only for purposes of the
Act and not for other purposes.327 If litigation ensues between the owner
and general contractor, the owner’s unilateral statement in a notice of
termination that the general contractor defaulted should certainly not be
given conclusive effect in that litigation.328
As will be discussed in Section IV.D below, if notice of contract has
been filed, the filing of a notice of termination is required to commence
the running of the 30-day period within which claimants under Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4802 must file statements of claim or privilege.329 As
much as the owner, the general contractor has an interest in the
commencement of the running of this period. After all, it is the contractor
who has ultimate statutory responsibility for these claims and must
indemnify the owner against them.330 Until the 2019 revision, however,
the general contractor had no means at his disposal to force the owner to
file notice of termination when work had been substantially completed or
abandoned. Given that the filing period did not commence to run until a

comments, multiple contractors can be involved on a single work, and only a
default by the general contractor should trigger the filing of a notice of
termination. See id. § 9:4822 cmt. h. Of course, if a contractor has filed notice of
his contract, he is by definition a general contractor, and his work is a separate
work. See id. § 9:4808(B).
326. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(E)(3)(d).
327. Id. § 9:4822(E)(4).
328. See id. § 9:4822 cmt. i.
329. Id. § 9:4822(B).
330. Id. § 9:4802(A), (F).
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notice of termination was filed, the general contractor could remain
exposed to liability for these claims indefinitely.
The 2019 revision introduced a mechanism by which the general
contractor can force the owner to file a notice of termination to commence
the running of the filing period when the work has been either substantially
completed or abandoned. Under those circumstances, the Act requires the
owner to file a notice of termination within 10 days after receipt of a
request from the general contractor. If the owner fails to do so, the general
contractor can, by summary proceeding conducted against the owner,
obtain a judgment decreeing that the work has been substantially
completed or abandoned. Once rendered and filed, the judgment itself has
the effect of a notice of termination, provided that the judgment properly
identifies the immovable and the work.331
The 1981 revision continued, and somewhat expanded, a provision of
the Act permitting a notice of termination as to “a specified portion or area
of work.”332 The purpose of this provision was to permit truncation of the
filing period applicable to those claimants who had provided labor or
materials with respect to that area of the work. The drafters of the 1981
revision did not intend for the filing of a notice of partial termination to
have the effect of relieving the area described in the notice from privileges
of those who had done, or in the future might do, work elsewhere on the
immovable.333
Nevertheless, a legislative change made in 2003 appears to have had
that precise goal in mind.334 That change had the potential, however, to
bring about results that might prove to be extremely unfair to those who
had provided, or had contracted to provide, labor or materials elsewhere
on the project. Because those claimants had not worked on the area
described in a notice of partial termination, the filing of the notice did not
trigger a requirement that they file statements of claim or privilege, and
indeed they might not at that time even have had a claim that they could
present. Yet, once the truncated filing period ran following the filing of
the notice of partial termination, their privileges would no longer
331. Id. § 9:4822(F). There is no need for the judgment to direct the owner to
execute and file a notice of termination.
332. Id. § 9:4822(F) (1982).
333. See id. § 9:4822 cmt. f (2007).
334. See Act No. 729, 2003 La. Acts 2470 (adding a final sentence to
subsection F: “Once the period for preserving claims and privileges has expired
and no liens have been timely filed, the portion or area of work described in the
notice of termination shall be free of the claims and privileges of those doing work
on the area described in the notice of termination, as well as those doing work
elsewhere on the immovable being improved.”). Id.
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encumber the area of the immovable described in the notice. In effect,
therefore, they could be deprived of a portion of their collateral, without
their consent, midway through a project.335
The 2019 revision restored the original meaning of the provision by
deleting the sentence that had been added by the 2003 amendment.336 At
the same time, the revision removed an ambiguity that had been contained
in the provision since the 1981 revision.337 It is now clear that a notice of
partial termination may be filed only with respect to a specified
geographical area of the immovable and not a specified component of the
work, such as the pouring of a building’s foundation or the installation of
its mechanical systems. As is the case with all notices of termination, the
2019 revision requires that a notice of partial termination set forth a
complete property description of the immovable.338 Where a notice of
partial termination is filed, its filing marks the commencement of the
delays within which those who provided labor or materials on the specified
area of the immovable must file their statements of claim or privilege. The
notice of partial termination does not otherwise free that area of the
immovable of privileges arising under the Act. A notice of partial
termination also does not divide a project into separate works.339 If an
owner wishes for such a division to occur, he should, at the inception, enter
into separate contracts and file notices of each of the contracts. Doing so
will cause all of them to constitute separate works.340

335. As the provision existed prior to the 2019 revision, it could also have the
unintended effect of an inadvertent resubdivision of the immovable. If a person
working elsewhere on the immovable later enforced his privilege through a
sheriff’s sale, the property sold at the sheriff’s sale would be only that part of the
immovable outside of the portion that had been described in the notice of partial
termination. With the 2019 revision, this is no longer a possibility because the
privilege of such a claimant will continue to encumber the entire immovable as it
was configured when work commenced.
336. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(G) (2020).
337. See Donald J. Tate, The New Private Works Act: An Operational Sketch,
8 S.U. L. REV. 133, 141–43 (1981).
338. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(G).
339. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Perkins Rowe Associates, L.L.C., 823 F. Supp.
2d 399, 413 (M.D. La. 2011) (“[T]his provision merely speeds up the limitations
period for filing liens. Section 4822(F) says nothing about creating separate
‘work,’ and therefore this provision has no affect on whether—instead of when—
a contractor may use that work to relate back the effective date of its lien.”).
340. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4808(B).
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D. Statement of Claim or Privilege
1. Purposes
A statement of claim or privilege is the essential document that a
Private Works Act claimant must file in order to preserve the substantive
rights that the Act grants to him, which include a privilege upon the
immovable in the case of all claimants and a personal claim against the
owner, contractor, and surety in the case of those claimants listed in
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802.341 Of course, it is the law itself that
creates those substantive rights; the filing of a statement of claim or
privilege does not create those rights but rather merely preserves them.
A statement of claim or privilege serves two purposes.342 First, it
informs the owner and contractor of the fact that the claimant has not been
paid and asserts a claim, privilege, or both. Second, it apprises third
persons who might have or acquire an interest in the immovable of the
existence of the claim or privilege.343
2. Formal and Substantive Requirements
The required content of a statement of claim or privilege is specified
in the Act and was largely unchanged by the 2019 revision. The statement
341. Id. § 9:4822. The 2019 revision uses the words “statement of claim or
privilege” consistently throughout the Act to refer generically to the filing that a
claimant under either Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801 or Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4802 is required to make in order to preserve his privilege, and, if he
is a claimant under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802, to preserve his personal
claim against the owner, contractor, and surety. A claimant under Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4801 is given only a privilege by the Act, whereas a claimant
under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802 almost always holds both a personal
claim and a privilege. The use of the words “statement of claim or privilege” in
the Act is not intended to imply which of these rights a claimant might enjoy or
whether he holds only one or both of them.
342. See, e.g., Mercantile Nat’l Bank of Dallas v. J. Thos. Driscoll, Inc., 195
So. 497 (La. 1940); Simms Hardin Co., L.L.C. v. 3901 Ridgelake Drive, L.L.C.,
119 So. 3d 58 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2013); Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. Belleville
Historic Dev., L.L.C., 815 So. 2d 301 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002).
343. Until expiration of the applicable filing period, however, third persons
cannot rely on the absence of a statement of claim or privilege because privileges
arising under the Act are effective as to third persons from the inception of the
work, even without a filing, provided that a statement of claim or privilege is
ultimately filed before expiration of the filing period. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4820(A).
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must be in writing and be signed by the claimant,344 but the Act does not
require that it take the form of an affidavit, as was required prior to the
1981 revision. The statement must contain a reasonable identification of
the immovable,345 identify the responsible owner,346 and set forth “the
amount and nature of the obligation giving rise to the claim or privilege
and reasonably itemize the elements comprising it.”347
The degree of specificity that is necessary to identify the amount and
nature of the claim has recently been the subject of a seemingly endless
spiral of cases that attempt to distinguish each other. In Hibernia National
Bank v. Belleville Historic Development, L.L.C.,348 the court held that a
general contractor’s statement of claim or privilege asserting that it was
owed a specified sum of money for furnishing “labor material to construct
[21] condominium units” on an identified immovable was sufficient to
preserve the general contractor’s privilege, but another panel of the same
court later distinguished this holding in Bradley Electric Services, Inc. v.
2601, L.L.C.,349 finding a supplier’s statement of claim or privilege to be
inadequate where it stated that a lump sum was owed “for services
rendered.” In so holding, the court cited a similar holding in Tee It Up
Golf, Inc. v. Bayou State Construction, L.L.C.,350 in which the court held
that a mere indication of a lump sum amount owed for “Materials
Supplied” does not satisfy the statutory requirement. The Tee It Up Golf
holding was itself distinguished by the court in Simms Harden Co., L.L.C.
v. 3901 Ridgelake Drive, L.L.C.,351 which found to be sufficient
subcontractors’ statements of claim or privilege for specific amounts of
money owed for “electrical and lighting work,” “wall preparation and
general painting work,” and “plumbing installation work” performed on a
condominium development, even though the statements did not
particularly identify the work performed on each specific condominium
unit.

344. Id. § 9:4822(H)(1), (2).
345. Id. §§ 9:4822(H)(3), 9:4831(B).
346. Id. § 9:4822(H)(5).
347. Id. § 9:4822(H)(4).
348. Hibernia Nat’l Bank v. Belleville Historic Dev., L.L.C., 815 So. 2d 301
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002).
349. Bradley Elec. Servs., Inc. v. 2601, L.L.C., 82 So. 3d 1242 (La. Ct. App.
4th Cir. 2011).
350. Tee It Up Golf, Inc. v. Bayou State Constr., L.L.C., 30 So. 3d 1159 (La.
Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2010).
351. Simms Hardin Co., L.L.C. v. 3901 Ridgelake Drive, L.L.C., 119 So. 3d
58 (La. Ct. App. 5th Cir. 2013).
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In Jefferson Door Co., Inc. v. Cragmar Construction, L.L.C.,352 a
supplier’s statement of claim or privilege was held to be insufficient where
it stated that a specified amount was owed for “certain materials consisting
of but not limited to trim, millwork, etc.” and made reference to itemized
invoices that were purportedly, but not actually, attached to the statement
of claim or privilege. In response to the Jefferson Door decision, the
legislature in 2013 added a sentence clarifying that the Act does not
“require a claimant to attach copies of unpaid invoices unless the statement
of claim or privilege specifically states that the invoices are attached.”353
This amendment may, however, miss the mark. The issue is not the
consequence of a failure to attach invoices or whether they are required at
all, but rather what is required to constitute a sufficient description of the
basis of the claim, with or without supporting invoices.354
In the 2019 revision, the legislature did not alter the sentence added
by the 2013 amendment, nor did it alter the remainder of the paragraph to
which it was appended. Accordingly, existing jurisprudence remains
relevant in judging the sufficiency of a statement of claim or privilege. It
should be remembered that the purpose of a statement of claim or privilege
is merely to apprise the owner, and also third persons, of the identity of
the person making a claim, the amount of the claim, and the basis for the
claim. As its name implies, in a statement of claim or privilege, the
claimant must certainly state his claim, but he is not required to prove it.
In considering whether a statement of claim or privilege is adequate to
satisfy the minimum requirements of the law, the courts should bear in
mind the cautionary note that they have announced in other contexts when
applying the Private Works Act: although the Act is to be strictly
construed, “care must be taken not to overlook the legislative intent and

352. Jefferson Door Co., Inc. v. Cragmar Constr., L.L.C., 81 So. 3d 1001 (La.
Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2012).
353. Act No. 277, § 1, 2013 La. Acts 1822. Arguably, the amendment by
implication added a requirement to the Act: where a statement of claim or
privilege refers to attached invoices, they must actually be attached or else the
statement will be found deficient, perhaps even if the statement without the
invoices would otherwise sufficiently describe the basis of the claim within its
four corners. Id.
354. It might be questioned whether the true deficiency in the statement of
claim or privilege under consideration in Jefferson Door was not so much the
failure to attach invoices as it was the use of a supergeneric description of the
materials that the claimant had supplied: “certain materials consisting of but not
limited to trim, millwork, etc.” Jefferson Door Co., 81 So. 3d 1001.
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fundamental aim of this act which is to protect materialmen, laborers and
subcontractors who engage in construction and repair projects.”355
As mentioned above, a statement of claim or privilege must identify
the owner who is responsible for the claim.356 In many cases, that person
is the owner of the immovable, but that is not always the case. As discussed
in Section III.A above, an “owner” for purposes of the Act can be a
usufructuary, holder of a servitude, lessee, or even a mere possessor
having no juridical link to the immovable other than the fact of his
possession.357 In some instances, the owner responsible for claims arising
under the Act may be a person who has no interest of record in the
immovable, such as the lessee under an unrecorded lease.358 In those cases,
determining the name of the correct owner to include in a statement of
claim or privilege can present a significant challenge for the claimant, who
may have no available means of determining who the responsible owner
is, given that a record search would be of no assistance to him.
To ease the task of preparing a statement of claim or privilege when
the responsible owner has no interest of record in the immovable, the 2019
revision allows a claimant in that situation to identify as the owner in his
statement of claim or privilege the person who appears of record to own
the immovable.359 This is, however, a permissive rather than mandatory
rule, and it provides the claimant with alternatives. If the responsible
owner has no interest of record in the immovable, the claimant’s statement
of claim or privilege may identify the owner as the person who appears of
record to own the immovable, even if the claimant actually knows the
name of the responsible owner. Alternatively, the claimant may instead
identify the responsible owner, even though the responsible owner has no
interest of record in the immovable.360 The intent of this rule is merely to
355. Bayer Indus., Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 241 So. 3d 1159 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2018); Bernard Lumber Co., Inc. v. Lake Forest Constr. Co., Inc., 572 So. 2d
178 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990); Keller Bldg. Products of Baton Rouge, Inc. v.
Siegen Dev., Inc., 312 So. 2d 182 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1975).
356. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4806(B), 9:4822(H)(5) (2020).
357. Id. § 9:4806(A).
358. See Cajun Contractors, Inc. v. EcoProduct Solutions, L.P., 182 So. 3d 149
(La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2015).
359. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(H)(5).
360. The Act does not condition the availability of these alternatives on the
absence of a filed notice of contract identifying the owner. Because filings in
Louisiana are indexed by name, rather than by tract, a third person would likely
have considerable difficulty finding a notice of contract filed by a person who has
no interest of record in the immovable if the third person does not already know
that person’s name from sources outside of the public records.
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facilitate the filing of a statement of claim or privilege; an identification of
the record owner in a statement of claim or privilege when that owner is
not the responsible owner, even though specifically authorized by the Act
under these circumstances, creates neither substantive claims against him
nor a privilege upon his interest in the immovable.361
3. Filing Periods Under the 1981 Act
To have effect, a statement of claim or privilege must be filed in a
timely manner. As revised in 1981, the Act set forth a fairly simple formula
for determining the deadlines for filing statements of claim or privilege. If
notice of contract was filed, claimants who were given a claim or privilege
under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802 were required to file within362
30 days after the filing of a notice of termination.363 Provided that a general
contractor complied with the requirement to record notice of his contract,
he was allowed a period of 60 days after the filing of notice of termination
within which to file his statement of claim or privilege.364 All other
claimants, including § 4802 claimants on a work for which notice of
contract was not filed and other persons granted a privilege under either
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801 or Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4802, were allowed 60 days to file, but the 60-day period ran from the

361. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822 cmt. l. An owner of an immovable who is
named in a statement of claim or privilege under this rule but who has no
responsibility for the claim is entitled to have the statement of claim or privilege
canceled as to him and his interest in the immovable by making a request for
cancellation under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4833. The partial cancellation
will, however, have no effect as to claims against the responsible owner. See id. §
9:4833 cmt. b.
362. The use of the word “within” in the 1981 Act led to an argument that a
statement of claim or privilege could not be filed before the commencement of
the 30-day period. That argument was rejected in Paul Hyde, Inc. v. Richard, 854
So. 2d 1000 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2003), which held that a claimant is not required
to defer filing until the commencement of the delays for filing. The 2019 revision
consistently uses the formulation “no later than,” rather than “within,” in order to
eliminate any basis for this argument. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4822(A)–(C).
363. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(A) (1982). Originally, the 1981 revision
did not require that notice of contract be filed in a timely manner as a condition
of the applicability of the 30-day filing period; however, a legislative amendment
in 1988 added that condition. See Act No. 685, § 1, 1988 La. Acts 1774.
364. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(B) (1982).
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filing of notice of termination or, if no notice of termination was filed,
from substantial completion or abandonment of the work.365
As straightforward as these timeliness requirements might appear,
they required substantial interpretation by the jurisprudence. One issue to
be addressed was whether, on a project for which notice of contract was
filed, the filing period for § 4802 claimants would end 60 days after
substantial completion in the absence of the filing of notice of termination.
The argument for this interpretation was essentially premised upon the
assertion that the reference to “other persons granted . . . a claim and
privilege under R.S. 9:4802” in the provision of the Act containing the 60day rule366 must necessarily refer to § 4802 claimants on a project for
which notice of contract was filed because, otherwise, this reference would
be to an empty set. Courts considering this argument consistently rejected
it, holding that, where notice of contract had been filed, the filing of a
notice of termination was required to start the filing period and that, in the
absence of a notice of termination, the filing period never began to run.367
Despite the wording of the provision containing the 60-day rule, this
appears to have been the intent of the 1981 revision.368

365. Id. § 9:4822(C). The 60-day rule applied to “[t]hose persons granted a
claim and privilege by R.S. 9:4802 for work arising out of a general contract,
notice of which is not filed, and other persons granted a privilege under R.S.
9:4801 or a claim and privilege under R.S. 9:4802.” As discussed below, this
wording contained an ambiguity that had to be addressed in the jurisprudence.
366. Id.
367. Bernard Lumber Co., Inc. v. Lake Forest Constr. Co., Inc., 572 So. 2d
178 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990) (rejecting arguments that former Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4822(C), which referred to claimants under Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4802, operated to impose an outer deadline of 60 days after
substantial completion in all cases); Rowley Co., Inc. v. Southbend Contractors,
Inc., 517 So. 2d 1260 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987) (holding that where a notice of
termination is deficient because of the lack of a proper description of the
immovable, it is ineffective to start the running of the filing period); see also In
re Whitaker Constr. Co., Inc., 439 F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2006) (which, citing both
Bernard Lumber and Rowley, rejected an argument that the reference in former §
4822(C) to “other persons granted . . . a claim or privilege under R.S. 9:4802”
limited the applicability of the 30-day filing period to those situations in which
both a notice of contract and a notice of termination were filed).
368. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822 cmt. a (2007): “If a notice of contract
is filed, a notice of termination is always required to commence the 30 day time
for filing.” This sentence, which states merely that the 30-day period commences
only upon the filing of notice of termination, does not, however, exclude the
possibility that the claimant might also be subject to the 60-day period.
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Another issue that arose was the period within which general
contractors were required to file statements of their privileges—an issue
that was complicated by a 1988 amendment to the Act requiring a general
contractor to file within 60 days after “the filing of the notice of
termination or substantial completion of the work.”369 Upon a casual
reading, this language certainly suggested that either the filing of notice of
termination or the fact of substantial completion would commence the
running of the general contractor’s 60-day filing period, though such an
interpretation would mean that a general contractor, who was originally
allowed 30 days longer than § 4802 claimants to file his statement of
privilege, would in certain cases have a much shorter period within which
to do so. This interpretation was rejected in Golden Nugget Lake Charles,
L.L.C. v. W. G. Yates & Sons Construction Co.,370 which held that, just as
is the case with § 4802 claimants, a notice of termination is required to
start the filing period applicable to a general contractor when notice of
contract has been filed. Although also based on policy arguments, the
court’s rationale was to a large degree predicated upon its observation that
the 1988 amendment that had added the reference to substantial
completion in the filing rule applicable to general contractors also made a
similar insertion in other provisions of the Act, and, in those other
provisions, it was obvious that “notice of termination or substantial
completion of the work” was a reference to two alternative titles of a
document rather than two distinct events.371
The rule under the 1981 revision that, when notice of contract had been
filed, the filing period for § 4802 claimants and general contractors would
commence to run only upon filing of a notice of termination had a potential
destabilizing effect on title to immovable property because, as the cases
observed, if the period has not begun to run, it cannot expire.372 The
implications of this rule were brought into sharp focus by the holding in
Thompson Tree & Spraying Service, Inc. v. White-Spunner Construction,

369. Act No. 685, §1, 1988 La. Acts 1774.
370. Golden Nugget Lake Charles, L.L.C. v. W.G. Yates & Sons Constr. Co.,
850 F.3d 231 (5th Cir. 2017).
371. The court specifically cited Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4822(F),
which, after the 1988 amendment, read as follows: “A notice of termination or
substantial completion of the work may be filed from time to time with respect to
a specified portion or area of work.”
372. See Rowley, 517 So. 2d at 1261.
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Inc.373 In that case, a filed contract and a filed notice of termination374 both
suffered from the same defect—the lack of a property description of the
immovable upon which the work was performed. Fifteen months after the
notice of termination was filed, an unpaid subcontractor filed a statement of
claim or privilege. Reasoning that both the notice of contract and the notice
of termination were defective for lack of a proper description of the
immovable, the trial court held that the applicable filing period was 60 days
from substantial completion and that the subcontractor’s statement of claim
or privilege was therefore untimely.375 The court of appeal reversed, citing
a provision of the Act to the effect that an error or omission in a notice of
contract does not cause it to be improperly filed in the absence of a showing
of actual prejudice by a claimant or other person acquiring rights in the
immovable.376 That same provision states that an improper identification
of the immovable is prima facie proof of actual prejudice. Nevertheless,
the court held that the notice of contract, despite its lack of a property
description, was sufficient for purposes of triggering the rule that the 30day filing period commences to run only upon filing of a notice of
termination. The court reasoned that the presumption of prejudice is for
the benefit of the claimant and cannot be turned against him to his
detriment.377 As for the notice of termination, which also lacked a property
description, the court simply observed that it was ineffective. Accordingly,
because notice of contract was filed but no effective notice of termination
was filed, the subcontractor’s filing period had never commenced to run,
and its statement of claim or privilege, though filed 15 months after the
purported notice of termination, was timely.378
373. Thompson Tree & Spraying Serv., Inc. v. White-Spunner Constr., Inc.,
68 So. 3d 1142 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2011).
374. The notice of termination was actually styled as a “certificate of
substantial completion.” Id. at 1145.
375. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(C) (1982).
376. Id. § 9:4811(B) (2020).
377. The court also held that the presumption, even if applied, was rebutted by
the subcontractor’s proof that it suffered no prejudice from the absence of a
property description in the filed contract.
378. As support for its rationale, the court cited a similar holding from the
Fourth Circuit in Rowley Co., Inc. v. South Bend Contractors, Inc., 517 So. 2d
1260 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1987), and acknowledged that, under similar facts, the
First Circuit had reached the opposite conclusion in Norman H. Voelkel
Construction, Inc. v. Recorder of Mortgages, 859 So. 2d 9 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir.
2003), which had held that where both notice of contract and a notice of
termination lacked a property description, the applicable filing period was 60 days
from substantial completion. The Thompson Tree court distinguished Norman H.
Voelkel Construction, Inc., on the ground that, in the latter case, the claimant did
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That the identical defect would cause one filing made under the Act to
be wholly ineffective but have no effect on the effectiveness of another
may seem surprising. But what is disconcerting about Thompson Tree is
not that specific holding but rather the adverse effect that the filing rules
under the 1981 Act, as so interpreted, could have on titles to immovable
property. It is a widespread practice for owners and contractors to file the
entire construction contract rather than the short-form notice of contract
contemplated by the Act. Just as frequently, they file an architect’s
certificate of substantial completion at the end of the work, rather than the
notice of termination that is prescribed under the Act. Usually, neither
filing contains a property description beyond a mere municipal address.
Under the Thompson Tree holding, this practice—common as it may be—
causes the filing period for § 4802 claimants and general contractors to
never begin to run, with the result that statements of claim or privilege
could conceivably be filed years after the work is complete, even to the
prejudice of third persons acquiring rights in the immovable in the interim.
4. Filing Periods Under the 2019 Revision
To address these problems and ambiguities, the 2019 revision
embarked upon a fresh start in the formulation of the filing rules applicable
to statements of claim or privilege, retaining the familiar 30-day and 60day periods but at the same time imposing an outer filing deadline that
applies when no notice of termination is filed. The revision first states, as
a general rule, that all claimants under the Act must file no later than 60
days after the filing of a notice of termination of the work, if one is filed,
or 60 days after the date of substantial completion or abandonment of the
work, if no notice of termination is filed.379 The revision then sets forth
three exceptions to this general rule.
First, if notice of contract has been timely filed, § 4802 claimants must
file statements of claim or privilege no later than 30 days after the filing
of a notice of termination or, if no notice of termination is filed, no later
than six months after the substantial completion or abandonment of the
work.380 The 2019 revision retained the requirement under former law that,
in addition to filing, a § 4802 claimant must also deliver a copy of the
statement of claim or privilege to the owner within the filing period, if a
notice of contract containing the owner’s address was timely filed.381
not rebut the presumption of prejudice arising under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4811(B).
379. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(A).
380. Id. § 9:4822(B).
381. Id.
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The second exception to the general timeliness rule applies to general
contractors, who must file a statement of claim or privilege no later than
60 days after the filing of a notice of termination, if one is filed, or no later
than seven months after the substantial completion or abandonment of the
work if notice of termination is not filed. 382 Of course, as discussed in
Section III.B above, a general contractor under a contract exceeding
$100,000 has no right to file a statement of claim or privilege unless notice
of his contract was timely filed. General contractors under contracts for a
lesser amount are covered by this exception only if they elected to file
notice of contract; otherwise, they are subject to the general 60-day rule.
Though presented differently in the drafting of the Act, these filing
deadlines are nearly identical in substance to those in effect prior to the
2019 revision, with the exception of the addition of the six- and sevenmonth deadlines applicable to § 4802 claimants and general contractors,
respectively, when notice of contract has been filed. As the official
revision comments reflect, the six- and seven-month periods are outer
deadlines and are by no means an extension of the filing periods that
applied before the revision.383 They serve the purpose of causing the filing
period to have an end date when the owner neglects to file a notice of
termination of a work for which notice of contract was filed. For instance,
under the facts of Thompson Tree discussed above, the unpaid
subcontractor would have been allowed to file a statement of claim or
privilege until the expiration of six months after substantial completion of
the work, which presumably occurred shortly before the time of filing of
the faulty certificate of substantial completion. Thus, its statement of claim
or privilege filed 15 months after the filing of the certificate of substantial
completion would have been untimely. Of course, if a proper notice of
termination is filed, the 30-day period applicable to § 4802 claimants and
the 60-day period applicable to general contractors will commence to run
with its filing, and the claimant will not have the ability to wait six or seven
months after substantial completion to file a statement of claim or
privilege.
The final exception to the general rule is the one that, as previously
mentioned, was added by an amendment made during the legislative
session that enacted the 2019 revision. This exception, which applies only
to residential works for which no notice of contract was filed, provides
that if a seller or lessor with a privilege under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4801 or any § 4802 claimant gives notice of nonpayment to the owner
before expiration of the 60-day filing period and then waits at least 10 days
382. Id. § 9:4822(C).
383. See id. § 9:4822 cmt. c.
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before filing his statement of claim or privilege, his filing period is
extended to 70 days.384 As discussed in Section III.F above, the notice of
nonpayment is not, however, mandatory, and a claimant who is content to
file within the 60-day period may do so without having first given notice
of nonpayment to the owner.
This rule contains two potential traps for the unwary claimant. First,
the extension is available only in the case of residential works and then
only when no notice of contract has been timely filed. Thus, a claimant
who wishes to avail himself of the extension must be certain that no notice
of contract has been filed.385 The second potential trap is that the claimant
must wait 10 days after giving notice of nonpayment before filing his
statement of claim or privilege. This rule creates the anomaly of a window
of “black-out” dates during which a claimant may not effectively file a
statement of claim or privilege. For instance, suppose that the claimant
gives notice of nonpayment to the owner 55 days after substantial
completion. The claimant may, if he chooses, file a statement of claim or
privilege that very day or on any of the next five days, up through 60 days
after substantial completion. Alternatively, he could wait 10 days and file
65 to 70 days after substantial completion, and, under those circumstances,
his statement of claim or privilege would be timely based on his
entitlement to an extension under the 70-day filing rule. What he cannot
do is file only on the 61st through 64th days because, if he does so, he will
not have satisfied the conditions of the 70-day filing rule. This is so
because he will not have waited the requisite 10 days between giving
notice of nonpayment and filing his statement of claim or privilege. Thus,
by the time he files on one of those days, the 60-day period will still apply
and, unfortunately for him, will have already expired. Of course, a
claimant can avoid this anomaly altogether by giving notice of
nonpayment no later than the 50th day or, as is always his right, by filing
on or before the 60th day after substantial completion.
5. Necessity of Filing
As mentioned above, the proper filing of a statement of claim or
privilege within the applicable filing period is essential for the
preservation of the claimant’s claim against the owner and his privilege on
the owner’s interest in the immovable. In the case of a § 4802 claimant,
384. Id. § 9:4822(D).
385. Of course, if notice of contract was filed, the applicable filing period for
§ 4802 claimants would be the 30-day period provided by Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4822(B), rather than the 60-day period provided by Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4822(A).
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however, filing is not essential to preserve the claimant’s rights against the
contractor and surety, provided that a statement of claim or privilege is
delivered to the contractor within the filing period.386 In the absence of
filing, however, the claimant’s rights against the owner and privilege upon
the immovable will both be extinguished.387
6. Request for Notice of Commencement of Filing Periods
As is clear from the preceding discussion, the filing of a notice of
termination is of paramount importance to a claimant because it usually
marks the commencement of the running of the delays within which the
claimant must file his statement of claim or privilege. As originally
enacted, the 1981 Act did not provide claimants with a means of requiring
an owner to inform them of the filing of notice of termination, and they
were apparently put to the task of continually searching the public records
to determine whether a notice of termination had been filed. A legislative
amendment in 1988 sought to protect § 4802 claimants against the
possibility of a surprise commencement of the filing period by allowing
them to give notice to the owner of an obligation arising out of the work.388
Once a § 4802 claimant gave this notice, the owner was required to notify
the claimant within three days after the substantial completion or
abandonment of the work or the filing of a notice of termination. If the
owner failed to do so within 10 days after the commencement of the filing
period, the owner was liable for all costs and attorney fees incurred by the
claimant in establishing and enforcing the claim. Significantly, this was
the only penalty that was provided, as the amendment did not state that the
failure caused either continued personal liability of the owner or an
extension of the filing period. Accordingly, the courts held that the
owner’s non-compliance did not affect an extension of the filing period,
386. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4823(B) (providing for the preservation of
a claimant’s rights against the contractor and surety when a statement of claim or
privilege is delivered to the contractor within the filing period, even if the
statement of claim or privilege is never filed).
387. Id. § 9:4823(A)(1). A claimant who has lost his rights against an owner
for failure to file a timely statement of claim or privilege is not entitled to recover
against the owner under a theory of unjust enrichment. See E. Smith Plumbing,
Inc. v. Manuel, 88 So. 3d 1209, 1213–15 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2012); Pinegrove
Elec. Supply Co., Inc. v. Cat Key Constr., Inc., 88 So. 3d 1097 (La. Ct. App. 5th
Cir. 2012); Newt Brown, Contractor, Inc. v. Michael Builders, Inc., 569 So. 2d
288 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1991).
388. Act No. 685, § 1, 1988 La. Acts 1774, adding LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4822(K)–(L).
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even as to the owner himself.389 Thus, the remedy provided by the
amendment was ill-suited to protect the claimant against the harm that
arose from the owner’s non-compliance: the claimant could not enforce
his claim if he failed to file within the filing period and, at most, had a
right to recover attorney fees.390
Under the 2019 revision, a § 4802 claimant can request that an owner
give the claimant notification of the substantial completion or
abandonment of the work or the filing of a notice of termination.391 Once
this request is made, the owner is required to notify that claimant within
10 days after the occurrence of either event. If the owner does not do so
and the claimant fails to file a statement of claim or privilege in a timely
manner, that failure does not extinguish the personal claim against the
owner, and the claim remains enforceable against the owner provided that
suit is brought to enforce it within one year after the expiration of the filing
period. Nevertheless, the filing period is not extended, and if the claimant
fails to file within the filing period, the privilege will be lost.392 If the
claimant does file within the filing period despite the owner’s failure to
give notice, then he has suffered no harm, and the ordinary rules apply. An
owner’s failure to comply with his obligation to give notice does not
preserve the claimant’s rights against the contractor or surety; those rights
will be extinguished unless the claimant either files a statement of claim
or privilege or delivers a statement of claim or privilege to the contractor
within the applicable filing period.393
E. Notice of Pendency of Action
Filing a statement of claim or privilege within the filing period is only
the first step that a claimant must take to preserve his rights under the Act.
As will be discussed more fully in Section VI.A, the claimant must
institute suit on his claim within one year after the date he filed his
389. Buck Town Contractors & Co. v. K-Belle Consultants, L.L.C., 216 So.
3d 981 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2016); Byron Montz, Inc. v. Conco Constr., Inc.,
824 So. 2d 498 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2002).
390. Buck Town Contractors allowed attorney fees in pursuing the claim, even
though the claim itself was dismissed; Byron Montz did not.
391. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(I)–(J).
392. If the Act had provided for an extension of the filing period or the
preservation of the privilege notwithstanding the claimant’s failure to file within
the filing period, third persons would potentially be prejudiced, for they would
have no knowledge of either the claimant’s request for notice or the owner’s
failure to give it.
393. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4823(B), discussed supra.
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statement of claim or privilege.394 Moreover, to preserve the effectiveness
of his privilege against third persons, the claimant must also file, within
the same one-year period, a notice of pendency of action in the mortgage
records.395 The required content of a notice of pendency of action is
prescribed by the Code of Civil Procedure.396 In addition to satisfying
those requirements, the notice of pendency of action must refer to the
claimant’s recorded statement of claim or privilege.397 In the absence of a
timely filed notice of pendency of action, the claimant’s privilege will lose
its effect as to third persons—even those with actual knowledge of it—but
the claim and privilege will nonetheless remain enforceable against the
owner and contractor.398
394. Id. § 9:4823(A)(2). As the 1981 Act was originally enacted, the one-year
period ran from the expiration of the filing period, rather than the actual date of
filing of the claimant’s statement of claim or privilege. An amendment to the Act
in 2012 caused the one-year period to run from the date of filing of the claimant’s
statement of claim or privilege, and the 2019 revision maintained that rule. See
Act No. 394, §§ 1–2, 2012 La. Acts 2111.
395. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4831(A), 9:4833(E).
396. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3752.
397. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4833(E). On this point, the 2019 revision
removed a provision of prior law that stated that the claimant’s notice of pendency
of action had to identify the recorded notice of contract if one was filed, and, if no
notice of contract was filed, the claimant could instead identify his recorded
statement of claim or privilege. This change removes the burden that the claimant
effectively had under prior law to search the records to determine, at his peril,
whether notice of contract had been filed.
398. Under the Louisiana public records doctrine, actual knowledge is no
substitute for recordation, and an unrecorded instrument usually has no effect
against a third person, regardless of whether the third person knows of its
existence. See McDuffie v. Walker, 51 So. 100 (La. 1909). There is, however,
case law to the effect that a third person with actual knowledge of the pendency
of a suit affecting an immovable is bound by its outcome, even if no notice of
pendency of action was filed. See Richardson Oil Co. v. Herndon, 102 So. 310
(La. 1924); Cannata v. Bonner, 982 So. 2d 968 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2008). But
see LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 3751 cmt. b (1960) (expressing an intent to overrule
Richardson Oil legislatively) and William V. Redmann, Louisiana Law of
Recordation: Some Principles and Some Problems, 39 TUL. L. REV. 491, 509–11
(1965) (expressing doubt that the “legislative overruling” was accomplished). See
also MELISSA T. LONEGRASS, SANDI VARNADO, & CHRISTOPHER K. ODINET,
SALE, LEASE, AND ADVANCED OBLIGATIONS: CASES AND READINGS 175–77
(Carolina Academic Press 2019). Nevertheless, the Private Works Act expressly
provides that a privilege arising under the Act ceases to have effect as to third
persons in the absence of a timely filed notice of pendency of action and makes
no exception for third persons with actual notice of the action. LA. REV. STAT.
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F. Cancellation of Filings
After a statement of claim or privilege has been filed, the owner or
contractor usually has an interest in having the statement of claim or
privilege removed from the records as soon as possible. Loan agreements
and mortgages almost always require the owner to do so; leases frequently
require a tenant who undertakes work to remove statements of claim or
privilege shortly after they are filed; and standard form building contracts
contain a stipulation that the contractor will cause statements of claim or
privilege filed by others to be released. Of course, a release can be obtained
by paying the claimant the full amount owed, but the owner or contractor
often either disputes the claim or does not have available sufficient
information to determine whether the claim is valid. The Private Works
Act provides a means by which the owner, contractor, or any other
interested person can obtain the release of a statement of claim or privilege
by either posting a surety bond in an amount equal to 125% of the principal
amount of the claim or depositing cash in the same amount with the
recorder of mortgages.399 The recorder is tasked with more than the
ministerial duty of receiving the security and canceling the statement of
claim or privilege; the recorder must determine whether the terms and
amount of the bond, or the amount of cash, is in conformity with the
requirements of the Act. If the recorder finds that they are, he then cancels
the statement of claim or privilege, as well as any notice of pendency of
action that may have been filed with respect to an action instituted to
enforce the claim.400
The effect of this cancellation varies depending on the identity of the
person who provided the release bond or cash security. If the owner did
so, then the cancellation extinguishes the privilege upon the owner’s
property but has no effect on the personal claims arising under the Act
ANN. § 9:4833(E). Thus, if the claimant neglects to file a timely notice of
pendency of action, his privilege is lost even as to those third persons who knew
about the pendency of his suit to enforce it, unless they are actually parties to the
suit. See Triangle Pac. Corp. v. Nat’l Bldg. & Contracting Co., Inc., 652 So. 2d
552 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1995); C & J Contractors v. Am. Bank & Trust Co.,
559 So 2d 810 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1990).
399. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4835(A). In all 64 parishes of Louisiana, the
clerk of the district court is the ex officio recorder of mortgages. See LA. CONST.
art. V, § 28(A) (2011); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44:71 (2018). In this Article, the
title “recorder of mortgages,” rather than the more common title of “clerk of
court,” will be used for the sake of consistency with the text of the Private Works
Act.
400. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4835(B) (2020).
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against either the owner or the contractor.401 If, on the other hand, it was a
contractor or subcontractor who furnished the security, then both the
privilege and the personal claim against the owner are extinguished.402 The
personal claim against the contractor arising under the Act, as well as any
contractual claim that might exist against either the contractor or a
subcontractor, are not extinguished.403
An amendment made to the Act in 1985 required any person who filed
a release bond or other security to give notice of the filing to the owner,
the claimant, and the contractor.404 With some drafting changes, the 2019
revision continued this requirement, but neither the 1985 amendment nor
the 2019 revision specifies any consequence of a failure to give notice
when required.
Of course, statements of claim or privilege are sometimes untimely or
otherwise improper, or they may have ceased to have effect for lack of
filing of a timely notice of pendency of action. The Act allows an owner
or other interested person to demand cancellation when a statement of
claim or privilege is improperly filed or asserts a claim or privilege that is
extinguished.405 If the claimant fails to file a request for cancellation of the
statement of claim or privilege within 10 days after his receipt of the
demand, the owner or other person making the demand is entitled to
proceed by summary process to obtain a judgment canceling the statement
of claim or privilege and also granting an award of attorney fees against
the claimant.406
The 2019 revision supplemented this rule with an additional provision
that applies in the specific case of an owner who is identified in a statement
of claim or privilege but who has no responsibility for the claim. This
could arise in a number of contexts. For instance, a naked owner may be
named in a statement of claim or privilege when in fact it was the
usufructuary who contracted the work. A statement of claim or privilege
may name the lessor when it is in fact the lessee under a recorded lease
who should have been named. The work may have been contracted by an
“owner” who has no interest of record in the immovable, such as a lessee
under an unrecorded lease, and, as discussed in Section IV.D.2 above,
under those circumstances the 2019 revision specifically permits the
claimant to name the record owner of the immovable in his statement of
401. Id. § 9:4823(D).
402. Id. § 9:4823(E). This provision was changed in the 2019 revision to apply
to release bonds filed by subcontractors, as well as those filed by contractors.
403. Id. § 9:4823(C), (E).
404. Act No. 556, § 1, 1985 La. Acts 1024.
405. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4833(A)(1).
406. Id. § 9:4833(B)–(C).

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 85

10/12/20 7:07 AM

1074

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

claim or privilege.407 Finally, unsure of the identity of the responsible
owner, the claimant might have named several owners out of an abundance
of caution in the hope of including the correct one. In all of these situations,
a person who is named as the owner in a statement of claim or privilege
but who has no responsibility for the claim may require the claimant to file
a request for partial cancellation of the statement of claim or privilege
insofar as it affects that person and his interest in the immovable.408 If the
claimant fails to comply, the owner who has no responsibility for the claim
can proceed by summary process to obtain a judgment ordering
cancellation and also recover attorney fees from the claimant. Such a
cancellation is, however, limited in its effect to the person who obtains the
judgment and does not affect the validity of the statement of claim or
privilege as to any other owner who may have responsibility for the
claim.409
As mentioned in Section IV.E above, if the claimant fails to file a
notice of pendency of action within one year after filing his statement of
claim or privilege, his privilege ceases to have effect as to third persons.410
The Act states that the recorder of mortgages shall cancel a statement of
claim or privilege upon his receipt of a proper request for cancellation or
upon being ordered to do so by a judgment of the court.411 Prior to the 2019
revision, an argument could have been made that these means of obtaining
cancellation were exclusive and displaced the more general provisions of
the Civil Code that allow cancellation of an instrument that has lost its
effectiveness against third persons for failure of timely reinscription.412
The 2019 revision addressed this issue through the addition of a provision
requiring the recorder to cancel the recordation of the statement of claim
or privilege upon receipt of a signed, written application for its
cancellation if the effect of recordation of the statement of claim or
privilege has ceased for lack of timely filing of a notice of pendency of
action.413 As the official revision comments indicate, the application need
407. See id. § 9:4822(H)(5).
408. Id. § 9:4833(A)(2).
409. Id.; see also id. § 9:4833 cmt. b.
410. Id. § 9:4833(E).
411. Id. § 9:4833(D).
412. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3367 (Supp. 2019). The Private Works Act does
not contemplate or require that a statement of claim or privilege must be
reinscribed; instead, its effect against third persons is continued by the filing of a
timely notice of pendency of action. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4833(E).
413. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4833(E). As discussed more fully infra in Part
IX, this change applies retroactively to works that were commenced before the
January 1, 2020, effective date of the Act. See Act No. 325, § 9, 2019 La. Acts.
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not be accompanied by an authorization for cancellation from the claimant,
nor is a judgment ordering cancellation required under this provision.414
As discussed in Section IV.A, the Act provides a mechanism by which
a notice of contract can be canceled before work has begun.415 The Act
also permits the cancellation of a notice of contract after the expiration of
the period for filing statements of claim or privilege following filing of a
notice of termination, and the 2019 revision made no substantive change
to those provisions of the Act. If notice of termination has been filed and
no statement of claim or privilege is filed before the expiration of 30 days
thereafter, and if the contractor concurs or acknowledges that he has been
paid in full, any person is entitled to obtain the cancellation of the notice
of contract.416 The contractor’s concurrence is not required if more than 60
days have elapsed after the filing of the notice of termination and the
contractor has not filed a statement of claim or privilege.417 As the official
revision comments indicate, if a statement of claim or privilege was filed
but subsequently canceled before the request for cancellation of the notice
of contract is made, the statement of claim or privilege is considered as
having never been filed for purposes of determining entitlement to the
cancellation of the notice of contract.418
V. NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
The 2019 revision to the Act added Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4804, a new provision containing notice requirements applicable to a
variety of categories of Private Works Act claimants, such as lessors,
professional consultants and subconsultants, sub-subcontractors,
residential claimants, and all § 4802 claimants. These notice requirements
were previously found in disjointed provisions scattered somewhat
haphazardly throughout the Act. Not only has the location of these notice
requirements been centralized, but they have been either simplified or
relaxed in many cases.
A. Lessors
Since 1975, the Private Works Act has contained a provision stating
that those who lease movables to someone other than the owner must
provide a notice to the owner in order to be entitled to rights under the
414.
415.
416.
417.
418.
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Act.419 The first such provision required the lessor to provide a copy of the
lease contract to the owner or contractor, or their agents or representatives,
within 10 days after the execution of the contract in order for the privilege
arising in the lessor’s favor under the Act to be valid.420
The 1981 Act largely retained this requirement, providing that in order
to assert his claim under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802, a lessor of
movables to a person other than the owner had to deliver a copy of the
lease to both the owner and the contractor not more than 10 days after the
movables were first placed at the site of the immovable for use in a work.
The official revision comments to the 1981 Act explained that the purpose
of this provision was to notify the owner and contractor that the equipment
being used at the site of the immovable was leased and could therefore be
creating liability for them.421 The Act was amended in 1991 to provide that
this requirement had to be satisfied for the privilege to arise, rather than
for the claim to be asserted.422 The implication of this change was that the
claim established by the Act in favor of the lessor could persist even when
the lessor’s failure to give notice caused a loss of his privilege. Whether
that was the actual intent of the legislature is questionable, but the
provision was interpreted to have precisely that meaning.423
In 2013, the notice requirement was expanded to cover privileges
granted by Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801 and to require the lessor
of movables to deliver notice, rather than a copy of the lease, to the owner
and contractor.424 The expansion of the notice requirement to leases that
give rise to privileges under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801 is curious
indeed, given that those leases are necessarily between the lessor and the
owner. The owner would presumably not need to be notified of the
existence of a lease to which he is a party, and the contractor would have
no responsibility for, and therefore no need to be notified of, a lease
entered into directly between the owner and lessor.
419. See Act No. 673, 1975 La. Acts 1467.
420. Id.
421. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802 cmt. g (2007).
422. Act No. 1024, 1991 La. Acts 3298, amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4802(G).
423. See Hawk Field Servs., L.L.C. v. Mid Am. Underground, L.L.C., 94 So.
3d 136 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012), writ denied, 99 So. 3d 652 (La. 2012).
424. Act No. 357, 2013 La. Acts 2130, amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4802(G)(1). The 2013 amendment also specified the required contents of this
notice: the name and mailing address of both the lessor and the lessee, a
description sufficient to identify the movables placed at the site of the immovable,
the terms of rental and payment, and the signatures of both the lessor and the
lessee.
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The requirement of giving notice within 10 days potentially led to
inequitable results. The 10-day period ran from when leased movables
were first placed at the site, not from when the specific movable in
question was placed there. Thus, if a lessor leased a rather inexpensive
item of equipment to a subcontractor for a short period of time, making
the conscious decision that the amount of rent that would be due was not
worth the trouble of giving notice to the owner and contractor, and then he
later leased another item of equipment at a greater rental rate or for a longer
term on the same project, he might find that he had already lost his
privilege for failure to have given notice within 10 days after leased
movables were first placed at the site.
The 2019 revision simplified—and to some extent relaxed—the notice
requirements that the Act imposes upon lessors. First, the Act does not
require notice when a lessor leases directly to the owner and is granted a
privilege under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801; instead, the notice
requirement applies only to lessors having a claim and privilege under
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802.425
For those lessors, the 2019 revision relaxed the form, content, and
timing of the notices they are required to give. The Act now requires a
lessor having a claim and privilege under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4802 to deliver to the contractor—and to the owner if notice of contract
was properly filed—notice that the lessor has leased or intends to lease
movables to a contractor or subcontractor for use in the work.426 The notice
must include the names and addresses of the lessor and the lessee and a
general description of the movables.427 The Act no longer requires that the
notice be signed by both the lessor and the lessee, nor does the Act require
that the notice set forth the terms of rental and of payment. That
information, if of interest to the recipient of the notice, is available upon
the recipient’s request, as discussed below.
The 2019 revision removed the strict 10-day deadline within which
the notice must be given by the lessor, instead providing that, if the notice
is given more than 30 days after the movables leased by the lessor are first
placed at the site of the immovable, the lessor’s claim and privilege will
be limited to rents accruing after the notice is given.428 In other words, a
lessor of movables who fails to provide a timely notice will no longer
automatically lose the entirety of his privilege under the Act, as was
425. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4804(B)(1) (2020); see also id. § 9:4804 cmt. c.
426. Id. § 9:4804(B)(1).
427. Id.
428. Id. As originally proposed by the Law Institute, the applicable time period
was 20 days; this was, however, extended to 30 days during the legislative
process. See H.B. 203, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
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provided under former law; rather, his claim and privilege will be limited
to rents accruing after the notice is given.429 The 2019 revision also
expressly provided that a lessor is not required to deliver notice to an
owner or contractor who is a party to the lease, a proposition expressed in
the official revision comments to the 1981 Act but not in the Act itself.430
The revised Act contains a new provision creating a mechanism by
which owners and contractors who have received a notice from a lessor
can request additional information about movables leased for use in work
on the immovable. Specifically, the Act requires that within 15 days after
receipt of a request by an owner or contractor, a lessor of movables granted
a claim and privilege under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802 must
provide a description sufficient to identify all of the leased movables that
remain at the site of the immovable and for which rents remain owing.431
A lessor who fails to provide a timely and accurate response loses his claim
and privilege to the extent of any damages suffered by the person making
the request as a result of the failure or inaccuracy.432 An amendment made
during the legislative process provides that a lessor is required to respond
to a request made by an owner or contractor only if the lessor has already
given a notice under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4804(B) to the person
making the request.433
B. Professional Consultants and Professional Subconsultants
As mentioned in Section III.I, a 1987 amendment to the Private Works
Act granted a privilege under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801 to
professional subconsultants of surveyors, engineers, and architects
engaged by the owner. The amendment provided that, for this privilege to
arise, a professional subconsultant was required to give notice to the owner
within five working days after his engagement.434 In 1989, the Act was
429. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802(G)(1) (2019); see also id. § 9:4804
cmt. c (2020); Hawk Field Servs., L.L.C. v. Mid Am. Underground, L.L.C., 94
So. 3d 136 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2012), writ denied, 99 So. 3d 652 (La. 2012).
430. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802 cmt. g (2007) (explaining that the
notice requirements applicable to lessors of movables “should not be construed to
require that a copy of the lease will have to be separately delivered to the
contractor or owner who is for some reason already a party to it.”).
431. Id. § 9:4804(B)(2) (2020).
432. Id.
433. Id.
434. Act No. 685, 1987 La. Acts 1657, amending LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4801(5). The notice was required to state the professional subconsultant’s name
and address, the name and address of his employer, and the general nature of the
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again amended to add a parallel provision to Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4802, granting a claim and privilege to “[p]rime consultant registered
or certified surveyors or engineers, or licensed architects, . . . employed by
the contractor,” as well as the professional subconsultants of those prime
consultants.435 This amendment conditioned the existence of the claim and
privilege upon the giving of a notice by the prime consultant or
professional subconsultant to the owner within 30 working days after his
employment.436
The 2019 revision largely retained the substance of these notice
requirements but relocated them to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4804.
Under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4804(A), to be entitled to a claim or
privilege under the Act, a professional consultant or professional
subconsultant must give written notice to the owner within 30 days after
his engagement in connection with the work, stating his name and address,
the name and address of the person who engaged him, and the general
nature of the work he was engaged to perform. The 2019 revision also
added one exception to this general rule: notice is not required to be given
by a professional consultant whom the owner directly engaged.437 Because
the owner is a party to the contract by which such a professional consultant
is engaged, requiring the professional consultant to give notice of his
engagement to the very person who engaged him would serve little
purpose.
C. Sub-Subcontractors
An amendment in 1988 to the Private Works Act provided that, before
any claimant not in privity of contract with the contractor would have a
right of action against the contractor, the claimant was required to record
his statement of claim or privilege in the mortgage records and provide
written notice to the contractor “stating with substantial accuracy the
amount claimed and the name of the party to whom the material was
work he was engaged to perform. A subsequent amendment the following year
changed the time period within which this notice had to be given from five
working days after the subconsultant was employed to 30 days after the
subconsultant entered into a written contract of employment. Act No. 713, 1988
La. Acts 1826.
435. Act No. 41, 1989 La. Acts 287, enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4802(A)(5).
436. Id. The notice was required to state the name and address of the prime
consultant or professional subconsultant, the name and address of his employer,
and the general nature of the work he was engaged to perform.
437. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4804(A).
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furnished or supplied or for whom the labor or service was done or
performed.”438 Among others, this provision applied to lower-tier
subcontractors who contracted with another subcontractor.
The Law Institute determined that this provision should be suppressed
on account of its incompatibility with other provisions of the Act.439
Specifically, the provision, which was found in former Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4822(J), required a remote claimant to file his statement of
claim or privilege before his right of action against the contractor or surety
would arise, yet Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4823(B) conferred upon
the claimant rights against the contractor and surety even if his statement
of claim or privilege was never filed, provided that the claimant delivered
his statement of claim or privilege to the contractor within the filing
period. To remove this conflict, House Bill No. 203 of 2019, as submitted
to the legislature, eliminated Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4822(J).440
Nevertheless, during the legislative session, a provision was added
that restored certain elements of former law. Unlike former law, this
provision, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4804(D), does not require a subsubcontractor to file his statement of claim or privilege for his right of
action against the contractor or surety to arise. The provision does,
however, require a subcontractor in privity of contract with another
subcontractor but not with the contractor to give notice to the contractor at
least 30 days before filing suit against the contractor, stating with
substantial accuracy the amount claimed and the name of the other
subcontractor for whom the labor or service was done or performed.441 A
sub-subcontractor who fails to satisfy the requirements of this provision
will have no right of action to enforce his claim under the Act against the
contractor or the surety.442
D. Residential Claimants
As discussed in Section III.F, a 1991 amendment to the Act mandated
that sellers of movables used in connection with a residential work give
notice of nonpayment to the owner at least 10 days before filing a
statement of claim or privilege and extended to 70 days the period within
438. Act No. 685, 1988 La. Acts 1774, enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4822(J).
439. Minutes of the June 17, 2016 Meeting of the Security Devices
Committee, Louisiana State Law Institute (June 22, 2016) (on file with the Law
Institute).
440. H.B. 203, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019).
441. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4804(D).
442. Id.
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which they were permitted to file their statements of claim or privilege.443
Although these requirements were eliminated by House Bill No. 203 of
2019 as proposed by the Law Institute,444 a provision was added during
the legislative session that allowed certain claimants on residential works
to give notice of nonpayment to the owner within the original 60-day filing
period and, by doing so, to extend the period within which they must file
their statements of claim or privilege to a total of 70 days.
Thus, as discussed in Section IV.D.4, the 2019 revision permits—but
does not require—sellers and lessors of movables granted a privilege by
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4801, as well as all claimants granted a
claim and privilege by Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802, to give notice
of nonpayment to the owner in connection with a residential work for
which a timely notice of contract was not filed.445 If this notice of
nonpayment is given before the expiration of the 60-day filing period that
would otherwise apply and at least 10 days before the statement of claim
or privilege is filed, then the 60-day filing period is extended to 70 days.446
The notice of nonpayment must set forth the amount and nature of the
obligation giving rise to the claim and privilege in order for this 10-day
extension to apply.447 This provision applies only to residential works,
which, as discussed in Section III.F, are now defined in the Act.448
E. Section 4802 Claimants on Works for Which
Notice of Contract Was Filed
As previously discussed, claimants under the Act must file statements
of their claims or privileges within a specified period of time in order to
preserve their claims and privileges. In addition to these filing
requirements, if a notice of contract was properly filed, the Act also
requires persons granted a claim and privilege under Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4802 to deliver a copy of their statement of claim or privilege
to the owner, provided that his address is given in the notice of contract.449
Such notice must be given no later than 30 days after the filing of a notice
443. Act No. 1024, 1991 La. Acts 3298, enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
9:4802(G)(2), 9:4822(D)(2).
444. See H.B. 203, 2019 Leg., Reg. Sess. (La. 2019). See also Minutes of the
June 17, 2016 Meeting of the Security Devices Committee, Louisiana State Law
Institute (June 22, 2016) (on file with the Law Institute).
445. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(D).
446. Id.
447. Id.
448. Id. § 9:4810(8).
449. Id. § 9:4822(B).
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of termination of the work or, if a notice of termination is not filed, no later
than six months after the substantial completion or abandonment of the
work.450 These time periods are the same time periods applicable to the
filing of the statement of claim or privilege itself, and a claimant’s failure
to satisfy these notice requirements will result in the loss of his claim and
privilege under the Act.
In addition to this requirement, which applies to all claimants under
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802, another provision of the Act imposes
a special notice requirement upon the seller of a movable sold to a
subcontractor where notice of contract was properly filed. The substance
of this requirement was added in 1999451 and was merely clarified by the
2019 revision. Specifically, the seller of a movable sold to a subcontractor
is required to give both the owner and the contractor notice of nonpayment
of the price of the movable no later than 75 days after the last day of the
calendar month in which the movable was delivered to the
subcontractor.452 This notice of nonpayment must contain the name and
address of the seller, the name and address of the subcontractor, a
description of the movable, and a statement of the unpaid balance owed to
the seller.453 The 2019 revision clarified that the failure of the seller of a
movable sold to a subcontractor to provide such notice will result in the
loss of the seller’s claim and privilege for the price of the movable.454
F. Mechanisms of Notice
Just as the notice requirements applicable to claimants were scattered
throughout the Private Works Act, so too were the rules concerning the
means by which notices were required to be given. Before the 2019
revision, the Act, as it had been amended, contained several provisions
requiring certain claimants to send notices to certain recipients by certified
or registered mail at certain addresses. For example, Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4802(G)(3) required sellers of movables to give notice of
nonpayment by certified mail, return receipt requested, to the owner and

450. Id.
451. Act No. 1134, 1999 La. Acts 3017, enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4802(G)(3).
452. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4804(C); see also AP Interiors, L.L.C. v.
Coryell Cty. Tradesmen, L.L.C., 239 So. 3d 393 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2018)
(rejecting arguments that the 75-day notice provision applied only to residential
projects).
453. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4804(C).
454. Id.
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general contractor at their last known addresses.455 In contrast, Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4822(J) required claimants not in privity of contract
with the contractor to give written notice of their claims by registered or
certified mail, postage prepaid, to the contractor at any place the contractor
maintained an office in Louisiana. Additionally, Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4835(C) required parties who filed bonds or other security to
give notice by certified mail to the owner and contractor at the address of
the immovable and to the lienholder at his address.
All the while, the Private Works Act contained a general notice
provision in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4842 to the effect that a notice
given under the Act is deemed to have been given when it is delivered to
the recipient or when it is properly deposited in the United States mail for
delivery to the recipient by certified or registered mail. This statute also
provided that the notice may be addressed to the owner, contractor, or
surety at the address given in a properly filed notice of contract and to a
claimant at the address given in a statement of claim or privilege or in a
notice given by the claimant in accordance with the provisions of the Act.
The enactment of the special rules mentioned above concerning the
mechanisms of giving notices suggests that the drafters of those rules
might have overlooked the existence of the general rule in Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4842.
The 2019 revision suppressed the numerous provisions concerning the
means by which notice must be given in specific circumstances and instead
enacted a single set of provisions, beginning with Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4842. This section now sets forth the general rule that, for
purposes of the Act, the delivery of a communication or document is
accomplished when it is actually received by the recipient or when it is
deemed to have been given or delivered in accordance with the newly
enacted provisions that follow.456 The revised provision incorporates new
terminology—“communication or document”—as opposed to notice, even
though a communication includes a notice.457

455. See id. § 9:4802(G)(2) (2019) (requiring sellers of movables in
connection with residential works to give notice of nonpayment via registered or
certified mail, return receipt requested, to the owner).
456. Id. § 9:4842 (2020). The revised notice provisions no longer include,
within the treatment of the word “delivery,” the presumption that proof of delivery
of movables at the site of the immovable is prima facie evidence that the movables
became component parts of, or were used on, the immovable. This presumption
was moved, without substantive change, to new Louisiana Revised Statutes §
9:4846.
457. See id. § 9:4842 cmt. b.
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The provisions that follow Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4842 set
forth the specific means by which communications or documents must be
given or delivered under the Act. Those provisions begin with Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4843, which is patterned after Civil Code article 1938
and provides that a communication or document is received when it comes
into the possession of the recipient or someone authorized by him to
receive it. This provision incorporates elements of former law and differs
from the provisions that follow in that, under Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4843, the critical point in time is when the communication or document
is actually received by the recipient, as opposed to when the
communication or document is transmitted by the sender.
In contrast, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4844 sets forth two
circumstances under which a communication or document will be deemed
to have been given or delivered upon transmission by the sender: when the
communication or document is sent by certain types of United States mail
or when it is sent by commercial courier. Specifically, the statute provides
that a communication or document is deemed to have been given or
delivered when it is deposited in the United States mail for delivery to the
recipient by certified or registered mail or by another means of delivery
for which the postal service registers and tracks the mailing.458 Of course,
the sender may also use other types of United States mail to send the
communication or document, but in those cases, the communication or
document will not be deemed to be given or delivered as of the time of
transmittal but rather as of the time of actual receipt in accordance with
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4843. The sender will also have the burden
of proving actual receipt.
Similarly to communications sent by certified or registered mail, a
communication or document that is sent by commercial courier is deemed
to have been given or delivered when it is deposited with the commercial
courier for delivery to the recipient, but the statute contains an added
requirement that the communication or document must be received by the
recipient within a reasonable period of time.459 In conjunction with this
provision, the 2019 revision defined “commercial courier” to mean
juridical persons whose primary purpose is the delivery of letters and
parcels.460 This definition of commercial courier is broad enough to
include national companies, such as Federal Express and United Parcel
Service, as well as regional companies and even local delivery companies.
458. Id. § 9:4844(A). This provision recognizes that the United States Postal
Service may devise new forms of delivery in the future that meet these
requirements.
459. Id. § 9:4844(B).
460. Id. § 9:4810(2).

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 96

10/12/20 7:07 AM

2020]

REWORKING LOUISIANA’S PRIVATE WORKS ACT

1085

Because the definition is so broad, the imposition of the additional
requirement that the communication or document be received within a
reasonable period of time is intended to ensure that it is the sender—not
the recipient—who bears the risk of using an unreliable commercial
courier.461 What constitutes a reasonable period of time is left for the court
to determine according to the circumstances, but if the communication or
document is received after a reasonable period of time, the sender will lose
the benefit of delivery as of the moment of transmittal rather than receipt.
Under those circumstances, the notice will still be effective as of the time
of its actual receipt. If, however, the notice is never received after being
deposited with the commercial courier, notice will not have been
effectively given.
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4844 specifies the addresses to which
communications or documents under the Act must be sent.
Communications or documents may be addressed to an owner, contractor,
or surety at the address provided in a properly filed notice of contract or
attached bond and to a claimant at the address provided in a properly filed
statement of claim or privilege.462 Alternatively, communications or
documents may be addressed to any of these parties at an address
contained in a previous communication with respect to the work, but this
address must be one that has been designated by the recipient as an address
for notice.463
If those addresses are not available, communications or documents
may be addressed to: (1) the owner or contractor at the address of the place
of business through which the contract between them was made; (2) the
surety at the address of the office through which the bond was issued; or
(3) the claimant at the address of the place of business through which the
contract with him concerning the work was made.464 Additionally,
communications or documents may be addressed to the owner, contractor,
surety, or claimant at any other address held out by these parties as the
place for receipt of communications related to the work.465
As a fail-safe, when the intended recipient is a juridical person that is
incorporated, formed, or organized under Louisiana law or is registered or
461. See Minutes of the April 27, 2018 Meeting of the Security Devices
Committee, Louisiana State Law Institute (May 3, 2018) (on file with the Law
Institute).
462. Id. § 9:4844(C).
463. Id. See also Minutes of the April 27, 2018 Meeting of the Security
Devices Committee, Louisiana State Law Institute (May 3, 2018) (on file with the
Law Institute).
464. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4844(D)–(E).
465. Id.
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authorized to do business in Louisiana, communications or documents can
always be addressed to the recipient’s registered office, principal office,
principal place of business, or principal business establishment in
Louisiana as reflected on the records of the secretary of state, as
alternatives to any other address that might be a permissible notice address
for the recipient.466
The final statute in the series of notice provisions is Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4845, which permits delivery of communications or
documents by electronic means. This section provides that a
communication or document is deemed to have been given or delivered
when it is delivered by electronic means to a recipient who has consented
to that method of delivery in connection with the work.467 Whether the
recipient has consented to receive a communication or document
electronically will be determined according to the context and surrounding
circumstances, including the conduct of the parties.468
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4845 specifies the three ways in which
a communication or document may be sent electronically: (1) by facsimile
transmission to a specified telecopier number; (2) by delivery to a
specified electronic mail address; or (3) by entry into a specified electronic
information processing system that satisfies the requirements of the
Louisiana Uniform Electronic Transactions Act (LUETA).469 In the case
of both facsimile and electronic mail transmissions, the sender must also
receive a confirmation of receipt,470 but this required receipt is merely one
indicating delivery and not the “read receipt” that is customary with
respect to email communications.471 In fact, neither the Private Works Act
nor LEUTA requires the recipient to read or retrieve the electronic
communication or even to be aware of the fact that it has been received;
rather, the electronic communication is considered to be received the
moment it reaches the intended recipient’s fax number, email address, or
electronic information processing system.472
466. Id. § 9:4844(F).
467. Id. § 9:4845.
468. See id. § 9:4845 cmt. b; see also id. § 9:2605(B)(2) (2018). For examples
of conduct that may be sufficient to indicate the recipient’s consent to receive
electronic communications, see id. § 9:2605 cmt. e.
469. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4845 (2020).
470. Id.
471. See Minutes of the June 15, 2018 Meeting of the Security Devices
Committee, Louisiana State Law Institute (June 19, 2018) (on file with the Law
Institute).
472. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4845 cmt. c; 9:2615(E) (2018); 9:2615
cmt. e (2018); see also In re Tillman, 187 So. 3d 445 (La. 2016).

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 98

10/12/20 7:07 AM

2020]

REWORKING LOUISIANA’S PRIVATE WORKS ACT

1087

VI. ENFORCEMENT
In keeping with its basic policy objective of ensuring that those who
contribute to the improvement of an immovable are paid for the value of
their work, the Private Works Act contemplates several mechanisms for
the enforcement of the claims and privileges it creates. These enforcement
mechanisms include the filing of suit, the initiation of a concursus
proceeding, the imposition of liability upon the contractor’s surety, and
the assessment of attorney fees. Each of these mechanisms will be
discussed more specifically below, along with a discussion of the topic of
subrogation.
A. Suit
The Act mentions the usual means of enforcement of a claim or
privilege—through an ordinary suit—only in the negative: a claim and the
privilege securing it are extinguished if a suit is not filed against the owner
before the expiration of one year after the date that the claimant filed his
statement of claim or privilege.473 The suit for enforcement is an ordinary
action governed by the Code of Civil Procedure474 and typically seeks both
a money judgment for the amount owed and recognition of the claimant’s
privilege. When the plaintiff in the suit claims a privilege, he is entitled to
have the immovable subject to the privilege seized before judgment under
a writ of sequestration upon posting security in an amount set by the
court.475 If the plaintiff succeeds in obtaining a judgment against the
owner, the judgment can be enforced by sale of the immovable at a

473. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4823(A)(2) (2020). As discussed supra in
Section IV.E, in order to preserve the effect of the privilege against third persons,
the claimant must also, within the same one-year period, file a notice of pendency
of action in the mortgage records; however, this step is not necessary for the
preservation of the claims against the owner, contractor, or surety. See id. §
9:4833(E).
474. If the claimant could produce an authentic act evidencing the privilege
and importing a confession of judgment, there would appear to be no preclusion
of the use of executory process to enforce the privilege. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC.
art. 2632 (2002). Nevertheless, perhaps because of the practical difficulty of
satisfying the requirements for use of executory process, there do not appear to be
any reported cases in which executory process has been used or even attempted
to enforce a Private Works Act privilege.
475. Id. arts. 3571, 3574 (2020).
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sheriff’s sale under a writ of fieri facias issued after expiration of the
delays for taking a suspensive appeal.476
Suit can be, and usually is, also filed against the contractor and the
surety, as well as against any person who may have contractual
responsibility for payment to the claimant. A suit against these parties
alone, however, will not preserve the plaintiff’s claim against the owner
or the plaintiff’s privilege upon the immovable.477
There are two instances in which the Private Works Act, as revised in
2019, requires that notice be given to a defendant before suit is filed. First,
as discussed previously, a sub-subcontractor who has no privity of contract
with the contractor must give the contractor notice of his claim at least 30
days before filing suit against the contractor or surety, identifying the
amount of the claim and the subcontractor with whom he contracted.478
Without such notice, the claimant has no right of action against the
contractor or surety. The second instance in which the Act requires notice
before suit can be filed applies in the case of a suit against the surety before
expiration of the filing period. A claimant who wishes to bring an action
against the surety during the filing period must deliver a copy of his
statement of claim or privilege to the surety at least 30 days before filing
suit against the surety.479 Otherwise, his suit is premature until expiration
of the filing period.480
As mentioned in Section IV.D.5 above, if a § 4802 claimant delivers
his statement of claim or privilege to the contractor within the filing period
but does not file the statement of claim or privilege, his claims against the
contractor and surety, but not his claim against the owner or his privilege,
476. See generally id. arts. 2291 et seq. (2002). Because the plaintiff’s recourse
is not limited to the immovable upon which the work was performed, the
judgment can also be enforced by seizure and sale of any other non-exempt
property of the parties cast in judgment.
477. See Wright v. Fontana, 290 So. 2d 449 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1974)
(recognizing the error of an attorney who filed suit against the construction
company to whom the attorney’s former client had supplied materials but failed
to name the owner of the property as a defendant in the suit, thereby leading to
the loss of the former client’s privilege under the Private Works Act).
478. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4804(D). This requirement, which was added by
a legislative amendment made during the course of the enactment of the 2019
revision, replaced a requirement under prior law that a claimant having no direct
contractual relationship with the contractor must file his statement of claim or
privilege within the filing period and give notice to the contractor within 30 days
after filing it. See id. § 9:4822(J) (2019).
479. Id. § 9:4813(D) (2020).
480. Id. § 9:4813 cmt. c.
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are nevertheless preserved, even in the absence of filing.481 Under these
circumstances, a parallel rule alters the usual rule that a claim is
extinguished if suit is not filed against the owner within one year after the
filing of the statement of claim or privilege.482 Where the claimant delivers
his statement of claim or privilege to the contractor within the filing
period, it is not essential for the claimant to file suit against the owner
within one year, as the Act otherwise requires,483 to preserve his rights
against the contractor or surety. For that limited purpose, it suffices for the
claimant to file suit against the contractor or surety within one year after
the date of expiration of the filing period.484 The deadline for filing suit
runs from the expiration of the filing period, rather than the date of filing
of the claimant’s statement of claim or privilege, as is the usual rule, for
the obvious reason that under these circumstances no statement of claim
or privilege was filed. It is also for this reason that the Act provides that
the surety’s liability on its bond is extinguished as to any person, other
than the owner, who fails to file suit against the owner, contractor, or
surety no later than one year after expiration of the filing period.485
B. Concursus
The enforcement mechanism that the Act contemplates is a concursus
proceeding initiated after expiration of the filing period.486 The concursus
is conducted contradictorily among the owner, contractor, surety, and all
persons who have preserved their claims by filing a statement of claim or
privilege within the filing period.487 When the owner convokes the

481. Id. § 9:4823(B).
482. See id. § 9:4823(A)(2).
483. Id.
484. Id. § 9:4823(B).
485. Id. 9:4813(E). As the revision comments observe, however, this does not
mean that the claimant can always wait until just before the one-year anniversary
of the expiration of the filing period to bring suit against the surety. If Louisiana
Revised Statutes § 9:4823(B) does not apply and no suit is filed against the owner
before the expiration of one year after the claimant filed his statement of claim or
privilege, the claimant’s rights against the owner, contractor, and surety will all
be lost by operation of Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4823(A)(2). See id. §
9:4813 cmt. d.
486. Id. § 9:4841(A). A Louisiana concursus is analogous to a federal
interpleader action. The procedural rules applicable to concursus proceedings are
found in LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 4651 et seq. (1998).
487. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4841(A). Filing a concursus is not mandatory,
however, and a claimant may, if he chooses, proceed instead to a direct suit against
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concursus, he may, but need not, deposit into the registry of the court all
remaining amounts that he owes to the contractor.488 The owner does not
have the exclusive right to convoke the concursus; it can be initiated by
any interested person, such as the contractor, the surety, or a claimant.489
A concursus initiated under the Act has its greatest utility when it is
convoked by an owner who has complied with the Act’s requirements of
filing a notice of contract and bond before commencement of the work. If
the owner has done so and has deposited all remaining contract sums into
the registry of the court, he is entitled to move for a judgment discharging
him from any further responsibility and ordering the cancellation of all
statements of claim or privilege filed against the immovable.490 The
motion is tried in a summary proceeding, and a suspensive or devolutive
appeal from any judgment rendered on the motion may be taken as a matter
of right, without the need for the trial court to designate the judgment as
final.491
Even if the owner has not filed a timely notice of contract and bond,
he is still permitted, within the concursus, to move for a judgment
canceling any untimely or improperly filed statements of claim or
privilege.492 Under those circumstances, however, he is not entitled to a
judgment discharging him from further responsibility or limiting his
liability to the amount of the remaining contract funds.
The owner’s attorney is entitled to recover his fees incurred in
initiating the concursus from the contractor and surety, and these fees may
be paid out of the funds deposited into the registry of the court, but only
after all properly preserved claims have been satisfied.493 If a claimant
initiates the concursus when no one else has done so within 90 days after
expiration of the filing period, the claimant’s attorney is similarly entitled
to recover his fees incurred in initiating the concursus from the contractor
and surety.494
the owner, contractor, or surety. See Levingston Supply Co. v. Am. Employers
Ins. Co., 198 So. 416 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1940).
488. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4841(B).
489. Id. § 9:4841(A).
490. Id. § 9:4841(C)–(D). As the official revision comments observe, the owner
bears the risk of the surety’s insolvency until a judgment on this motion is rendered.
See id. § 9:4841 cmt. c.
491. Id. § 9:4841 cmt. b. Cf. LA. CODE CIV. PROC. art. 1915(B) (2014).
492. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4841(D)(1).
493. Id. § 9:4841(F).
494. Id. As when the owner’s attorney is awarded his fees, the fees awarded to
a claimant’s attorney may be paid from any funds deposited into the registry of
the court, but only after all properly preserved claims have been satisfied.
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A surety that convokes a concursus proceeding is required to deposit
into the registry of the court an amount equal to 125% of all claims that
have been preserved through the filing of timely statements of claim or
privilege, but in no event more than the full amount of the bond.495 After
all claimants have answered or have failed to answer within the delay fixed
by the court, the surety may, upon order of the court, withdraw all amounts
it had deposited in excess of 125% of the claims that remain.496
C. Liability of the Surety
The 2019 revision made no substantive change to the provisions of the
Act bearing upon the nature and extent of the surety’s liability.497 Through
the issuance of a payment bond, the surety guarantees the payment up to
the aggregate amount expressed in the bond of claims of the owner, all
persons having a claim under the Act against the contractor, and all
persons to whom the contractor is contractually liable.498 A payment bond
stands as security for claims made by § 4802 claimants. Although the
owner is the obligee of the bond, the owner is not within the class of
persons granted a right of action under the bond for his own losses.499 As
a legal suretyship, the bond is deemed to conform to the requirements of
the Act, notwithstanding any provision of the bond to the contrary.500 A
495. Id. § 9:4841(E). This amount is commonly referred to as the “penal sum”
or “penal amount” of the bond. See, e.g., In re Whitaker Constr. Co., Inc., 439
F.3d 212 (5th Cir. 2006); L & A Contracting Co., Inc. v. Ram Indus. Coatings,
Inc., 762 So. 2d 1223 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 2000).
496. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4841(E). The 2019 revision eliminated the
reference in prior law to a judgment of default against claimants who did not
answer because no judgment of default is obtained in a concursus. Instead, if a
claimant does not answer, the court sets a delay allowing him a second
opportunity to do so, and he is estopped from asserting his claim if he does not
answer within the delay set by the court. See LA. CODE CIV. PROC. arts. 4656–57
(2020).
497. Although the 2019 revision deleted the statement in Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4835(A) that a surety does not have the benefit of division or
discussion, this deletion had no substantive effect because suretyship law now
provides, as a general proposition, that a surety has no such rights. See LA. CIV.
CODE art. 3045 (2020).
498. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4812(C).
499. Roy Anderson Corp. v. 225 Baronne Complex, L.L.C., 280 So. 3d 730
(La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 2019).
500. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4812(D); see also LA. CIV. CODE art. 3066 (2020).
Thus, where a bond issued for a contractor contained a provision that suit must be
brought within two years from the date of the bond, that provision was displaced by
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surety is liable on its bond even if the bond is not actually attached to the
filed notice of contract and even if no notice of contract is filed.501
Although only a payment bond is required to fulfill the requirements of
the Act, a bond provided under the Act is deemed to guarantee the
contractor’s performance under the contract to the owner, unless the bond
expressly provides otherwise.502
An agreement between the owner and contractor for an extension of
time for the contractor’s performance of the work does not extinguish the
surety’s obligation.503 Other modifications of the contract, or changes in
the work, do not extinguish the obligations of the surety to persons other
than the owner. If the surety is materially prejudiced by a change to which
it did not consent, it is relieved of any liability to the owner and is entitled
to be indemnified by the owner for any resulting loss or damage.504
Before the 2019 revision, the Act did not specify the qualifications of
a surety issuing a payment bond, other than a requirement that the surety
be solvent. The 2019 revision provides that, on contracts in which the price
of the work exceeds $100,000, the bond must be issued by a surety
company licensed to do business in Louisiana.505 Another change made by
the 2019 revision is that the amount of the bond must be at least as great
as the total contract price, rather than the tiered percentages of the contract
price that applied under prior law.506
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4813(D), which allows suit to be brought against the
surety within one year after the expiration of the period for filing statements of claim
or privilege. See Peter M. Trapolin & Associates, Architects v. Twin City Federal
Savings and Loan Ass’n, 488 So. 2d 1191 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1986). On the other
hand, where a bond is issued by a subcontractor for the benefit of a contractor, it is
not a legal suretyship given in accordance with the Act, and such a time limitation
is enforceable. See Con-Plex, Div. of U.S. Indus., Inc. v. Vicon, Inc., 448 So. 2d
191 (La. Ct. App. 1st Cir. 1984); Landis & Young v. Gossett & Winn, 178 So. 760
(La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1937).
501. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4813(C).
502. Id. § 9:4812(C)(2). In contrast to a payment bond, a performance bond is
not a legal suretyship, and the language of the performance bond controls the
extent of the surety's liability under it. Roy Anderson Corp., 280 So. 3d 730.
503. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4812(E)(1). Nevertheless, under general
suretyship law, a surety has the right to require security when the principal
obligation would be due but for an extension of its term to which the surety did
not consent. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3053(4) (2020).
504. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4812(E)(2).
505. Id. § 9:4812(A). This is the same qualification that applies to sureties
issuing bonds to obtain the release of statements of claim or privilege under
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4835(A).
506. Id. § 9:4812(B).
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Even though the surety’s bond is now required to be issued in an
amount equal to the contract price, it remains possible for the aggregate
amount of all claims arising from a work to exceed the amount of the bond.
In that circumstance, the Act provides a hierarchy of payment. First, those
persons who preserved their claims by filing a timely statement of claim
or privilege in the mortgage records are paid, with payment being made to
them on a pro-rata basis if the bond is insufficient to satisfy all of their
claims.507 After those claims are paid in full, payment is made to those
persons who did not preserve their claims by filing a statement of claim or
privilege but to whom the contractor is otherwise liable.508 These claims
are not paid pro rata but rather in the order in which they are presented to
the surety, and the surety is therefore able to pay valid claims in this
category as soon as they are presented. Finally, after all other claims have
been satisfied, payment is made to the owner.509
The surety’s liability to all claimants other than the owner is
extinguished if the claimant fails to institute an action against the owner,
contractor, or surety no later than one year after the expiration of the filing
period.510 Nevertheless, as discussed in Section VI.A above, the claimant
does not always have the ability to institute suit throughout the entirety of
that one-year period. If the claimant files a statement of claim or privilege
against the owner at some point before the last day of the filing period, he
will have only one year from the time of filing within which to institute
suit against the owner, and his failure to do so will extinguish his rights
against all persons.511 The joinder of a claimant to a concursus proceeding
507. Id. § 9:4813(B)(1).
508. Id. § 9:4813(B)(2). This category includes claimants who did not file a
statement of claim or privilege within the filing period but preserved their claims
against the contractor and surety by delivering the statement of claim or privilege
to the contractor within the filing period. See id. § 9:4823(B).
509. Id. § 9:4813(B)(3).
510. Id. § 9:4813(E). In Metropolitan v. Landis, 627 So. 2d 144 (La. 1993), the
Louisiana Supreme Court held that the one-year time period within which a
claimant must institute an action under Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4813 is
peremptive rather than prescriptive. The issue presented to the Court was whether
a general contractor’s repeated acknowledgments of a debt owed to the claimant
subcontractor interrupted prescription as to both the general contractor and its
surety. Id. at 147. Determining that the one-year period is peremptive, rather than
prescriptive, the Court held that the period could not be interrupted or suspended,
and a suit filed after expiration of the period is therefore untimely. Id. at 148.
511. There is an exception to this rule, however, if the statement of claim or
privilege is delivered to the contractor within the filing period. See LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 9:4823(B). In that event, the claimant has a period of one year from the
expiration of the filing period within which to bring suit against the contractor and
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satisfies the requirement for the institution of an action, even if the
claimant is not the plaintiff in the concursus.512
D. Attorney Fees
The claims and privileges arising under the Act do not secure a
claimant’s attorney fees, whether the claimant asserts entitlement to
attorney fees by contract or by statute.513 The 2019 revision contains an
express statement to that effect.514 Thus, even if a supplier sells materials
on open account to a contractor or subcontractor, the supplier is not
entitled to recover attorney fees from the owner under the open account
statute515 or to assert a privilege upon the immovable for payment of
attorney fees. The Act does not, however, preclude a claimant from
recovering attorney fees from any person responsible for them under law
outside of the Private Works Act. Thus, if an owner has directly purchased
materials on open account from a supplier, the owner may well be
responsible for the supplier’s attorney fees under the open account statute,
but there would still be no privilege upon the immovable securing the
award of attorney fees.516
The Private Works Act itself provides for an award of attorney fees in
a few instances, such as when a claimant fails to request cancellation of an
improperly filed or lapsed statement of claim or privilege517 or when an
owner or claimant convokes a concursus.518

surety. Id. Nevertheless, if the claimant did not file his statement of claim or
privilege in the mortgage records within the filing period, his claim against the
owner and his privilege upon the immovable will be lost, regardless of the filing
of a timely suit against the contractor or surety. See id. § 9:4823(A)(2).
512. Id. § 9:4823(F); see also id. § 9:4813 cmt. e.
513. See Accusess Envtl., Inc. v. Walker, 185 So. 3d 69, 78 (La. Ct. App. 1st
Cir. 2015); Byron Montz, Inc. v. Conco Constr., Inc., 824 So. 2d 498, 504 (La Ct.
App. 4th Cir. 2002).
514. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4803(C).
515. Id. § 9:2781 (2018). See E. Smith Plumbing, Inc. v. Manuel, 88 So. 3d
1209, 1213–15 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir. 2012) (finding that subcontractors might
have been entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs under the open account
statute from the general contractor with whom they contracted but that these
amounts were not recoverable from the owners). See also Accuess Envtl., Inc.,
185 So. 3d 69.
516. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4803(C).
517. Id. § 9:4833(B).
518. Id. § 9:4841(F).
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E. Subrogation
Occasionally, a contractor or subcontractor who has discharged an
obligation that was owed to a claimant attempts to assert subrogation to
the claimant’s claims and privileges arising under the Act, often for the
purpose of gaining a more favorable priority than the contractor or
subcontractor has in his own right. For instance, in Pringle-Associated
Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes,519 a subcontractor, after paying its own
employees the amounts it owed them, sought to claim subrogation to their
laborer’s privileges to the prejudice of a mortgagee who had priority over
the privilege that the subcontractor was accorded by the Act. On rehearing,
the Louisiana Supreme Court rejected the subcontractor’s claim of
subrogation, citing the general rule that one cannot be subrogated to the
rights of the obligee of an obligation as to which he is the principal
obligor.520
An alternative ground for the Court’s holding in Pringle-Associated
Mortgage Corp. was that a laborer is not a creditor of the owner until he
files his statement of claim or privilege and that there can thus be no
subrogation to a laborer’s rights until the laborer has done so. This
rationale was based on the wording of the pre-1981 Act, which provided
that a laborer had a personal claim against the owner “for a period of one
year from the filing of his claim” and that the presentation and recordation
of his claim in the manner required by the Act would “create in his favor
a privilege on the land and improvements.”521 Notably, the present Private
Works Act contains no similar pre-condition, providing instead that filing
519. Pringle-Associated Mortg. Corp. v. Eanes, 226 So. 2d 502 (La. 1969).
520. See also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 1829 cmt. d (2008). The Louisiana
Supreme Court would later have occasion to reach a similar holding in Bayou Pierre
Farms v. Bat Farms Partners, III, 693 So. 2d 1158 (La. 1997), in which the Court,
analogizing to its prior ruling under the Private Works Act in Pringle-Associated
Mortgage Corp. v. Eanes, held that an agricultural laborer’s privilege protects only
the individuals who actually perform agricultural labor rather than the partnership
employing them. But see Tee It Up Golf, Inc. v. Bayou State Constr., LLC, 30 So.
3d 1159 (La. Ct. App. 3d. Cir. 2010), which, without citing either PringleAssociated Mortgage Corp. or Bat Farms, allowed a corporate general contractor
in a Private Works Act case to claim the laborer’s privileges of its own employees.
This portion of the Court’s opinion was only dicta because the Court correctly found
that the general contractor’s statement of claim or privilege, which contained only
a municipal address of the immovable, was defective. Id. at 1162. The official
revision comments to the 2019 revision indicate an intent to repudiate this dicta in
Tee It Up Golf, Inc. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802 cmt. h.
521. Id. § 9:4812 (1966).
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is necessary only to preserve claims and privileges, rather than to create
them.522
The 2019 revision makes clear that a contractor or subcontractor who
discharges a claim arising under the Act may not assert subrogation,
whether legal or conventional, to the claimant’s claim under the Act or his
privilege upon the immovable.523 As the official revision comments
indicate,524 allowing them to do so would be inconsistent with the
indemnities that they owe under the Act.525 The preclusion of subrogation
applies regardless of whether, as in Pringle, the contractor or
subcontractor is the principal obligor of the obligation. For instance, if a
contractor, in response to a claim made against him by a supplier to a
subcontractor, pays the obligation owed to the supplier, he may not assert
subrogation to the supplier’s claim against the owner or the supplier’s
privilege on the immovable. The Private Works Act does not, however,
preclude him from asserting subrogation to the supplier’s contractual right
against the responsible subcontractor who failed to pay the supplier.526
Similar rules apply under the 2019 revision to a surety that pays a
claimant to whom the surety is liable. The surety is legally subrogated to
the claimant’s contractual rights but may not assert by subrogation his
claims or privileges arising under the Act.527 The Act does not, however,
preclude the surety from asserting subrogation to the owner’s rights under
suretyship law.528

522. Id. § 9:4822 (1982). Nevertheless, a few cases decided long after the 1981
revision have continued to cite Pringle-Associated Mortgage Corp. for the
proposition that a claim and privilege does not arise in favor of a claimant until
he files a statement of claim or privilege. See Century Ready Mix Corp. v. Boyte,
968 So. 2d 893 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2007); First Thrift and Loan, L.L.C. v.
Griffin, 954 So. 2d. 269 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 2007). The error in this reasoning
is apparent from two provisions of the Act stating that certain narrow classes of
privileges arising under the Act are not effective as to third persons until a
statement of claim or privilege is filed. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4808(C) and
9:4822(D) (1982); see now id. §§ 9:4808(C) and 9:4820(D) (2020). If no claim or
privilege arising under the Act were effective even between the parties until filing,
these provisions would be both unnecessary and meaningless.
523. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4802(F) (2020).
524. Id. § 9:4802 cmt. h.
525. Id. § 9:4802(F).
526. Id.
527. Id. § 9:4813(F).
528. Id. § 9:4813 cmt. g.
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VII. EFFECTIVENESS OF PRIVILEGES AGAINST THIRD PERSONS AND
RANKING
The issue of the ranking of a Private Works Act privilege against other
encumbrances is inextricably linked to the issue of when the privilege
becomes effective against third persons. Private Works Act privileges are
generally effective against third persons, without recordation, as of the
earlier of the date of commencement of work or the date of filing notice of
contract, and they are inferior to only those mortgages and vendor’s
privileges that previously became effective against third persons.529 The
2019 revision did not alter this basic rule or its numerous exceptions. The
revision did, however, wholly rewrite the ranking provision of the Act in
an effort to make it more consistent with the general regime that exists
under other Louisiana law for the ranking of encumbrances upon
immovables.
A. Effectiveness of Private Works Act Privileges Against Third Persons
It is perhaps a common belief among Louisiana practitioners that
privileges upon immovables, like mortgages,530 quite naturally rank
according to the dates of their filing, with the result that they are
necessarily inferior to those encumbrances that were previously recorded
but superior to those encumbrances recorded afterward. This belief, to the
extent that it exists, is a misconception of the regime that the Civil Code
actually establishes. The Civil Code provides that privileges take effect
against third persons from the date of registry,531 but they have priority
over mortgages, even previously recorded mortgages, provided that the act
or other evidence of the secured obligation is recorded in a timely
manner.532 Among themselves, the ranking of privileges is determined by
the nature of each of the competing privileges, with privileges of the same
nature being paid concurrently.533 The time within which filing of a
529. Id. §§ 9:4820–21.
530. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3307(3) (2020).
531. Id. art. 3274.
532. Id. arts. 3186 and 3274. See Lawyers Title Ins. Corp. v. Valteau, 563 So.
2d 260 (La. 1990); Verret v. Rougeau, 579 So. 2d 1239 (La. Ct. App. 3d Cir.
1991); see also PLANIOL & RIPERT, supra note 9, No. 3139, at 700: “Because of
their nature, the privilege necessarily ranks all mortgages established on the same
immovable, although anterior to it. This is provided by [French Civil Code] Art.
2095, which provides that the privilege is the right to be preferred to the other
creditors, even mortgages.”
533. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3187–88.
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privilege must occur in order to be considered timely is generally governed
by Civil Code article 3274: seven days from the date of the act or
obligation when registry is required in the same parish in which the act
was passed or the obligation originated; otherwise, 15 days.534
Statutes creating specific privileges often create exceptions to these
general rules, such as by providing that those privileges will take their
ranking based on the dates of their filing.535 The Private Works Act itself
creates exceptions to the general rules of the Civil Code: most of the
privileges the Act creates are effective against third persons without
recordation,536 from the earlier of the time of filing of notice of contract or
the time of commencement of the work,537 provided that the privileges are
preserved by filing a statement of claim or privilege within the filing
periods the Act prescribes.538 The Act also includes its own self-contained
ranking rules to rank privileges arising under it against other privileges
and mortgages.539
In Gleissner v. Hughes,540 the Court considered an objection to the
constitutionality of the 1916 predecessor to the Private Works Act,541
which at the time provided that a privilege arising under its provisions and
recorded within 45 days after the owner’s acceptance of the work had
priority over all other privileges and encumbrances, even those that had
been recorded before work began. At the time, the Louisiana Constitution
534. Id. art. 3274.
535. See, e.g., LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:1123.115 (2018) (privilege in favor of
condominium association); id. § 9:1145 et seq. (2018) (privileges in favor of an
association of property owners); id. § 9:4870 (2007) (privileges arising from work
on oil, gas, and water wells); id. § 47:1577 (2004) (general privileges securing
state tax obligations). Some statutes grant the special privileges they create full or
partial priority over pre-existing encumbrances. See, e.g., id. § 30:2205(F) (2020).
536. Exceptions to the recordation requirement apply to a number of other
privileges on immovables as well. For instance, some of the general privileges
established by the Civil Code, such as those securing funeral charges and expenses
of the last illness, are effective against third persons without any recordation at
all. See LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19 (1921); see also Joseph Dainow, Civil Code
and Related Subjects: Security Devices, 22 LA. L. REV. 322, 323 (1962) (“The socalled ‘public records’ doctrine has taken such a strong hold on the minds of the
legal profession that, with the aid of a little wishful thinking and a lot of legal
pyro-techniques, there develops a blind spot which refuses to see the established
exceptions.”).
537. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4820(A).
538. Id. § 9:4822.
539. Id. § 9:4821.
540. Gleissner v. Hughes, 95 So. 529 (La. 1922).
541. Act No. 229, 1916 La. Acts 494.
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of 1913542 provided that “[n]o mortgage or privilege on immovable
property shall affect third persons, unless recorded or registered in the
parish where the property is situated, in the manner and within the time as
is now or may be prescribed by law.”543 The Court held that, although the
privileges asserted by the Private Works Act claimants certainly could not
affect third persons unless recorded, the constitutional provision left to the
legislature the determination of the manner and time within which the
privileges must be recorded in order to bind third persons. Citing article
3274 of the Civil Code as an example of another instance in which the
legislature had allowed a delay for recording a privilege, the Court held
that the 1916 Act was simply an enlargement of the filing period otherwise
provided in the general rule expressed in article 3274.
Four years later, the Court in Capital Building & Loan Association v.
Carter followed Gleissner.544 Citing its earlier holding in Gleissner and
the analogous provision of the Constitution of 1921,545 the Court held that
“[u]nder this provision a lien or privilege may affect third persons during
the period in which it is not of record, if, eventually, it is recorded in the
manner and within the time prescribed by law.”546 The Court found that
the 30-day filing requirement that existed under the 1922 predecessor to
the Private Works Act applied and that, because the materialmen did not
file within it, they held no privilege on the property. Because the Court
held that the materialmen had no privilege, what it said about the effect
against third persons of unfiled privileges during the period prescribed for
their filing might rightly be considered dicta; however, that objection
cannot be raised to the nearly contemporaneous holding of the Court in
542. LA. CONST. art. 186 (1913).
543. The identical provision had been contained in article 176 of the 1879
Constitution and later appeared in article XIX, section 19, of the 1921
Constitution. This provision was continued in force as a statute following the
adoption of the Constitution of 1974 and still exists as statutory law today as
article XIX, section 19, of the Constitution Ancillaries.
544. Capital Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Carter, 113 So. 886 (La. 1927). Under the
facts of the case, a lot owner, acting as his own contractor, erected a residence on
the lot using materials supplied by two materialmen. After completion, he sold
the property to a building and loan association, which immediately resold the
property to a third person, retaining a vendor’s privilege that was timely recorded.
Three months after completion, the materialmen filed claims under the 1922
predecessor to the Private Works Act, which generally provided for a 30-day lien
filing period but was unclear as to what the filing period was in the case of a work
performed by the owner himself.
545. LA. CONST. art. XIX, § 19 (1921).
546. Capital Bldg. & Loan Ass’n 113 So. 886, 888 (La. 1927) (emphasis
added).
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Central Lumber Co. v. Schroeder,547 in which the materialman did in fact
file within the 30-day filing period. According to the Court, “[s]ince the
privilege was recorded within the time and in the manner prescribed by
law, it affected third persons during the period in which it was not of
record.”548 As authority for this proposition, the Court cited the
constitutional provision as well as its prior holdings in both the Gleissner
and the Capital Building & Loan Association cases.549 Professor Daggett
interprets these holdings as establishing the principle that the legislature
has the prerogative of prescribing the time within which privileges on
immovables must be recorded, and, if a privilege is recorded within the
prescribed time, it is effective against third persons during the period of
time that it is not of record.550 Interestingly, this line of cases impresses
upon the 1870 Code a meaning that was explicitly stated in the 1825
Code551 but was removed in the 1870 revision, which substituted in place
of that explicit statement a provision, found in present article 3273, that
privileges are valid against third persons from the date of the recording of
the act or evidence of the indebtedness.552
As the Private Works Act existed before the 2019 revision, most
privileges arising under it took effect against third persons from the earlier
to occur of the commencement of work or the filing of notice of contract,
provided that statements of claim or privilege were later filed within the
filing periods provided in the Act.553 This rule was unchanged under the
547. Central Lumber Co. v. Schroeder, 114 So. 644 (La. 1927).
548. Id. at 646 (emphasis added).
549. Though not cited in any of the Supreme Court decisions discussed above,
the Orleans Court of Appeal had previously reached a similar holding based upon
nearly identical reasoning. Pratt v. Damon Castle Hall Co., 2 Pelt. 67, 70 (Orleans
Ct. App. 1918). Ruling on the effectiveness of a paving lien recorded within the
60-day period allowed for its recordation, the court analogized to article 3274 and
held that “[t]he property was also affected with the privilege, without recordation,
as regards third persons during sixty days after the issuance of the certificate,
because the law, by its very letter, accorded the contractor these sixty days within
which to record his privilege.” Id. at 72–73 (emphasis added).
550. See DAGGETT, supra note 13, § 72, at 296–321.
551. Articles 3240 and 3241 of the 1825 Code provided that a privilege was
valid against third persons from the date of the act if recorded within a specified
period of time. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3240–3241 (1825).
552. See generally Wheelright v. St. Louis, N.O. & Ocean Canal Transp. Co.,
17 So. 133 (1895). That change might, however, be explained by the fact that the
1870 Code originally shortened the period for recording a privilege to the very
day on which the contract giving rise to the privilege was entered into; thus, there
was no need for the provision on retroactivity of a timely filing.
553. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4820(A) (2019).
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2019 revision,554 although the filing periods themselves were slightly
altered, as discussed earlier in this Article.555 Thus, the Private Works Act
continues to constitute an exception to the general rules set forth in Civil
Code article 3274, and the act adopting the 2019 revision recognizes both
this specific exception and the existence of other exceptions through the
addition of a sentence to that article specifically stating that its provisions
are subject to exceptions provided by legislation.556
Not all privileges arising under the Private Works Act are, however,
effective against third persons retroactively to the commencement of
work. The 2019 revision continued to provide two exceptions to that
general rule. First, privileges in favor of architects, engineers, and
surveyors have no effect as to third persons acquiring rights in the
immovable before their statements of claim or privilege are filed.557 The
second exception applies in the case of privileges established by the Act
in favor of those engaged in site preparatory work. Those privileges also
have no effect against third persons until a statement of claim or privilege
preserving them is filed.558 These exceptions effectively subordinate
Private Works Act privileges held by professional consultants and
subconsultants, as well as those arising from site preparatory work, to
mortgages that may be filed between the commencement of work and the
filing of the claimant’s statement of claim or privilege, and they also cause
the loss of those privileges if the immovable is sold before a statement of
claim or privilege is filed. These exceptions do not, however, affect the
ranking of those Private Works Act privileges against other privileges
arising under the Act. Once Private Works Act privileges are properly
preserved and made effective against third persons through the filing of a

554. Id. § 9:4820(A) (2020).
555. Id. § 9:4822(A)–(D).
556. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3274 (2020).
557. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4820(D). Prior to the 2019 revision, this rule,
which has existed since at least the 1922 Act, was found in Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4822(D)(1)(b). See Act No. 139, §12, 1922 La. Acts 290. The 2019
revision expanded the rule to apply to all professional consultants and
subconsultants, rather than only those engaged directly by the owner.
558. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4808(C). The same rule applied prior to the 2019
revision. Site preparatory work is also deemed to be a separate work to the extent
it is not a part of the contractor’s work. Id. This means that in most cases the filing
period for privileges arising out of site preparatory work will commence to run
following completion of the preparatory work, rather than completion of the entire
project.
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statement of claim or privilege, they are entitled to the ranking given them
by the Act, as discussed in Section VII.B below.559
B. Ranking of Private Works Act Privileges Against Other Encumbrances
upon the Immovable
The date that privileges arising under the Act become effective against
third persons is an important factor in the determination of their ranking
against other encumbrances, but it is not wholly dispositive. The 2019
revision did not change the basic ranking rules of the Act. Essentially,
laborer’s privileges have priority over all mortgages and other privileges,
except privileges securing certain enumerated charges owed to
governmental bodies. Other privileges arising under the Act are likewise
subordinate to privileges securing those governmental charges, and they
are also subordinate to mortgages and vendor’s privileges that became
effective as to third persons before those Private Works Act privileges
become effective as to third persons. In other words, privileges arising
under the Act in favor of claimants other than laborers are superior to all
mortgages and vendor’s privileges except those that were effective as to
third persons prior to the commencement of work or filing of notice of
contract.560 The 2019 revision made no substantive change in these rules.
559. Id. § 9:4821.
560. As it existed immediately before the 1981 revision, privileges arising
under the Act were ranked behind those bona fide mortgages and vendor’s
privileges that had been “duly recorded before the work or labor is begun.” Act
No. 298, 1926 La. Acts 552, 559 (quoted in Hortman-Salmen Co. v. White, 123
So. 709, 710 (La. 1929)). Thus, actual recordation of a mortgage at the moment
of commencement of the work was the paramount consideration. A few years
before the 1981 revision of the Private Works Act, the court in American Bank &
Trust Co. in Monroe v. F & W Construction, Inc., was presented with the issue of
the ranking of Private Works Act privileges against a collateral mortgage that had
been recorded before commencement of work but without contemporaneous
pledge of the collateral note. 357 So. 2d 1226 (La. Ct. App. 2d Cir. 1978).
Construing the law in effect at the time, the court held that the collateral mortgage
under these circumstances was not a bona fide mortgage that would prime
privileges arising out of work begun before the collateral note was pledged.
Mindful of this holding, the redactors of the 1981 revision of the Private Works
Act changed the ranking rule to provide that Private Works Act privileges—other
than those in favor of laborers—are inferior to mortgages and vendor’s privileges
“that are effective against third persons before the privileges granted by [the Act]
are effective.” LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821 (1982). For a discussion of the
application of this rule under the 1981 Act, see Rubin, supra note 58, at 610. Since
the time of the 1981 Act, the legislature has codified the rules governing when a
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What has changed in the 2019 revision is the manner in which the Act
presents these ranking rules. Before the 2019 revision, the 1981 Act set
forth, in schematic style, a single hierarchy of all possible competing
encumbrances, including privileges arising under the Act.561 For those
yearning for simplicity, nothing could have been more clear. One problem,
however, was that many lawyers and even some judges were sometimes
tempted to look to the ranking provision of the Private Works Act, rather
than the Civil Code and other relevant authority, to resolve ranking
problems, even where no Private Works Act privilege was involved.562
Another problem was that the ranking scheme under the 1981 revision was
based, at its foundation, upon the invalid premise that, as a rule, mortgages
outrank all privileges other than vendor’s privileges and Private Works
Act privileges. Indeed, as discussed above, the general rule of ranking
privileges against mortgages is the opposite.563
Yet another problem was that this schematic chart of priorities had the
effect of reordering priorities in certain cases, based on the fortuity of
whether a Private Works Act privilege existed. Suppose, for instance, that
long before any work is undertaken, a homeowner becomes delinquent on
dues owed to his homeowners’ association, which files a sworn detailed
statement of its claim in the mortgage records in order to preserve its
privilege. Later, a mortgage is recorded. Unquestionably, the
homeowners’ association’s privilege has priority over the mortgage.564
Now suppose that, while this state of facts exists, the homeowner hires a
laborer to make repairs to his residence and fails to pay $100 in wages
owed to the laborer, who then files a statement of claim or privilege under
the Private Works Act. Under the law in effect prior to the 2019 revision,
the ranking of the homeowners’ association’s privilege against the
collateral mortgage becomes effective against third persons. LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 9:5551 (2007). On the ranking issue, the 2019 revision makes no change in the
law and retains nearly the identical wording that was found in the 1981 Act.
561. This ranking scheme was an innovation of the 1981 Act. Previous law did
not purport to rank all mortgages and privileges against each other but instead
provided that privileges arising under the Act were superior to all other mortgages
and privileges, except for mortgages and vendor’s privileges recorded before
work began. See Act No. 298, 1926 La. Acts 552.
562. See, e.g., Brandner v. New Orleans Office Supply Center, Inc., 654 So.
2d 858 (La. Ct. App. 4th Cir. 1995) (Schott, C.J., concurring).
563. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3186, 3269, and 3274 (2020). See, e.g., Devron
v. His Creditors, 11 La. Ann. 482 (1856) (holding that, in cases where the
movables and unencumbered immovables of a debtor are insufficient to pay the
general privileges, they are paid from the properties subject to mortgages,
beginning with the least ancient and descending to the most ancient).
564. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:1145–48 (2018).

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 115

10/12/20 7:07 AM

1104

LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 80

mortgage was instantly reordered: the laborer had first priority, and the
homeowners’ association’s privilege was reordered behind the mortgage,
based on the fortuity of the existence of a Private Works Act privilege.
One advantage to the ranking scheme of the 1981 Act was that its allinclusive hierarchical ranking minimized the instances of circular
priorities. This advantage came with a price, however, in the form of the
reordering of priorities that would otherwise have existed.565
The 2019 revision takes the approach that it is not the province of the
Private Works Act to resolve the ranking of all competing encumbrances
upon an immovable, particularly where no Private Works Act privilege is
at issue. Instead, the ranking rules of the Act are limited in their scope to
ranking privileges arising under the Act against other encumbrances and
among themselves. Under the 2019 revision, a Private Works Act privilege
continues to rank behind those privileges securing enumerated
governmental charges. As a general rule, Private Works Act privileges
rank ahead of all other privileges and ahead of all mortgages. The
exception to this general rule is that a Private Works Act privilege, other
than one in favor of a laborer, is inferior to mortgages and vendor’s
privileges that became effective as to third persons before the Private
Works Act privilege becomes effective as to third persons. Substantively,
this is the identical rule that was in effect before the 2019 revision.
As discussed in Section VII.A, the date that Private Works Act
privileges become effective as to third persons is governed by the Act
itself.566 It is not always a simple matter to determine from the public
records when competing encumbrances become effective as to third
persons. For instance, a collateral mortgage does not become effective as
to third persons until the later to occur of registry of the collateral
mortgage or the perfection of a security interest in the collateral mortgage
note.567 Thus, the public records alone will usually not be a reliable

565. This advantage will be in some cases sacrificed, at least in theory if not
in practicality, under the ranking rules of the 2019 revision. In the example given
above, a vicious circle would exist if, instead of a laborer, a contractor had filed a
statement of claim or privilege under the Act. The contractor would outrank the
homeowners’ association but not the mortgagee, and the mortgagee would
outrank the homeowners’ association.
566. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4808(C), 9:4822(A), (D) (2020).
567. Id. § 9:5551 (2007). See discussion supra note 560. In contrast, it is clear
that a mortgage securing future advances has effect as to third persons from the
moment of recordation, even if nothing is secured by the mortgage at that time.
See KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Perkins Rowe Associates, LLC, 823 F. Supp. 2d 399
(M.D. La. 2011).

346780-LSU_80-4_Text.indd 116

10/12/20 7:07 AM

2020]

REWORKING LOUISIANA’S PRIVATE WORKS ACT

1105

indicator of the date that a collateral mortgage takes effect against third
persons.
In the case of a vendor’s privilege, a lack of clarity in the law exists.
Suppose that, on a Friday afternoon, a closing occurs in which a purchaser
acquires an immovable under an act of credit sale that is not recorded in
the conveyance or mortgage records until the following Monday morning.
In the meantime, on Saturday, a contractor hired by the new owner begins
work for the construction of a building upon the immovable. The roofing
subcontractor, who is not paid for work performed many months later,
timely files a statement of claim or privilege within the filing period
following substantial completion of the work. In a ranking dispute between
this subcontractor and the unpaid vendor, it is not certain who would
prevail. The vendor’s privilege was timely filed within the seven-day
window provided by Civil Code article 3274, but it was not of record at
the moment work began. What is unclear under the law is whether the
vendor’s privilege was effective as to third persons from the time of
execution of the act of credit sale, given that the act of credit sale was
ultimately filed in a timely manner, or only from the date on which filing
occurred. In the former case, the vendor’s privilege would outrank the
subcontractor’s privilege, but in the latter case, it would be the
subcontractor who would have priority. Convincing arguments can be
made to support either position.568
The date on which a Private Works Act privilege is preserved by the
filing of a claimant’s statement of claim or privilege usually does not affect
its ranking against other encumbrances. Most privileges under the Act take
effect against third persons, and therefore enjoy ranking, based on the date
work commenced or notice of contract was filed, not based on the date of
filing of the statement of claim or privilege.569
The 2019 revision retained, but significantly clarified, a special
ranking rule that had been contained in the Private Works Act since
1966.570 This rule, which is now found in Louisiana Revised Statutes
§ 9:4820(B), applies only to works for the addition, modification, or repair
568. For a detailed analysis of this ranking issue, see Cromwell, supra note 31,
at 1238–48.
569. There are exceptions to this rule in the case of privileges arising from site
preparatory work and privileges in favor of professional consultants and
subconsultants. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4808(C), 9:4820(D).
570. Act No. 507, 1966 La. Acts 1062, enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:4819(A)(2). See also LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4820 cmt. b (2007) (explaining
that the 1981 revision incorporated the substance of this provision as § 9:4820(B)
but made significant clarifications concerning the effect of the rules originally set
forth in the former provision).
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of an existing structure, and then only if no notice of contract is filed with
respect to the work. The rule provides that when work is suspended for 30
days or more on such a project,571 that part of the work performed before
the suspension is deemed, for ranking purposes only, to constitute a
separate work from that part performed after work resumes.
Consistent with this concept, Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4820(B),
as modified by the 2019 revision, specifies that a claimant572 who is
entitled to a privilege with respect to work performed before the
suspension must file a statement of claim or privilege within 60 days after
the onset of the suspension in order to maintain his priority over a
mortgage or other right that became effective as to third persons after work
initially began.573 If he does not do so, the mortgage or other right will
have priority over his privilege, even as to work performed before the
suspension. Regardless of whether he does so, the mortgage will in any
event have priority over any privilege arising in the claimant’s favor from
work performed after work resumes; this is consistent with the concept
that the work before the suspension is deemed to be separate from that
performed after the suspension, but only for the purposes of ranking the
rights of third persons who acquired rights in the immovable before work
resumes.
Where Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4820(B) applies, it is not
imperative for a claimant to file a statement of claim or privilege within
60 days after the onset of the suspension of work; he is permitted to file
within the normal filing period following substantial completion or
abandonment of the entire work and, by doing so, will preserve his
privilege upon the immovable and his claims against the owner,
contractor, and surety. But if he waits to file, he risks losing the priority of
571. Under the statute, a work is considered suspended if the cost of the work
done, in labor and materials, is less than $100 during a period of 30 days or more.
See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4820(B)(1) (2020).
572. Because laborer’s privileges arising under the Act always have priority
over mortgages and other privileges, they do not risk a loss of priority to an
intervening mortgage when there is a 30-day cessation of work. See id. §§
9:4820(B)(2), 9:4821(A)(2).
573. It should be noted that, if the claimant files a statement of claim or
privilege within 60 days after the onset of the suspension of work, he will not only
preserve his priority over an intervening mortgage, but the existence of the
intervening mortgage will cause him to achieve priority over Private Works Act
privileges—other than laborer’s privileges—of those pre-suspension claimants
who elect to defer filing until the substantial completion or abandonment of the
project, as well as the privileges of all non-laborer claimants arising from postresumption work. See id. § 9:4821(C).
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his privilege to a mortgagee or other third person who acquires rights in
the immovable at any point after work initially began and before it
resumes.574
It is likely that the identical rules were intended by Louisiana Revised
Statutes § 9:4820(B) as it existed before the 2019 revision;575 however, the
meaning of the former provision was certainly not easy to grasp from
reading its text, which did not appear to convey completely or accurately
the concepts that the official revision comment576 ascribed to it.577 Only a
574. Moreover, as will be discussed more fully in Section VII.D below, he also
risks having his privilege become subordinate to the privileges of those Private
Works Act claimants who do elect to file within 60 days after the onset of the
suspension of work in order to maintain their own priority over an intervening
mortgage. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821(C).
575. Before the 2019 revision, § 9:4820(B) provided as follows:
If the work is for the addition, modification, or repair of an existing
building or other construction, that part of the work performed before a
third person’s rights become effective shall, for the purposes of R.S.
9:4821, be considered a distinct work from the work performed after
such rights become effective if the cost of the work done, in labor and
materials, is less than one hundred dollars during the thirty-day period
immediately preceding the time such third person’s rights become
effective as to third persons.
576. Comment (b) to former § 9:4820(B) stated as follows:
Subsection B incorporates the substance of former R.S. 9:4819A(2). It
clarifies certain aspects of the former provision. This section is irrelevant
if a notice of contract for a work has been previously filed since under
Subsection A(1) such filing fixes the effectiveness of the privileges as to
all work done under its terms. In the absence of a filed contract, if a work
of repair or renovation is suspended for more than thirty days, then as to
third persons acquiring rights in or over the immovable (including
mortgages) that part of the work done prior to the thirty day period will
be considered a separate work from that conducted thereafter. The
former law was unclear as to the effect of the previous work. If persons
performing such work file their claims within sixty days of the date the
prior activities cease they will enjoy priority over subsequent mortgages
in the same manner as if the work had been completed. The provisions
do not prevent them from awaiting final completion of the work to file
their claims, but they may lose priority over intervening rights acquired
during the time the work is temporarily suspended. Furthermore, the
existence of such prior activity and the filing of claims for it will not give
retroactive effect to work performed after the suspension ends insofar as
the rights of third persons may have intervened.
577. First, from the text of former § 9:4820(B), it was not apparent that the
provision applied only when notice of contract had not been filed. Second, the
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single reported case cited the provision, finding it to be completely
inapplicable to the facts before the court,578 and commentary on the
meaning of the provision was sparse.579 The 2019 revision more clearly
states the limited applicability of the provision to projects on existing
structures for which no notice of contract is filed, its limited effect for
ranking purposes only, and the filing options available to a claimant who
has performed work on such a project before the onset of a suspension.
C. Ranking of Private Works Act Privileges Against Uniform
Commercial Code Security Interests
Prior to the 2019 revision of the Private Works Act, there was little
opportunity for a privilege arising under the Act to come into competition
with a security interest created under Chapter 9 of the Uniform
Commercial Code (UCC).580 The former operated exclusively upon
immovables; the latter upon movables. It was, and is, certainly possible
for goods subject to a Chapter 9 security interest to become component
revision comment envisioned that suspension of work for any discreet 30-day
period would cause a loss of priority as to all third persons who may have acquired
rights in the immovable, but the text of the provision seemed to describe a period
that was relative to the time that a specific third person acquired rights in the
immovable. Finally, the revision comment indicated that a claimant had a choice
as to when to file a statement of claim or privilege for amounts accruing prior to
the suspension: either file within 60 days from the onset of the suspension, and
thereby preserve the priority of his privilege over intervening rights of third
persons, or file within the normal filing period following the end of the resumed
work, in which event he would lose his priority over the rights of those third
persons. The requirement of filing within 60 days after the commencement of the
suspension might have been inferred from the statement that that the presuspension work was deemed to be a “distinct” work, but it was certainly not clear
from the text of the provision that a claimant could await completion of the work
and then file, preserving his priority over the rights of third persons other than
“intervening rights acquired during the time the work is temporarily suspended.”
LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4820 cmt. (b) (2007).
578. KeyBank Nat’l Ass’n v. Perkins Rowe Associates, LLC, 823 F. Supp. 2d
399, 412 (M.D. La. 2011).
579. Rubin, supra note 58, at 584; Tate, supra note 337, 135–36.
580. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-101 et seq. (2016). It was, and is, however,
possible for a Private Works Act privilege to attach to a thing that is made
immovable only by declaration under Civil Code article 467. See Tate, supra note
337, at 141. But in that event, the thing that has been declared to be immovable
would become a component part of the immovable and therefore a fixture as
defined in Chapter 9 of the UCC, and it would be subject to the fixture priority
rule of Chapter 9. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-334.
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parts of an immovable, or “fixtures” as they are known in the parlance of
the UCC.581 In that event, the security interest in the goods is lost, unless
the secured party made a fixture filing before the goods became
immobilized. Where the secured party does so, Chapter 9 contains a
ranking rule582 to rank the security interest that continues in the fixtures
against the claims of “encumbrancers” of the immovable, such as the
holder of a privilege upon the immovable.583
As discussed in Section III.G, the 2019 revision, by expanding the
definition of the term “immovable” as used in the Act,584 extended the
reach of privileges arising under the Act to include not only land and
buildings, but also other constructions that are permanently attached to the
ground and that would be classified by law as immovable if they belonged
to the landowner. When these other constructions are owned by someone
other than the landowner, such as a lessee or holder of a servitude, they
are characterized as movables under property law585 and usually as
equipment under the UCC.586 Of course, this presents the possibility that
these other constructions may already be encumbered by Chapter 9
security interests before Private Works Act privileges arise or may become
encumbered by Chapter 9 security interests afterward. Chapter 9’s ranking
rule applicable to fixtures is not useful to rank a Chapter 9 security interest
in these other constructions against Private Works Act privileges because
fixtures are by definition goods that have become component parts of an
immovable,587 and these other constructions—being movable—are clearly
not component parts of the immovable.588
The 2019 revision added a ranking rule to cover this isolated sphere
of competition between privileges arising under the Act and Chapter 9
security interests. A Private Works Act privilege that attaches to
movables—that is, to permanently attached constructions other than
buildings when those other constructions are owned by someone who is
not the owner of the ground—is inferior to a Chapter 9 security interest
that was perfected before the privilege became effective against third
persons or that is later perfected by a financing statement that was filed

581. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-102(a)(41).
582. Id. § 10:9-334.
583. Id. § 10:9-102(a)(32).
584. Id. § 9:4810(4) (2020).
585. LA. CIV. CODE art. 475 (2020); see also LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 464 cmt.
d (2010).
586. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 10:9-102(a)(33) (2016).
587. Id. § 10:9-102(a)(41).
588. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 463, 475.
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before the privilege became effective against third persons.589 As
explained in Section VII.A, the date that a Private Works Act privilege
becomes effective against third persons is usually dependent on when
work begins or when notice of contract is filed in the mortgage records,
rather than on when a statement of claim or privilege is filed.590 The date
that a security interest is perfected is, of course, a matter governed
exclusively by Chapter 9 of the UCC.591
This priority rule allows a secured party with a Chapter 9 security
interest the benefit of the first-to-file-or-perfect rule that generally applies
under Chapter 9,592 provided that the secured party enjoys either
continuous filing or perfection from the date that it first filed or perfected
and provided that that date precedes the date on which competing Private
Works Act privileges become effective as to third persons.593 Of course,
the ranking rule applies only to rank the secured party’s security interest
in the movable construction against the Private Works Act claimant’s
privilege in the same movable construction. The secured party has no
security interest in the immovable itself. The Private Works Act claimant’s
privilege upon the immovable, and upon the lease or real right allowing
the movable construction to exist on the immovable, would therefore not
be subject to the security interest, regardless of when it became perfected.
D. Ranking of Private Works Act Privileges Among Themselves
The Private Works Act provides that the privileges it creates rank
among themselves according to a specified hierarchy based upon their
nature. Laborer’s privileges have the highest priority, followed by the
privileges of subcontractors, sellers, and lessors, all of which have equal
ranking behind that of laborers. Those accorded the lowest tier of ranking
include contractors, professional consultants, and professional
589. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821(D) (2020).
590. Id. § 9:4820(A). For exceptions to this rule, see id. §§ 9:4808(C),
9:4820(D).
591. See id. §§ 10:9-308 et seq. (2016). A Chapter 9 security interest is not
perfected by a filing in the local mortgage records but rather by the filing of a
financing statement in the UCC records of any parish clerk of court or, if the
debtor is located in another state, by a filing with the proper filing office in that
other state. See id. §§ 10:9-301(1), 10:9-501(a)(4).
592. See id. § 10:9-322(a)(1).
593. As comment (g) to Louisiana Revised Statutes§ 9:4821 indicates, the
statute creating privileges for labor, services, or supplies provided in connection
with oil, gas, and water wells contains a similar rule to rank those privileges
against Chapter 9 security interests. See id. § 9:4870(B)(3) (2007).
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subconsultants.594 This hierarchy did not change with the 2019 revision,
but the revision did fill a gap that had been created by a prior legislative
amendment. As discussed in Section III.I, the legislature in 1989 amended
Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4802 by adding a paragraph (A)(5), which
granted a claim and privilege to surveyors, engineers, and architects
engaged by a contractor and their professional subconsultants.595
Apparently through inadvertence, the legislature failed to amend the
ranking provision at the same time to provide a ranking for this newly
created privilege. Under a literal application of the ranking statute as it
existed before the 2019 revision, this privilege would rank behind those of
all other Private Works Act claimants, including the contractor and
surveyors, engineers, and architects engaged by the owner. The 2019
revision cured this apparent oversight by ranking the privileges of all
professional consultants and subconsultants equally, regardless of whether
they are engaged by the owner or contractor.596
When privileges arise under the Private Works Act from two or more
successive works, an interesting ranking question arises: do privileges
from the work that commences first outrank those arising from later
works? Because privileges arising from the first work are effective as to
third persons before those arising from later works, temptation exists to
reach the conclusion that privileges arising from the first work must
necessarily have priority.597 That conclusion would be based upon the
unspoken premise that privileges, like mortgages, rank in order of
effectiveness against third persons. That premise is, however, untrue: as
mentioned above, privileges as a rule rank among themselves according to
their nature, rather than according to the order of their filing or
effectiveness as to third persons, and privileges of the same nature rank
concurrently.598 Nothing in the Private Works Act, either before or after
the 2019 revision, provides otherwise with respect to the ranking of one
Private Works Act privilege against another.599
594. The privilege of surveyors, engineers, and architects has ranked equally
with that of the contractor since at least 1922. See Act No. 139, 1922 La. Acts 290.
595. Act No. 41, 1989 La. Acts 287.
596. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821(B)(3) (2020).
597. There are apparently no reported cases that have addressed this issue. In
her treatise, Professor Daggett, without citation to authority, makes the
observation that privileges arising from one work will “naturally” outrank those
arising from a later work. See DAGGETT, supra note 13, §71, at 295.
598. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3187–88 (2020).
599. The Private Works Act does provide otherwise with respect to the issue
of the ranking of privileges arising under the Act against vendor’s privileges and
other types of privileges. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4821(A).
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Before the 2019 revision, the text of the Act did not specifically
address this issue, though one of the official revision comments to the Act
observed that “all claims of materialmen, subcontractors and lessors of
movables rank equally (whether or not they arise out of the same work)
and ahead of the privilege of the contractor and surveyors, architects, and
engineers which also rank equally.”600 With the 2019 revision, this rule is
made express in the text of the law itself.601
Nevertheless, in order to resolve a vicious circle that would sometimes
result from a strict application of this rule, the revision includes an
exception. Suppose that between the time of commencement of one work
and the time of commencement of a later work on the same immovable, a
mortgage is filed. Later, subcontractors from each of the two works file
statements of claim or privilege. For the reasons just mentioned, the two
subcontractors would ordinarily rank equally, even though they were
involved with different works begun at different times. Of the two
subcontractors, however, only the one involved with the first work would
have priority over the mortgage. In this case, the Act includes a rule that
resolves the vicious circle that would otherwise arise: because the first
subcontractor has priority over the mortgage, he also has priority over all
Private Works Act privileges that are subordinate to the mortgage.602 Thus,
under these circumstances, priority would go to the privilege of the
subcontractor from the first work, followed by the mortgage, followed by
the privilege of the subcontractor from the second work. This example
demonstrates the importance of the definition of a “work.”603 If there had
been only a single work that commenced before the mortgage was filed,
rather than two successive works with an intervening mortgage, the
privileges of both subcontractors would outrank the mortgage and would
rank equally between themselves.
VIII. CHANGES TO THE CIVIL CODE
The articles of the Civil Code providing for construction privileges
remained unaltered for nearly a century after the legislature’s enactment
600. Id. § 9:4821 cmt. b (2007).
601. Id. § 9:4821(B) (2020) (“[T]he privileges granted by this Part rank among
themselves in the following order of priority, regardless of whether they arise
from the same work or different works and regardless of the dates on which the
privileges become effective as to third persons.” (emphasis added)).
602. Id. § 9:4821(C).
603. Id. § 9:4808(A) (“a single continuous project for the improvement,
construction, erection, reconstruction, modification, repair, demolition, or other
physical change of an immovable”).
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of legislation effectively superseding them. As mentioned in Section I.D,
the 1926 Act purported to exhaust the subject matter and to repeal all
conflicting laws, including inconsistent provisions of the Civil Code.604
Despite their continued presence in the Civil Code, these articles have
truly been “dead letters,” as the courts have held that they were impliedly
repealed by the 1926 Act, even in the case of provisions not inherently in
conflict with that Act.605
The 2019 revision recognized this reality by expressly repealing the
entirety of Civil Code articles 2772, 2773, 2774, 2775, 2776, 3268, and
3272.606 A number of other articles, however, contemplated the existence
of the privileges created by the repealed articles but could not themselves
be repealed outright. In those instances, the articles were modified to
eliminate references to construction privileges created by the Civil
Code.607 In several of these modified articles, a reference to special
privileges created by legislation was substituted. This reference would, of
course, encompass privileges arising under the Private Works Act, all of
which are special privileges.608
The revision of Civil Code article 3267 forced the legislature to
address two apparent errors that have existed in that article since the
adoption of the 1825 Civil Code. Prior to the revision, the article provided
that, if the movables of a debtor were insufficient to satisfy vendor’s
privileges and construction privileges, those special privileges would be
satisfied before most general privileges. As Professor Joseph Dainow
argued long ago, the word “movable” in the article should have been
“immovable.”609 When that substitution is read into the article, the
604. Act No. 298, §16, 1926 La. Acts 552.
605. See Robertshaw Controls Co. v. Pre-Engineered Products, Co., Inc., 669
F.2d 298 (5th Cir. 1982) (holding that the “stop payment” provision of Civil Code
article 2772 was impliedly repealed by the 1926 Act, even though the provision
was not inherently inconsistent with that Act).
606. Act No. 325, §3, 2019 La. Acts.
607. Act No. 325, §2, 2019 La. Acts, amending LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3249,
3267, 3269, and 3274. The amendment to article 3249 also repealed an
anachronistic privilege created under paragraph 4 of that article in favor of
persons working on the construction or repair of levees. The last reported case to
interpret that provision is Wheelright v. St. Louis, N.O. & Ocean Canal
Transportation Co., 19 So. 591 (La. 1896), which involved a claim by the sheriff
for the cost of heavy expenditures that he had incurred while the property was
under seizure in a suit instituted by the purported privileged creditor.
608. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3249, 3267, 3269 (2020).
609. Dainow, supra note 34. As Professor Dainow observes, the only other
Civil Code that appears to have replicated this error is the Civil Code of Argentina.
Id. at 378. The redactors of the Argentine Civil Code are known to have borrowed
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meaning of the article is that special privileges on immovables are paid in
preference to general privileges, other than those general privileges
specifically listed in the article. The 2019 revision corrected that error, and
the article now provides what was almost certainly intended from the
inception.
The other apparent error in the article had been noted, seemingly for
time immemorial, by an asterisk in the printed volume of the Revised
Statutes claiming the existence of an error in the English translation of the
French text and indicating that the word “debts” should be “creditors.”610
The Law Institute considered this claim of error but decided that the word
“debts” was appropriate because the things to which “debts” stand in
juxtaposition are “charges,” which are clearly themselves debts rather than
creditors.611 The Law Institute’s decision on this point is supported by the
language of the Projet of the 1825 Civil Code, which used the French word
“créances” rather than “créanciers” in the French version of the article,
while using “debts” in the English version.612 Because a créance is a debt,
and not a creditor, there was no inconsistency in the two versions
contained in the Projet. When the 1825 Code was actually adopted, the
error that crept in appears to have been made in the French, rather than the
English, version of the article. For these reasons, in the 2019 revision, a
conscious decision was made to leave the word “debts” in the article,
rather than substituting “creditors.”
As discussed in Section VII.A, the 2019 revision also amended Civil
Code article 3274, which provides the general rule that a privilege upon
an immovable is not effective as to third persons until recorded and enjoys
priority over mortgages only if recorded within a short window of time.
As amended, the article now recognizes that these rules are subject to
exceptions provided by legislation.613 The Private Works Act is itself an
example of legislation creating exceptions to the article.

provisions from the Louisiana Civil Code, among others. See Rolf Knutel,
Influences of the Louisiana Civil Code in Latin America, 70 TUL. L. REV. 1445,
1462 (1995–96).
610. The phrase in question reads: “in preference to other privileged debts of
the debtor, even funeral charges, except the charges for affixing seals, making
inventories, and others which may have been necessary to procure the sale of the
thing.”
611. Minutes of the April 27, 2018 Meeting of the Security Devices
Committee, Louisiana State Law Institute (May 3, 2018) (on file with the Law
Institute).
612. Projet of the Civil Code of Louisiana of 1825, p. 378.
613. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3274 (2020).
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IX. TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS OF THE 2019 REVISION
The 2019 revision became effective January 1, 2020, and it applies
prospectively to works begun on or after that date, other than those for
which notice of contract was filed before that date. With the limited
exceptions discussed below, the Act as it existed prior to the 2019 revision
will continue to apply even after January 1, 2020, to works that were begun
before that date or for which a notice of contract was filed before that
date.614
As mentioned in Section IV.D, one of the goals of the revision was to
promote the stability of land titles by providing an outer date for the filing
of statements of claim or privilege arising from works for which notice of
contract was filed. As discussed previously, under the Act as it existed
prior to the 2019 revision, where notice of contract was filed, the delays
for filing did not commence to run upon substantial completion of the
work but rather ran only from the date of filing a notice of termination. If
no notice of termination was filed, the filing period never expired. The
2019 revision changed this rule by imposing an outer deadline that is
reckoned from the date of substantial completion or abandonment of the
work, even in the absence of filing of a proper notice of termination.615
If the revision were wholly inapplicable to works begun before
January 1, 2020, the titles of immovables on which those works were
performed would not benefit from this curative effect, and the filing
periods applicable to those works would continue to remain open
indefinitely—until the owner actually files a notice of termination. To
address this, the revision provides a special outer filing date for works for
which a notice of contract was filed before January 1, 2020.616 If, in the
case of any such work, a notice of termination was also filed prior to
January 1, 2020, then the filing period already began to run at the time the
revision became effective, and the revision provides that the filing rules
under pre-revision law will continue to apply.617 This is so because the
application of those rules will be sufficient to bring about a prompt
termination of the filing period.
If, on the other hand, no notice of termination was filed before
January 1, 2020, the filing period clearly would not have commenced to
614. Act No. 325, §6, 2019 La. Acts.
615. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:4822(B)(2) (2020).
616. Act No. 325, §7, 2019 La. Acts. If no notice of contract is filed before
that date, then under the Act as it existed before the 2019 revision, the filing period
would run from the date of substantial completion or abandonment, and the
application of the new curative provision is unnecessary.
617. Act No. 325, §7(A), 2019 La. Acts.
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run under pre-revision law, even if the work was actually completed
months or even years earlier. For that reason, the revision provides two
special filing rules for those works. If the work was substantially
completed or abandoned before January 1, 2020, even though no notice of
termination was filed before that date, then claimants must file within the
filing period that would have applied under pre-revision law—that is, 30
or 60 days after the date that a notice of termination is ultimately filed,
depending upon the type of claimant—but in no event may the filing be
made later than July 31, 2020, in the case of a general contractor or later
than June 30, 2020, in the case of all other claimants.618 If the pre-existing
work was not completed or abandoned, and no notice of termination is
filed, until after January 1, 2020, the filing periods provided by the 2019
revision are simply made applicable, despite the general non-retroactivity
of the revision.619 The act adopting the 2019 revision specifically provides
that a failure to file within these periods causes the loss of the claimant’s
claim and privilege under the Private Works Act.620 Of course, contractual
rights would not be lost.
The effect of these rules is that, where a pre-existing work on a project
for which notice of contract was filed was substantially completed before
January 1, 2020, the filing period will in all events end no later than
July 31, 2020, for general contractors and no later than June 30, 2020, for
other claimants, even if no notice of termination is ever filed.621 This effect
will result whether substantial completion occurred at some point between
the adoption of the revision and its January 1, 2020, effective date or
whether substantial completion occurred many years earlier.
Another exception to the general rule of non-retroactivity exists in the
case of the rules ranking Private Works Act privileges among themselves
and against other encumbrances upon an immovable. Chaos would reign
if differing ranking regimes were allowed to rank encumbrances bearing
618. Act No. 325, §7(B), 2019 La. Acts.
619. Act No. 325, §7(C), 2019 La. Acts.
620. Act No. 325, §7(D), 2019 La. Acts.
621. Legislation enacted in response to the COVID-19 public health
emergency may have had the effect of extending one or both of these deadlines
slightly. See Act No. 162, §1, 2020 La. Acts, enacting LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
9:5828-30 (2020). In addition to extending prescriptive and peremptive periods
that would otherwise have expired on or before July 5, 2020, the legislation
ratified a gubernatorial proclamation that had suspended all “legal deadlines” until
at least April 13, 2020, without specifying the effect of the suspension or limiting
its reach to periods that would otherwise have expired during the period of
suspension.” See State of Louisiana, Executive Department, Proclamation
Number JBE 2020-30.
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upon the same property. Accordingly, the revision provides that the
changes to the ranking rules found in Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4821
are retroactive. There may be a rare case in which this retroactive
application of the ranking rules would deprive a claimant, mortgagee, or
other privilege holder of rights that have already vested. Both for reasons
of fairness and for the purpose of avoiding an unconstitutional impairment
of vested rights, the 2019 revision provides that the new ranking provision
is not to be applied retroactively where such application would cause the
divestiture of vested rights.622
The final instance of retroactivity involves the amendments that the
2019 revision made to Louisiana Revised Statutes § 9:4833.623 Apart from
purely stylistic changes, the revision effected two changes of substance in
that section. The first was the addition of a procedure allowing an owner
who is improperly named in a statement of claim or privilege to require
cancellation of the statement of claim or privilege insofar as it affects that
owner and his interest in the immovable.624 This procedure is made
available to owners who were improperly named under filings made with
respect to works that were begun before the effective date of the revision.
The other change was the addition of language making clear that the
recorder of mortgages is required to cancel a statement of claim or
privilege upon request when its effect has ceased for lack of timely filing
of a notice of pendency of action.625 In this instance as well, there is no
reason why this provision should not also be applied retroactively to preexisting works in order to facilitate the removal from the public records of
statements of claim or privilege that have lost their effectiveness against
third persons.
CONCLUSION
Doubtless, it remains as true today as in the time of Goethe that a
building should be properly situated, securely founded, and successfully
executed. But, as this Article has sought to demonstrate, it is equally
important that contractors, subcontractors, materials suppliers, equipment
lessors, laborers, professional consultants, and others who contribute to
the improvement of an immovable be compensated for their contributions.
Founded in the civil law’s “intelligent sense of justice”626 and shaped
through three major revisions amid countless legislative amendments,
622.
623.
624.
625.
626.
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Act No. 325, §9, 2019 La. Acts.
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City of Baltimore v. Parlange, 23 La. Ann. 365, 366 (1871).
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Louisiana’s Private Works Act has consistently promoted the basic policy
of protecting the rights of those persons to payment, while at the same time
delicately balancing the interests of owners, lenders, contractors, and other
persons having interests arising from private works.
As was the case with prior revisions of the Act, the impetus for the
2019 revision was a perception that piecemeal legislative amendments
over the years had generated confusion, inconsistencies, unintended
results, and pointless complexity. Toward the ends of removing confusion
and restoring the Act’s integrity and cohesiveness, the 2019 revision made
substantial progress, particularly through the use of more precise language
to achieve the results that are intended and the elimination of duplicative
or conflicting provisions. The 2019 revision also succeeded in eliminating
a number of unnecessary traps for unwary claimants, though, as pointed
out in the discussion above, it might have created one of its own for
residential claimants. Additionally, the 2019 revision represents a step
toward modernization of the law, particularly through its accommodation
of electronic means of communication. To the extent that one of its goals
was simplification, however, the 2019 revision can claim only marginal
success, for the Act remains nearly as complex as ever. Of course, this
complexity exists not merely for its own sake, but rather because of a
sentiment by those with an interest in the proper working of the Act that
complex rules are needed to achieve fairness under the multitude of
circumstances and claimants that it covers.
Earlier revisions of the Private Works Act were themselves followed
by innumerable legislative amendments, leading each time to a perception
of confusion and disorder beckoning for yet another revision. Likely, and
perhaps inevitably, proposals will continue to be made over the years to
come for further legislative changes to the Act. It is the authors’ hope that
this Article will serve as a useful resource not only in its discussion of the
changes that were made by the 2019 revision but also in its broader
treatment of the policies and mechanisms of the Private Works Act and its
significance in Louisiana law.
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